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ABSTRACT
BLACK ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE U.S.: AN HISTORICAL APPRAISAL,
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
(A Study in Demand for Entrepreneurship)
Robert K. B. Bofah
Submitted to the
Department of Urban Studies and Planning,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
on June 21, 1971
in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
The study is concerned with the development of entrepreneurship
at the grassroots level. A school of social scientists believes that
in the development of this type of entrepreneurship, "supply determi-
nants", i.e. socio-cultural factors and experience which determine
a subgroup's or individual's ability to perceive entrepreneurial
opportunities engendered in the process of economic development, are
more important than "demand determinants", i.e. governmental actions
and programs geared to entrepreneurial promotion. This study
however takes a contrary view that demand determinants are more
important. In support of this viewpoint, the entrepreneurial
experience of American Negroes is used as a frame of reference.
To evaluate the significance of socio-cultural and institutional
factors in the development of black entrepreneurship since the Civil
War, the Southern socio-economic environment, the attitude of the
Federal Government toward Negro economic progress, the impact of the
trade union movement and goals of race-advancement organizations are
examined. Our analysis shows that the hostile Southern environment,
the passive federal attitude toward black economic progress, and the
exclusion of most blacks from the mainstream of the trade union
movement militated against the development of black entrepreneurship.
What is more, black leaders failed to address themselves to the key
economic issues that would have enabled blacks to achieve economic
integration and progress.
To understand the contemporary characteristics and problems facing
black etrepreneurs, and to devise appropriate programs to assist them,
ii
i ii
52 black businesses in Boston, selected on the basis of "better
performance", are employed as a case study. The study identifies
seven types of enterprise and finds that they differ with respect
to employment levels, wage rates, extent of capitalization, use of
federal loans, physical assets, sales, insurance premiums, etc.
Among the entrepreneur's many problems, inadequate sources of
finance and employee-related problems are most pressing. It is
further discovered that as "organization-makers", they exhibit some
common characteristics, namely (1) they come from average Negro
homes; (2) most of them have had worthwhile work experience in the
white business sector; (3) 54% of them possess second businesses;
(4) they are less involved in community affairs; and (5) most of
them went into business for the purpose of reaping the fruit of their
own labor and making money.
Finally, in search for workable solutions to black business
problems, federal assistance programs for minority businesses are
evaluated, and it is concluded that overhauling of existing programs
is overdue and that the private sector has a crucial role to play.
Furthermore, it is argued that long range solutions should be con-
ceived within the framework of a national urban policy. On the basis
of the Boston survey, "incremental" solutions are proposed for tack-
ling such immediate problems as inadequate loans, poor fringe benefits
for employees, high cost of relocation and dual entrepreneurship.
Thesis supervisor: Lloyd Rodwin
Title: Professor of Land Economics
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The problem of reviving the economy of U.S. central cities appeals
to different constituencies and for different reasons. To local poli-
ticians, it boils down to finding all possible means of strengthening
the cities' economic bases so that reliance on federal aid may be
reduced to a minimum. State and national politicians are equally
concerned about the weakening economic bases, but in addition, politi-
cal pressures compel them to pay frequent attention to the rising
unemployment levels. To the large corporations, the central cities
will for the foreseeable future continue to be the bastion of
American capitalism. They realize that relocation of their businesses
in the suburbs and smaller cities will not provide them with a lasting
answer to ever-increasing operation costs, and consequently they deem
it advantageous to put to maximum use the accumulated inner-city
physical assets. At the extreme end of the ''interest continuum'' are
the urban blacks.2 To them, a return to the old rural South is an
anathema; they want to be urban dwellers and consequently demand
that a piece of the economic action be given to them.
1Robert L. Morris, "Downtown: The Pulse Strong or Weak?", Nation's
Cities, Vol. 5, No. 10 (1967), pp. 28-31.
2 1n this study, the word blacks will be used interchangeably with the
word Negroes. The author is aware of the preference different black
groups have for each of the two.
I
2A lot of debate rages over how best blacks could be brought into
the mainstream of American life. National consensus is lacking, for
as Anthony Downs rightly points out, ''our society abounds with
arrangements that provide special economic advantages to those who
are already privileged, presumably in order to evoke socially desired
behavior from them."3  In accordance with such entrenched arrangements,
and since the demands of economic powers in the society keep on mount-
ing with the passage of time, one begins to understand why economic
advantages cannot be easily bestowed on the underprivileged such as
the blacks and other minority groups.
The South has sought to justify the vestiges of slavery for over
a century, such that civil rights protests are regarded in the region
as unimportant or as an encroachment upon the privileges of whites.
The North, on the other hand, has merely tried to accommodate Negroes
who were considered aliens for several generations. Consequently,
the Northerners never addressed themselves to the Negro problem until
the devastating riots of Watts, Detroit and other cities took their
unprecedented tolls in the mid-sixties.
Social and economic pressures have built up to such a point that
the Negro problem can no more be relegated to a secondary importance.
While in 1860, almost all the nation's 4.4 million Negroes lived in
the rural South, by 1960 their number had increased to about 19
million, and were found in all the fifty states, although the
southern states contained 54% of them. They have also become more
3Anthony A. Downs, "Alternative Futures for the American Ghetto,"
Daedalus, Vol. 97, No. 4 (Fall, 1968), p. 1370.
3urbanized than rural. In the North and West, three-fourths of the
white population live in urban areas, but all the Negroes are
urbanized in the two regions. Even in the South, three out of every
five Negroes live in urban areas. For large metropolitan areas with
a population of one million and over, Negroes account for 25%,
compared with their 11% share of the total
major problem facing the nation
whom the urban economy is not f
elaborate this point, the rate
usually twice that of whites.
example, the unemployment rates
6.8% for blacks.6 Often offici
include those who are underempl
have stopped looking for jobs.
by the Department of Labor in 1
population. 5 Hence, a
is the rapid urbanization of the Negro
ully prepared to accommodate. To
of unemployment among Negroes is
In the first quarter of 1970, for
among whites was 3.8%, compared with
al figures on unemployment do not
oyed and those who out of frustration
In 1966, a special study conducted
ow-income neighborhoods of nine large
cities revealed that the number underemployed in these areas was two
and one-half times greater than the number unemployed. Altogether
the underemployment and unemployment rates were 32.7%. 7
TU.S. Dept. of Labor, The Negroes in the United States (Bulletin
No. 1511). Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., June 1966, p. 1.
5Laboratory for Environmental Studies, M.I.T., Ways of Providing New
and Improved Job Opportunities for the Urban Ghetto Poor. Cambridge,
December, 1968, p. 8.
6U.S. Dept. of Labor, Monthly Labor Review (June 1970), p. 96.
7The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of,
New Times Edition, 1968, p. 257.
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A cursory examination of the types of job normally available to
Negroes is equally disappointing. In 1965, they accounted for 4.7%
of white collar workers, 11.9% of blue collar workers, 14.7% of farm
workers and 26.3% of service workers, as compared with their share of
over 11% of the total population in that year. Being the last to be
employed and first to be fired, Negro workers have traditionally
commanded lower wages than whites, and it reflects the semi-skilled
or unskilled types of job the average Negro worker has an access to.
Comparing the top 20% of U.S. population with the bottom 20%,
Professor L. C. Thurow points out that since the last World War,
the gap between the two groups has widened from $8,600 to over $12,000,
and this implies that the gap between black and white families has
widened from $2,000 to over $3,000.9 He further remarks that in a
recession black incomes are approximately 50% of white's, increasing
to 60% in times of full employment.10 More startling are absolute
income earnings. In 1961, six out of every ten Negro families had
an income of less than $4,000 per year, but six out of every ten
white families earned above $4,000. Low quality job, job ceiling and
low income have conspired to victimize Negroes to the extent that
U.S. Dept. of Labor. The Negroes in the United States, op. cit.,
Table IIB-1, p. 107.
9 Lester C. Thurow, A Statement made at Hearings before the Joint
Economic Committee of the Congress of the U.S. on Employment and
Manpower Problems in the Cities: Implications of the Report of the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. 89th Congress, 2nd
session, May 28, 29, June 4, 5 and 6, 1968. Washington, D.C.:
U.S.G.P.0., 1968, p. 139.
10 Ibid.
5they cannot maintain middle-class standards as most whites do.
If discrimination in jobs were to be disregarded as a factor
contributing to low economic status of Negroes, it would seem that
their lower educational attainment has been a major set-back in pro-
curing good jobs. In 1964, 16% of Negro males aged twenty to
twenty-four had one or more years of college. Comparing this age
group with the same proportion of white males aged fifty-five to
sixty-four who received their college education thirty-five to forty
years ago, Ras
in educational
to disregard t
argument reduc
To a very
not favor the
Rockefellers,
always hope tc
hi Fein points out that a gap
attainment exists between whi
he question of discrimination
tio ad absurdum.
of over
tes and
in jobs
thirty-five years
blacks.11  But
makes the
large extent, the American socio-economic system does
dynasties of Lincolns, Roosevelts, Nixons, Fords,
etc., and whereas a hardworking average white can
improve his socio-economic position at some future
date, it is not always so for the average Negro. Indeed, Gunnar
Myrdal does not exaggerate when he describes the Negro problem as a
"class" and a "caste" problem.12 The basis for class differentia-
tion in the American society is that it favors wide differences in
wealth among families, while at the same time it disallows any system
1 1Rashi Fein, ''An Economic and Social Profile of the Negro American,''
in Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark (eds.), The Negro American.
Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965, p. 113.
12Gunnar Myrdal, The American Dilemma. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964
(paperback edition), chs. 9 and 10, pp. 205-229.
6of privileges and special treatment to be meted to specific groups.
Thus, in the face of discrimination in jobs, education and housing,
the political machinery has been ineffective in meeting the needs of
those groups victimized by discrimination, and the victims, notably
Negroes, Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans, are forced into the
lower class category.13 The "class problem" of Negroes is exacerbated
by the slave tradition with which they are associated. It is this
tradition which has created the Negro "caste problem." In general,
Negroes lack group solidarity, one of the common strategies minorities
in many societies employ to improve their socio-economic status.
A question frequently posed by concerned observers is whether
American Negroes can, within some limits, control their own economic
destiny, relying on such methods as group solidarity in running
community-owned enterprises, economic integration with the white
business sector through various job programs and individual entre-
preneurship. This work is purposely concerned with individual
entrepreneurship, a fertile but untapped means through which some
Negroes can upgrade their economic status.
Purpose and Scope of the Study
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that socio-cultural
factors alone do not determine entrepreneurial capabilities within a
nation or among an ethnic group, but we should also take into
13For problems posed by the lower class in American society, see
Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future
of Our Urban Crisis. Boston: Little and Brown, 1968.
OW
7account deliberate public policies to promote entrepreneurship. In
explaining the development of entrepreneurship at the grassroots
level, several social scientists contend that supply determinants,
i.e. socio-cultural history and experience which enable a sub-group
or individuals to perceive entrepreneurial opportunities engendered
in the process of economic development, are more important than
demand determinants, i.e. governmental actions and programs geared to
entrepreneurial promotion. This study, however, takes a contrary
view that demand determinants are more important. In support of this
stand, the entrepreneurial experience of American blacks is used as a
point of reference.
The study is divided into four parts. The first part poses the
economic problem of American blacks in terms of (1) job placement,
job upgrading, and job training; (2) community development and self-
determination approach using community resources and outside help;
and (3) independent entrepreneurship. It is argued that we still
do not know the relative merits of all the three approaches, and
therefore we should pay enough attention to independent entrepreneur-
ship. In support of this line of thought, the experiences of five
countries in relation to entrepreneurial promotion (demand deter-
minants) at the grassroots level are discussed. Further, the
theoretical arguments put forth by social scientists in support of
"supply determinants" are examined, and a disquieting conclusion
is reached that the "supply approach" contains too many loopholes
to be accepted as a working hypothesis.
Id
8Part II is primarily concerned with historical factors that
account for the current level of entrepreneurship among American
blacks. These factors are the Southern environment, federal attitude
toward black economic problems, trade unionism and black leadership.
The Southern environment, dominated by its slave tradition, is
examined from the angle of the tenancy-plantation system and its
attendant credit practices,
was economically and social
neurship. With respect to
development, two historical
and the Great Depression -
most severe economic hardsh
that the federal political
economic plight of Negroes,
and it is argued that the environment
ly too hostile to promote black entrepre-
federal attitude toward black economic
periods, namely the Reconstruction era
periods when Negroes had to face the
ips - are examined. Our analysis reveals
machinery was "almost passive" to the
to the extent that it chose to back the
landed aristocracy on the most vital economic issues. Put in another
way, demand determinants were simply not at work.
In appraising the role of the trade union movement in black
economic progress, it is discovered that occupational immobility
among Negro workers was a direct consequence of their being left
out of the mainstream of the movement; and in the absence of worth-
while work experience, the development of black entrepreneurship
at the grassroots level remained a misnomer. While the black worker
was facing the hostile Southern environment, inaction of the
government and unfriendly trade unions, we find that the different
types of black leadership which emerged at the turn of the century
9and thereafter were motivated by different goals. They either
promoted black entrepreneurship in the wrong direction or adopted
a rapprochement with white employers and trade unions. The review
of the historical factors suggests that the present low level of
black entrepreneurship has its roots in "institutional constraints''
which either discouraged or remained passive to black economic
development.
A case study of contemporary black entrepreneurship in Boston
is the content of Part III. The study, which was carried out last
summer and part of the fall, focuses on the "more promising" black
entrepreneurs in Boston. The reason for selecting this group is
that they are potential agents of economic development. The Boston
study has two parts. The first part concentrates on the character-
istics and problems of the seven types of enterprises identified in
the study. Among other things, our intention here is to provide
some basic data for decision-making and planning. The study finds
that the seven types of enterprise differ with respect to employment
levels, wage rates, extent of capitalization, use of federal loans,
physical assets, sales, insurance premiums, etc. It is further
revealed that among the many problems black businesses face,
insufficient equity capital, working capital, long-term loans and
employee-related problems are most paramount.
The second part of the Boston study is concerned with the entre-
preneur himself as an organization maker. Our interest in this
connection is to examine such aspects of "supply determinants" as
10
the entrepreneurs' family background, their involvement in community
affairs, their work experience which prepared them for entrepreneur-
ship, and reasons for going into business. A conclusion is reached
that: (1) in terms of educational background and other middle class
characteristics they are not different from the rest of Boston blacks,
but they differ somewhat in terms of the entrepreneurial background
of the family. (2) Most of them have had worthwhile work experience
in the white business sector. (3) 54 % of them carry on other businesses.
(4) They are less involved in community affairs. (5) Most of them
went into business for the purpose of reaping the fruit of their own
labor and making money.
In the fourth part of the essay, an attempt is made to evaluate
the impact of federal programs in promoting black entrepreneurship.
It is disclosed that while the government is trying to solve some key
problems, still the programs could immensely be improved. In search
for more workable solutions, it is argued that the private sector
has a crucial role to play. It is also argued that the problems of
black businessmen are an integral part of central city problems,
and therefore their solutions should be conceived within the frame-
work of a national urban policy. In conclusion, the study makes
specific recommendations for tackling such immediate problems as
inadequate loans, lack of employee benefits, dual entrepreneurship,
and so forth.
PART I
SOME FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES
Thus, even though some significant
insights into the study of entrepre-
neurship have been contributed by
both economists and other social
scientists, it is still generally
true that entrepreneurship as a
subject for study lies in a no-
man's land.
Alec P. Alexander (EEH, Winter
1967, p. 136)
CHAPTER TWO
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Of the choices open to the Federal Government in any drive to
improve the economic status of minority groups, three are of special
importance. These choices may be identified as (1) job training,
job placement and job upgrading; (2) incentives to community-owned
economic organizations; and (3) encouragement to private or independent
entrepreneurship. All the three choices have merits and demerits, and
opinions differ considerably as to which choice will yield the best
results for the society as a whole. In the following sections, the
major issues posed by the three choices will be examined, and the
need to pay special attention to independent entrepreneurship, the
concern of this study, will be emphasized.
The Problem of Jobs
It has been argued that the issue is not so much making dis-
advantaged groups in the American society owners of means of production
as ensuring that they have access to decent jobs which command decent
wages. If it is a matter of creating jobs, so the argument goes,
independent entrepreneurs are ineffective providers of jobs; but
instead we should rely on business corporations with enough resources
and capacity to launch large-scale employment-generating projects.
12
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This belief is shared by the White House and the administration alike,
as evidenced by the multiplicity of manpower training programs which
have come into being since the passage of the Manpower Development
and Training Act of 1965. Indeed, the capacity of the private sector
to generate employment for both blacks and whites is enormous, given
favorable economic trends. In 1960, for example, blacks comprised 2%
of commercial bank employees, but by 1969 deliberate solicitations by
bank authorities increased the black's share to 10% in most cities and
20% in some cities. 1 In 1968, automobile companies reported that
14.5% of their workers were blacks, and in production operations they
comprised almost 25% of the work force.2 Iron and steel industries
managed to increase by a small margin black representation in their
total work force from 9.7% in 1938 to 13.3% in 1968.3
The crucial problem in the private sector is not so much the
discriminatory practices sometimes followed in hiring blacks, as
difficulties in promoting them to higher positions through systematic
training and job-upgrading. While avowed non-discriminatory hiring
policies may be "advertised" by corporations in all regions of the
country, there is little evidence that job training and upgrading are
an integral part of their labor policies. In a 1970 survey in
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, "Financing Inner City,"
Monthly Review, October 1969, p. 203.
2 Herbert R. Northrup, Negro Employment in Basic Industry. Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970, p. 78, p. 80.
3lbid., p. 257 and p. 291.
14
connection with opportunities for black managers in over 300 major
corporations, it was discovered among those reporting that Polaroid
had the highest proportion of 4% of its managers as blacks. Some
reported zero percentage. It was also discovered that the top-ranking
black in each corporation was either in personnel, public relations or
some sort of community affairs post. Further, most firms avoided a
question related to target goals for black recruiting, training and
4promotion.
Appeals from race-advancement organizations and the Federal
Government to corporations to hire blacks with all shades of skill
have caused some of the corporations to look into investment opportuni-
ties in ghetto areas. However, the experience of a few of them which
have established subsidiary plants in these areas has not been
encouraging enough.5 Not only are their profit levels unpredictable
or negative in some cases, but also white businesses in general are
easy targets in times of inner city riots. Anthony Downs therefore
rightly points out that creating new jobs in the ghettos will not
4MBA Staff Report, "The Two Voices of Equal Opportunity," The Master
in Business Administration, Vol. 4, No. 7 (April 1970), pp. 12-15.
5See New York Times, May 4, 1969, "Economic Development in Blighted
Inner-City Areas is Running into Snags," p. 72; Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 23, 1969, "Ailing Entrepreneurs," p. 1; Business Week, "Busi-
ness and the Urban Crisis,'' Feb. 3, 1968, pp. 57-72; Newsweek, "Banks:
Black Capitalism," Aug. 26, 1968, p. 71. See also Dean R. Ericson,
Urban Minority Business Development: The Problem of Resource Channel-
ing Through Intermediary Institutions. M.A. Thesis, Sloan School of
Management, M.I.T., June 1969; The Conference Board, Business and the
Development of Ghetto Enterprise. Report No. 517, New York, 1971;
The Staff of the Wall Street Journal, Business and Blacks. Prince-
ton, N.J.: Dow Jones Books, 1970.
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occur in the future under normal market conditions.6 In the absence
of market inducements, legislative proposals were advanced in
CongressZ during the 1967-68 fiscal year to aid corporations inter-
ested in setting up plants in the ghettos. Although the proposals
have not yet passed the Senate floor, it is evident that the
mechanism for attracting industries to the ghettos goes beyond the
bounds of tax rebates, assumption of labor training and land develop-
ment costs by the public, and so forth. Perhaps a little bit of
philanthropy on the part of business leaders, and rescheduling of
national development priorities may get us out of the present impasse.
An alternative approach of bringing people to jobs located in
the suburbs has equally been frustrating.8 An automobile company in
Detroit experimented in 1969 with free bussing of minority workers
residing in the city's depressed areas to suburban assembly plants.
But after a few weeks, the number of passengers per bus began to
fall sharply, despite an assiduous campaign mounted by the company.
The bussing had to be terminated because most of them were not used
to getting up early and reporting daily for work. In view of various
problems surrounding the practice of bussing workers, suburbaniza-
6Anthony Downs, op. cit., p. 1336.
7The proposals were contained in Senate Bill 2088, introduced by
Senators Robert Kennedy, Ribicoff, Javits, Bayh, Pearson and others
on July 12, 1967 to the Senate Committee on Finance.
8 For an interesting analysis of problems posed by suburban job loca-
tion, see Phillip B. Herr and Aaron Fleischer, The Mobility of the
Poor (a research monograph prepared for the Joint Center for Urban
Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard University, September 1968.
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tion of low-income housing has been suggested as a long-term solution.
Proponents of suburban low-income housing argue that large-scale
movement of plants and jobs to suburbs cannot be reversed, and con-
sequently the spread of low-income housing throughout metropolitan
areas will bring jobs closer to disadvantaged families. As a matter
of fact, the Nixon administration has been swayed to this line of
thought by its policy to provide land and housing development incen-
tives to suburban municipal authorities interested in putting up low-
income housing.9 However, these authorities are more interested in
strengthening their tax base by attracting industries, middle-income
housing and shopping centers, instead of incentive-ridden low-income
housing. 0 In the absence of a deliberate effort of the government
to spread low-income housing, most suburban municipalities will not
voluntarily initiate it.
President Lyndon B. Johnson, realizing the difficulty in attract-
ing industries to the ghettos or bussing minority workers to suburban
plants proposed in his State of the Union address of January 1968 a
9The policy was outlined at a news conference in December 1970 by
Mr. Romney, Secretary for Housing and Urban Development. The admini-
stration emphasizes that it is not prepared to penalize suburban
governments which opt not to have low-income housing.
10 For an incisive discussion of problems relating suburban low-income
housing and related problems, see Anthony Downs, "Alternative Futures
for the American Ghetto," op. cit.; J. F. Kain and J. H. Persky,
"Alternatives to the Gilded~Ghetto," Public Interest, No. 14 (Winter
1969), pp. 74-87; and Nathan Glazer, ''Housing Problems and Housing
Policies," Public Interest, No. 7 (Spring 1967), pp. 21-51. President
Nixon's position on the issue can be found in the Herald Traveler
(Boston), June 12, 1971, p. 1.
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a program called Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS).
By this program, the Federal Government pays the cost of training
and hiring hard-core workers in existing plants for a period of
twelve months. Thereafter, the corporations are at liberty to put
the workers on their payrolls or lay them off. In a number of cases,
the corporations do not employ the workers after their training, due
in part to trade union pressures. However, a major criticism against
the program is that trainees are often trained in dead-end jobs. On
the whole the program has achieved a limited success and this high-
lights some of the social and psychological road-blocks militating
against job-generating programs.
Community Economic Development Corporations
Within the last few years, a school of thought comprising poli-
ticians, white businessmen and black leaders who believe that large
economic organizations can accumulate more capital and wealth at a
faster rate than small individual businesses are advocating for com-
munity-based economic development corporations. They argue that such
corporations will bring into fruition the wished-for concept of "black
capitalism" as a force to reckon with in the economy. Therefore,
since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ghetto-based de-
llAn outline of the "JOBS'' program can be found in the "President's
Report," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, No. 3, January 19,
1968, pp. 96-101. See also U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and So-
cial Welfare, The JOBS Program: Background Information. Report
prepared for the Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty.
Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1970.
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velopment corporations have been initiated in over a dozen cities,
with the full support of liberal Senators and local politicians. 12
The aims of the corporations differ widely. While some concentrate
on profit-making ventures, others, in addition to business ventures,
have set up management training centers for black businessmen and
skill training centers for those who want to work but lack skills.
Some of the corporations have also involved themselves in arranging
capital for businessmen.
A few critics would reject the fact that the community-based
corporations are enabling a substantial number of blacks to play and
learn leadership roles or reinforce their leadership capabilities,
which are notoriously limited in the black communities. However,
only a handful of the corporations are known to be economically
13
viable. One of the main reasons for the little success achieved
12 Examples of community-based development corporations are Model
Inner City Community Organization in Washington, D.C.; Bedford-
Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation in Brooklyn, N.Y.; Harlem Common-
wealth Council; National Economic Growth and Reconstruction Organi-
zation in New York; 10-36 Zion Investment Association in Philadelphia;
Greater Philadelphia Enterprises Development Corporation; Detroit
Economic Development and Services Corporation; Inner City Business
Improvement Forum in Detroit; Greenpower Foundation in Watts, Los
Angeles; Freedom Industries and State Enterprises in Boston. See
also Center for Community Development. Profiles in Community Based
Economic Development. Cambridge, 1971.
A brief review of the performance of a cross-section of the corpora-
tions can be found in Laboratory for Environmental Studies, M.I.T.,
Ways of Providing New and Improved Job Opportunities for the Urban
Ghetto Poor (a preliminary report on the Urban Ghetto Study Program),
Cambridge, December 1968, Appendix A. For the most up-to-date and
more comprehensive study, see The Conference Board, op. cit; Martin
Skala, "Inner-city Enterprises: Current Experiences,'' in W. F.
Haddad and G. D. Pugh, Black Economic Development. Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969, pp. 151-171.
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so far is that in a short span of time they have dissipated their
efforts over either many ventures or have assumed community welfare
functions which are incompatible with profit-maximization goals or
advantages of economies of scale. Besides, they lack well trained
personnel for such vital areas as marketing, planning, advertising
and accounts.
Another discouraging feature about them is that they are heavily
financed from external sources. For example, the much publicized
Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation received 77% of its
operating capital of $9 million in 1968 from federal sources.14
Other corporations have to rely on philanthropic contributions of
large corporations and banks, and this is unquestionably not a healthy
state of affairs.
It has been argued that by investing in the shares of the
corporations, blacks will not only extricate themselves gradually
from chronic financial dependence on white banks as sources of
business loans, but will be earning more through dividends. But this
has not happened. To be sure, the case of the ghetto economy is com-
parable to developing countries which have to rely on external in-
vestors or foreign aid to develop their economies. If the aid
continues for a considerable number of years, such countries do not
only lose their economic independence but also risk their political
sovereignty. Efforts of black leaders to involve large corporations
14Louise Campbell, "Communities: Bedford-Stuyvesant, Part II," City,
May 1968, p. 24.
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and to rely on them for most of their needs only lengthens the process
of 'decolonization,'l5 and therefore it becomes more difficult for
ghetto dwellers to obtain significant control over the development
of their own community. Moreover, the more blacks lose economic
control of their community, the more attenuating their ailing politi-
cal influence becomes.
Nevertheless, the difficulties that have to be overcome before
the corporations can become economically independent and viable under-
scores the need and urgency to upgrade the socio-economic status of
minority groups. Economic development in whatever form cannot be
an end in itself. It should reinforce community's social and politi-
cal goals. Writing on economic development of Harlem, Thomas
Vietorisz and Bennett Harrison rightly indicate that "when emphasis
is placed on economic development as a catalyst of social and poli-
tical change, project recommendations cannot be made primarily on
16
the basis of commercial profitability." It is for this reason
that proponents of community-based corporations see nothing wrong
with the use of federal funds for skill training programs and for
technical and managerial assistance, provided such incentives are
directed toward social and economic goals. If federal and other
types of aid to the corporations enhance the chance of blacks self-
15See an interesting discussion on this theme by Riciard A. Cloward
and Frances F. Piven, "Corporate Imperialism for the Poor," Nation,
October 16, 1967, pp. 365-367.
16
Thomas Vietorisz and Bennett Harrison, The Economic Development
of Harlem. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1970, pp. 68-69.
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determining their own socialeconomic and environmental destiny,
then it could be argued that more financial aid is called for,
especially at this time when a sizeable number of the corporations
across the country are being hit by the present economic recession.
Programs for creating more jobs for economically disadvantaged
members of the society and for guiding the growth of mushrooming
community-based development corporations provide limited opportunities
for individuals to create their own success stories in the nature of
"independent entrepreneurship."1 7  The American economy was founded
on this kind of entrepreneurship, and the economy still feeds enor-
mously on it, despite the astronomical growth of large corporations.
In the next section, we shall make a case for independent entrepre-
neurship as one of the possible paths to attain economic development
goals for the ghetto.
Independent Entrepreneurship
Critics, skeptical of economic viability and necessity of
individual black enterprises argue that the failure rate18 among
these enterprises is so high that the government might as well
1 7An independent entrepreneur has been defined as 'a man who has
created out of nothing an ongoing enterprise." See Orvis Collins
and David G. Moore, The Organization Makers. New York, Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1970, p. 85.
18The failure rate among small businesses that are just starting
is about 50% for the whole nation. Among black business the
rate is known to be higher than the national average. See U.S.
News and World Report, Vol. 69, No. 21, November 23, 1970, "p.72.
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concentrate on upgrading job opportunities and wages for minority
workers, and providing maximum incentives to community-based corpora-
tions. They further argue that other ethnic groups such as the
Irish, Italians, and Jews were initially confronted with economic
hardships of one type or another, and were similarly subjected to
racial troubles. But, as the critics contend, they have emerged
victorious on their own.
In answer to these critics, first, it is worth noting that the
circumstances which normally lead to the failure of black businesses
are gradually changing. The odds against minority enterprises, e.g.
limited access to conventional business loans, lack of managerial
and technical skills, general counseling services, etc. are being
eliminated by federal assistance programs, though at a very slow
pace. Further, the semi-closed and impoverished market in which
the black entrepreneur used to operate in is now beginning to open
up and to show signs of incipient prosperity. In a 1963 survey of
15 major metropolitan areas, 5.9 million Negroes in 1.6 households
had a total net income of about $7 billion, i.e. $4,159 per house-
hold and this represented a marked improvement over the previous
decade. 9 The study points out also that the total Negro population
in the U.S. had a total spending power of $21.9 billion in 1963.
Therefore, if we consider 78 major cities with 25% of their total
19 Bernard Howard & Co., The New Dimensions of the Negro Market.
(An appraisal of Negro buying power in 15 major metropolitan
market areas.) New York, 1963, p. 2.
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population being Negroes, then Negroes' share of downtown department
and retail trade amounted to 30% of the total in 1963.20 A rather
startling conclusion reached by the study is that the typical Negro
family is young and is often a first-acquisition consumer, 'spending
a far greater proportion of its total income on goods and services .
than its white counterpart (and) tends to be a better consumer than
the typical white family with twice its income." 2 1
The rising Negro income could also be looked at from another
angle. In 1939, the median income of Negro men was 41.4% of the
median income of white men. But by 1960 the proportion had risen to
59.9%. Equally important is the faster rate of growth of the Negro
population. Between 1950-1960 for example, while the total U.S.
population grew by 18.4%, the Negro population went up by 25.4%.
No doubt the Negro population and market have been expanding, and
it stands to reason that Negroes develop their entrepreneurial
skills and talents pari passu, if not more, such that part of the
dollars earned may stay within the ghetto areas. Unfortunately the
development of black entrepreneurship has severely lagged behind
the rate of capital accumulation in these areas. What is more, the
economic history of blacks has not favored independent entrepreneur-
ship. Charles E. Silberman rightly points out that the reasons for
the economic plight of the Negro in the United States lie very deep
2 0Ibid.
2 1 1bid., (unpaged).
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in their history, and that if blame is to be assessed it will have to
be placed on white society.22 As we shall see in Part II, post-Civil
War events in black economic history have been marked by a naked
struggle for survival in a society whose wealth and prosperity are
even closer to recent immigrants from Europe than to minority groups.
Comparing blacks with other ethnic groups, Eugene P. Foley poses the
problem succinctly in the following way:
But these others had a system of social organization
that the Negroes have never had in their strong family
traditions, and their churches and synagogues. In ad-
dition, each of the other ethnic groups were inspired
and motivated by an honored culture which stimulated
high aspiration and expectations as well as a lofty
sense of self-esteem. One thing more those groups
possessed which Negroes have lacked until very re-
cently and have badly needed in order to protect them-
selves in a hostile environment - group solidarity.2 3
As victims of technological progress, the socio-economic position
of blacks in the American society has been made more shaky and less
enduring. Since the industrial revolution, each major technological
progress has spelt disaster for the average black worker.24 The
2 2 C. E. Silberman, "The Economics of the Negro Problem,'' in Eli
Ginzberg (ed.), The Negro Challenge to the Business Community. New
York, McGraw-Hill, 1964, p. 22.
2 3 Eugene P. Foley, The Achieving Ghetto. Washington, D.C., The
National Press, Inc., 1968, pp.16-17.
24Technological changes in industry since World War Il have resulted
in 97% increase in white-collar jobs, vis-a-vis blue collar jobs
which have been declining. Hence a black adult with a lower educa-
tional attainment than an average white worker usually bears the
brunt of technical transformation. See Charles E. Silherman, op.
cit.
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mechanization of Southern farms in the early decades of this century
deprived many black laborers of their livelihood. Even the introduc-
tion of the washing machine drastically reduced the number of female
black domestic workers. And yet the society has not sufficiently
prepared them to cope with all these changes through the acquisition
of good education, work skills and effective participation in several
economic sectors.
The legitimacy of the claim of Negroes to a share of the urban
economy is reflected in their participation rate in business and in
their share of business ownership, after playing various economic
roles for over three hundred years. A few statistics might throw
light on the amount of progress Negroes have so far made in business.
Of the total civilian labor force of 68 million in 1960, 8% were
engaged as non-farm managers,officials and proprietors. Of the 68
million, 6.6 million or about 10% were Negroes, but only 1.5% were
in these managerial categories. In the same year, about 2.4 million
people were self-employed, and only 2.5% of them were Negroes,25 as
compared with their 11% share of the total population.
Individual cities tell similar stories. For example, the total
Newark, N.J., population is about 400,000, more than half of whom
are blacks. Of the city's 12,172 licensed businesses only 10% are
Negro-owned.26 Negroes comprise 63% of Washington, D.C.'s 800,000
U.S. Census of Population, 1960, "Occupational Characteristics,"'
1963, Table 3.
26Theodore L. Cross, Black Capitalism: Strategy for Business in the
Ghetto. New York: Atheneum Press, 1969, pp. 60-61.
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population but own less than 13% of the licensed 11,755 businesses. 27
Boston has a population of about 600,000, 15% of whom are Negroes.
Its center city area contained 2,552 businesses in 1969, and of this
number 143 or 6% were Negro-owned.28 Identical examples can be cited
from all the major cities.
The types and volume of business owned by Negroes are equally
discouraging. Chicago's three million inhabitants comprise over one
million Negroes. Of over 92,000 businesses in the city in 1969, 89,158
or 96.9% were in the hands of whites. There were only 4 black auto-
mobile dealers, about a dozen black manufacturing firms and a handful
of department, clothing and shoe stores.29 In 1969, 76,176 retail
establishments with gross sales of $10.5 billion and 410,174 employees
were recorded in New York City, with 29.3% of its 10 million inhabi-
tants composed of minority groups. Of these retail businesses,
5,000 (or about 7%) were minority-owned and had gross sales of
$300 million and 15,000 employees. In comparison with the minority
share of the city's total population, minority retail establishments
should have numbered 22,830, should have accounted for $3.1 billion
of the sales and should have engaged 123,000 persons.30 Similar small
271bid.
28 Boston Urban Foundation, Center City, Vol. II (A Report prepared by
the Urban Research Inc., Boston). Boston, September 1969, p. C-6.
2 9Chicago Economic Development Corporation, Annual Report, 1969, p. 6.
30Capital Formation Inc., New York, Annual Report, 1969, pp. 6-7.
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shares could be traced in the city's service establishments. The total
service establishments numbered 55,230 in 1969, and had gross sales of
$7 billion and 333,931 employees. Of this number, about 3,000 were
estimated to be minority-owned; their total gross sales were put at only
$275 million and they engaged only 900 employees. 3 1
One could go on citing such depressing statistics to show how far
the Negro has climbed up the socio-economic ladder after one hundred
years of emancipation. As a matter of fact, since the Second World
War, the share of Negroes of the total self-employed businessmen has
been declining. As justifiable as their claim to effective participa-
tion in the economy may be, black businessmen can do a lot to improve
their businesses and their competitive position by simply "playing
according to the rules of the game." In a consumer opinion survey
carried out in Nashville, Tennessee, the needs of black businesses
were listed in the following order of magnitude: wide variety of
merchandise, lower prices, improved service, cleanliness, parking
space, delivery service, trained personnel, trading stamps, advertis-
ing, large building, friendlier workers and credit service.32 While
some of these shortcomings are embedded in the socio-economic system
and cannot be solved through personal efforts, others are within the
sphere of competence of an average black businessman. For example,
the need to keep business premises clean, carry a variety of
31Ibid.
32 Louis H. Schuster, et al., Business Enterprises of Negroes in
Tennessee. (A report prepared for SBA.) Washington, D. C., 1961.
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merchandise, improve delivery service and to inspire workers are the
businessman's own burden, and cannot be solved by any doses of
governmental assistance. The root of these shortcomings can be traced
to the lack of business tradition and severe dearth of managerial
talents.
Apart from the personal input of the black businessman, the
ghetto environment and institutional constraints impose severe road-
blocks. In general the ghetto economy operates in an environment
different from the rest of the urban economy. It is characterized by
a high-cost credit merchandising and generally higher level of prices.
Sheer poverty often compels some black families to buy basic consumer
goods and services on credit basis. Under this circumstance, ghetto
businessmen, both black and white who subscribe to the credit prac-
tice, usually assign mark-up prices to their goods and services to
minimize risks embedded in the practice. Doing business in the ghetto
requires a kind of ethics possessed by local indigenous traders in
a typical small West African town, where business prosperity depends
on the extent to which traders can generously extend credits to
their townfolk all of whom may belong to the same intricate network
of the extended family system.
With respect to institutional constraints, black businessmen do
not have the same advantages as white businessmen in buying goods at
wholesale prices, in penetrating the richer white market for both
consumer and producer goods, and in having easy access to long-term
29
loans, working capital, credit extension, and insurance. 3 3  Besides
black entrepreneurs have loose political contacts and business
connections.
Is Independent Entrepreneurship the Answer?
Independent entrepreneurship is decidedly not the ultimate answer
to black economic problems. We have already touched on two other
approaches, namely (1) job training, job procurement and job upgrading;
and (2) community development corporations. It is not the intention
of the author to treat these two approaches in this essay. It suffices
for our purpose to note that our experience with all the three is not
rich enough to rule out any of them. The author is interested in
independent entrepreneurship simply because it has not been nurtured
to the full within the context of American capitalism and the frontier
spirit that have made America what it is today.
The need to upgrade the level of black entrepreneurship stems
from three main lines of argument. First, the small number of blacks
in business and the proportion of business wealth they control are
incompatible with their aspiration for civil and economic equality.
Second, as long as blacks continue to contribute marginally in the
major economic sectors, the ghetto, as a socio-economic unit, will
increasingly face the "balance of payment problem." Third, the
3 3 St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis: A Study
of Negro Life in a Northern City, Vol. 2. New York: Harper and
Row, 1962, ch. 16, pp. 430-469. See also Theodore L. Cross, op.
cit., p. 53 et seq.
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flight of white-owned businesses from the ghetto is creating a gap in
the area's entrepreneurial opportunities which should necessarily be
filled. These three grounds provide rationes decidendi on black
entrepreneurial promotion.
In any event, independent entrepreneurship cannot be expected to
work wonders if federal financial assistance, good working relationship
with the white business community and support from all the three levels
of government are wanting. With the enforcement of anti-racial dis-
crimination laws, channels are being opened for integration. But
while integration is rapidly widening the urban market for black
consumers, the reverse situation does not hold. Unless integration is
encouraged in the economic sphere by absorbing independent black entre-
preneurs in the entire urban economy, they will soon lose the little
control they now exercise over such traditionally favored areas as
funeral homes, hair-dressing and insurance. Maurice H. Stans, Secre-
tary of Commerce, once said:
Our first responsibility in the Government is to
see that everybody has a job and the security of
a paycheck. But that isn't full participation in
the American system. Until a man also has the
choice of owning his own establishment - being an
employer, a capitalist, a 'success story' - he is
not a full participant in the American system.3
In the next chapter, we shall consider the policy implications of
promoting entrepreneurship from the grassroots level. Though the dis-
cussion will be theoretical for the most part, the underlying practi-
cal lessons shall be given due attention.
34 U.S. News and World Report, November 23, 1970, OP. cit., p. 42.
CHAPTER THREE
GRASSROOTS ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A THEORETICAL AND
PRACTICAL EXPLANATION
The entrepreneur has been assigned various functions since the time
of Adam Smith.I He has been conceived of as a master who manipulates
materials and workmen,2 as an adventurer who undertakes risks,3 as an
innovator who carries out new combinations, and as a surrogate for
business organization.5
For our own purpose, we may sum up the functional definition of
entrepreneurship in the following way: that it is both a risk-taking
and "innovative" or "copying" process in which projected ideas, one's
For a discussion of the functional definition of entrepreneurship,
see Appendix A.
2Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Book 1, Gateway Edition). Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1967 (reprint), pp. 116-117.
3Among economists who regard the entrepreneur as a risk-taker are:
(a) Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics. London: MacMillan
Company, 1961 (edition), p. 293.
(b) Frederick B. Hawley, who contends that the reward to the entre-
preneur as a risk-taker is his profit. See F. B. Hawley, "The Risk
Theory of Profit", QJE, Vol. 7 (July 1893), pp. 459-479.
(c) Frank H. Knight, who slightly departs from Hawley and argues
that profit "is a unique kind of risk which is not susceptible of
measurement." See his Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. New York:
Sentry Press, 1964 (edition), pp. 22-48.
4Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1961 (edition), p. 74.
5 Frederick Harbison, "Entrepreneurial Organization as a Factor in
Economic Development," QJE, Vol. 70, No. 3 (August 1956),
pp. 364-379.
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own skill, capital and labor (which may be hired) are combined in
concert with a worthwhile management practice to achieve rewarding
goals.
The decision-making involved is a rational one, to all intents
and purposes. The goals, according to Collins and Moore, are often
unclear and diffuse, but nevertheless the expected rewards are
sufficient to sustain the process.
"Relative success" of an enterprise has not been assigned an
explicit importance in the definition. For one thing, businessmen
have different goals, as indicated above. The profit-maximizer would
go after high profits. The businessman who is searching for social
prestige through business would probably settle for small profit
margins in order to employ more people in the community. In other
words, he would like to satisfy7 rather than maximize. Belshaw
lucidly warns us not to be blinded by such time-honored criteria as
profit rate per unit of investment, rate of expansion, etc. but we
must consider, inter alia, the objectives of the entrepreneur and
"the degree to which the social and financial costs of the undertaking
6Orvis Collins and David G. Moore, The Organization Makers: A
Behavioral Study of Independent Entrepreneurs. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1970, p. 91.
7A number of economists hold to this viewpoint. Interesting arguments
have developed in connection with firms pursuing different goals
simultaneously; for example, maximization of profits versus necessity
to control a portion of a known market. For some of these arguments
see Herbert A. Simon, "Theories of Decision-making," AER, Vol. 49, No.3
(June, 1959), pp. 253-283; Julius Margolis, "The Analysis of the
Firm: Rationalism, Conventionalism and Behaviorism," Journal of
Business, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July, 1958), pp. 187-199.
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contribute to the general and financial well-being, either of the parti-
cipating group, or of the neighborhood society of which it is a part,
or of the political unit." 8
The rate at which an economic system generates successful entre-
preneurs capable of playing useful economic roles depends significantly
on the historical processes, institutional framework, economic oppor-
tunities and cultural milieu that interact to create an entrepreneurial
class. The interaction takes the form of forces generating demand for
and supply of entrepreneurs. To this theme we shall now turn.
Demand-Supply Dichotomy
The theories and reasons usually advanced to explain the growth
of entrepreneurship generated in the development process have tended
to lean on the side of supply, i.e., culturally determined factors,
factors in personality development, and one's capacity to perceive
investment opportunities. In other words, the supply curve is assumed
to be inelastic to some extent, so that to increase the level of
entrepreneurship, one has to manipulate the supply curve more than
the demand curve. It is this grave bias which is being questioned
in this section.
As we shall see later, the theories and various analytical dis-
cussions on the supply of entrepreneurship are buttressed on socio-
anthropological and anthropo-psychological factors which are either
8Cyril S. Belshaw, 'The Cultural Milieu of the Entrepreneur: A
Critical Essay", EEH, Vol. 7, No. 3 (February 1955), pp. 161-162.
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too universal to be applied to diverse cultural milieux, or may be
inappropriate for particular stages of economic development. A
dynamic economic development policy geared to the promotion of
entrepreneurship cannot overlook such issues as creation of a capital
market, technical aid, education of entrepreneurs, foreign trade
policy which provides export incentives to local producers, supportive
administrative services, etc. These incentives determine "effective
demand'' for entrepreneurs, and could be more decisive in raising the
level of entrepreneurship than supply factors. 9
It is hypothesized here therefore that at pre-industrial stages
of economic development of a nation (or a subgroup within a nation,
e.g. American blacks), determinants of demand for entrepreneurship
are critical in bringing about supply responses and not vice versa;
that specific governmental actions or events (e.g. passage of legis-
lations favoring entrepreneurship, establishment of development
banks, political independence, etc), are sufficient conditions to
stir a new awareness in existing and potential entrepreneurs to
respond to investment opportunities, notwithstanding all socio-
cultural constraints. Thus in promoting entrepreneurship at the
grassroots level, "demand determinants" provide the driving force.
Our hypothesis has two major implications which should briefly
be explored. First, such political events as attainment of political
9See for example W. Arthur Lewis' explanation of the importance of
economic institutions in economic development in his Theory of
Economic Growth. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970 (reprint),
ch. 3, pp. 57-163. Elsewhere he asserts: "What is deficient is not
the spirit of enterprise, but the experience of administration,"'
p. 196.
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independence, a passage of a bill reserving specific economic sectors
for indigenous entrepreneurship, and a bill that makes government loans
easily accessible to disadvantaged social groups can change people's
attitude toward entrepreneurship. This implies then that at the early
stages of economic development of a nation or a social group, the
process of political development entails higher economic expectation
of an average man than it is normally perceived by both the economist
and the politician. Bluntly stated, a sense of economic responsibility
of citizens is a concomitant sequel of political development, ceteris
paribus.
Second, some governmental actions are more rewarding than others,
depending on the stage of economic development the nation finds itself.
For example, at an early stage, rapid expansion of the capital market
may not necessarily promote entrepreneurship, whereas aid to business-
men in business education, legal matters and small loans advanced
through a development bank may propel entrepreneurship in the right
direction.10 It is a difficult task prescribing which governmental
actions should be employed for specific stages of economic develop-
ment. The interest of the government in promoting entrepreneurship,
10 As an alternative to formal promotional programs, some governments
sometimes resort to the price mechanism to motivate people. For
example, prices of important commodities may be raised to encourage
more economic participation and output. See E. Dean, "Economic
Analysis and African Response to Price," Journal of Farm Economics,
Vol. 47 (May 1965), pp. 402-409, and Walter P. Falcon, "Farmers
Response to Price in a Subsistence Economy: The Case of W. Pakis-
tan," AER, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 54, No. 3 (May 1964),
pp. 580-591.
M M = = = = = =
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diversity of economic opportunities, political stability, the tradi-
tional attitude of different social groups toward entrepreneurship and
so on could in turn influence the realization of these actions. The
author believes strongly that in choosing among alternative courses of
action, "trial by error" approach may yield the best results.
In the next section, we shall briefly examine the experiences of
five selected countries where assistance programs have been launched
in the past to promote entrepreneurship. It is hoped that their
experiences will demonstrate the effectiveness of some demand deter-
minants. Owing to the lack of adequate data on the impact of the pro-
grams on economic development of the selected countries, we shall
not attempt to evaluate the programs in detail. Instead, emphasis
will be placed on how indigenous citizens responded to new economic
opportunities created by the programs.
Experiences of Selected Countries
Case 1: State of Madras, India
Starting with the State of Madras, India, James J. Berna 1 2
reports about how a government policy to aid cottage and small-scale
industries was able to influence the Brahman caste who traditionally
were not in business to turn suddenly to business ventures. In brief,
11This approach could be considered as a rational decision-making
process according to Herbert A. Simon. See his "The Architecture
of Complexity," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,
Vol. 106, No. 6 (December 1962), pp. 467-482.
12 James J. Berna, Industrial Entrepreneurs in Madras State. London,
Asia Publishing House, 1960.
Now
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the aid programs consisted of two types. The first was begun after
independence in 1947 by the Government of Madras. It concentrated on
the training of village workers to assist cottage industries; it
provided loans for land, building, machinery, equipment and materials,
and helped businessmen market their products. The second, and
probably more important type of aid was extended by the Government of
India's Small Industries Service Institute and National Small Indus-
tries Corporation in the period 1954-56. Programs consisted of the
following:
1. technical service, research and training;
2. establishment of pilot projects;
3. establishment of industrial estates;
4. a hire purchase arrangement for the purchasing of
machinery and equipment through a loan scheme. For
example, a down payment of about 1/5 of the price of
machinery was required of small industries; and
5. tariffs and import licence policy to protect infant
industries.
In his study of 52 light-engineering firms employing between
50 and 250 persons in the State of Madras, Berna discovered that among
the proprietors, twelve were graduate engineers and also first genera-
tion entrepreneurs. Of the twelve, five were Brahmans who according
to their caste, did not belong to families of entrepreneurs. He
explains it this way: "Entrance into manufacturing industry is at
a wide remove from traditional Brahman activity, which in modern
times has traditionally lain in the fields of education, government
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service and the professions."
One could explain the response in the following manner. Under
colonial rule incentives to industrial entrepreneurs were almost
non-existent. The major services of wealth in the State were land
ownership, high positions in the civil service and the professions.
The Brahmans, unlike other castes, had the greatest access to all
these sources of wealth which in turn brought them prestige and power.
With attainment of political independence in 1947, a historical
event filled with all sorts of expectations, and with the inauguration
of the assistance programs, there emerged a new class of non-Brahman
industrialists who through acquisition of wealth were in a position
to challenge the prestige and power denied them for ages. 4 Thus
the only avenue the Brahman could take to maintain the status quo was
to strengthen their sources of wealth by turning to business ventures.
Commenting on Berna's study, Hoselitz suggests that the creation
of a new generation of Brahman industrialists could be attributed to
the present high value they ascribe to economic development with the
13 1bid., p. 70. Clifford Geertz's account of how the nobility of
Trabanan, on the Island of Bali, Indonesia, sought to strengthen
their economic power after the Dutch took over the reins of govern-
ment parallels the experience of Madras Brahmans. Before the
arrival of the Dutch, the Bali nobility controlled both political
and military leaderships, in addition to their being the major
landowners. Colonial rule compelled them to resort to commerce
and industry in order to maintain the status quo. See Clifford
Geertz, Peddlers and Princes. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1963, pp. 82-141.
14In 1967, for example, the first non-Brahman Head of State, was
elected and the present Head is also a non-Brahman. This reflects
the increasing political power being wielded by the non-Brahmans,
in addition to promising strides in business.
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backing of the government.15
Case 2: Pakistan
Papanek's study16 of a randomly sampled 250 Pakistani industrial-
ists employing 20 or more persons supports the demand hypothesis. One
of the major conclusions he reaches is that "the development of
industrial entrepreneurs may depend largely on economic incentives
which are determinable by government policy."1  In this study,
it is shown that people whose primary occupation before 1947 (or
before entering industry if this was later) was tradeaccounted for
almost half of the entrepreneurs. The main explanation was that the
economic incentives enabled the more energetic traders to enter
manufacturing since business was already their chosen line of occupa-
tion. The study also points out that the traditional trading class
or caste in control of industry came from five small communities,
although they comprised just one-half of the total population. 18
Papanek finds further evidence that even the Muslims who at
the time of independence in 1947 formed only a small proportion
15 Bert F. Hoselitz, ''Entrepreneurship and Traditional Elites,"
EEH, Vol. I, No. 1 (Fall 1963), pp. 38-41.
16Gustav F. Papanek, ''The Development of Entrepreneurship,"
AER, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 52, No. 2 (May 1962),
pp. 46-58.
17 lbid., p. 57.
18Ibid., p. 54.
40
of trade and manufacturing class developed a vigorous entrepreneurial
group, and by 1958, a span of only 10 years, their number had
- 19increased. The lessons we gather from the Pakistani experience are
twofold. First, given the right incentives, it is relatively an easy
task for a government to direct the entrepreneurial potential of a
social group towards a more rewarding area of entrepreneurship that
support economic growth. Second, given the right economic incentives,
a social group, like the Muslims, who have traditionally been found
in small numbers in business, could be enticed into business in pro-
mising numbers, notwithstanding their neutral traditional attitude
toward business and money-making.
Case 3: Turkey
The experience of Turkey exemplifies how political events,
working in concert with economic incentives provided by the Government,
can drastically change people's attitude toward, and evaluation of
their economic roles. 20 The first historical hallmark was the
establishment of the Republic in 1923, when about 80% of commerce,
finance and small industries were known to be in the hands of the
Greeks and Armenians.21 Kemal Ataturk's social reform during the
19Ibid., p. 49.
2 0 See Alec P. Alexander, "Industrial Entrepreneurship in Turkey:
Origins and Growth,'' Economic Development and Cultural Change
Journal, Vol. 8, No. 4 (July 1960), pp. 349-365.
2 1 Ibid., p. 350.
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Republic years led to a decline in the alien population. Their
departure caused a vacuum in especially trade and commerce, and con-
sequently it fell to the lot of the Turks to fill the gap. The
government responded in several ways. For example, it established in
1924 a business bank, Is Bankasi, to advance loans to businessmen.
The establishment of new state enterprises which indirectly became
a springboard for independent entrepreneurship was another. In short
the creation of an entrepreneurial class in the period 1923-50 was
the result of promotional programs designed to arouse people's
interest in economic development.
A second event in the Turkish experience was the assumption of
power by Celal Bayar in 1950. The period marked a new phase and a
new strategy in entrepreneurial promotion. To all intents and
purposes, Bayar pursued policies catering largely for interests that
had been neglected by the Republicans.22 He initiated a number of
programs to aid businessmen, e.g. bu>siness Ioans through the Turkish
Development Bank created in 1950, lowering of corporate taxes, and
liberalization of imports during the period 1950-52. Alexander
sums up the impact of Bayar's programs this way: "In 1950, it was
the active presence of a business community and of other middle class
elements, grown largely as a result of the policies of the new regime
which became decisive factors in the political change leading towards
2 2 Lloyd Rodwin, Nations and Cities: A Comparison of Strategies for
Urban Growth. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1970, p. 73.
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greater economic and political liberalism."23 In brief, Bayar's
economic policies were conducive to the development of entrepreneurship,
because, as the author sees it, the right incentives were provided to
neglected social groups, especially the lower class, whose economic
aspirations were enlivened by a sudden event, namely, a change in
government.
Case 4: Philippines
Carroll's study24 of 92 Filipino manufacturing firms employing
100 or more persons provides us with a further supporting evidence of
our demand hypothesis. Commenting on the growth of Filipino-owned
manufacturing plants in the 1950's, he suggests that very probably the
necessity of import license or dollar allocations and the manner in
which they were made available tende to accelerate this develop-
ment.25 Economic incentives provided by the government in the 1950's
included exemptions from import controls, and it is reported that in
1953 alone 122 exemptions were granted, and that by the end of 1958,
1,083 grants and tax exemptions were received by 862 firms.26 Also
2 3Alec P. Alexander, ''Industrial Entrepreneurship in Turkey: Origins
and Growth," op. cit., p. 358.
24John J. Carroll, The Filipino Manufacturing Entrepreneur: Agent
and Product of Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965.
2 5 lbid., p. 127.
26 Ibid., p. 35.
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during the decade, the government made credit available to prospective
industrial entrepreneurs through special banking arrangements, and
financing agencies. It is no wonder then that 53 out of the 92 firms
interviewed were created in the period 1950-60. Of the 53, only two
reported that they did not receive government assistance from the
start. Ten out of the 17 created between 1945-1949 also had government
support, and none of the 22 created before 1945, i.e. the colonial
period, had any support.27 Carroll rightly sums up the overpowering
impact of determinants of demand thus: 'Filipino entrepreneurs were
not slow in responding to incentives and opportunities such as these.
They seem to have developed a form of entrepreneurship far more
political in its methods than that which appeared at similar stages
of development in the westerr nations...." 28
Case 5: Ghana
A recent experience of Ghana is similarly interesting. In
1968, the ruling military government passed a decree (Decree 323)
which simply said that all aliens in retailing whose annual volume
of business amounted to $500,000 or less, or those in wholesaling
grossing about $1 million or less, should liquidate their businesses
within two years after the passage of the decree. An Act, Ghanaian
2 7 lbid., p.
28 Ibid. p.
179.
179.
WFAW
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Business Promotion Act (Act 334)29 was formally passed in June 1970
by the new civilian government, validating the decree with effect
from September 1970. To implement the Act the government included in
its 1970-71 budget, a $1.5 million business loan program. An
Agricultural Development Bank has also been established to advance
loans to farmers. Productivity and technical aid centers have been
established to provide the much needed technical services.
Like most former African colonies, excluding probably Nigeria,
a greater part of the retailing and wholesaling have traditionally
been controlled by aliens, notably large European firms, Syrians,
Lebanese and Indians. It is interesting to note that Ghanaians who
never dreamt of going into business turned into businessmen overnight
after the passage of the Act. For example, it was reported that
between August 1 and December 31, 1970, 1,820 new firms were
registered, and this represented a 100% increase in the rate of
registration.30 Since then more new firms have been registered.
Several civil servants who were holding very secure posts are
reported to have resigned to go into business.
It is clear that Ghanaians were not simply unbusinesslike. It
was a deliberate policy of the British Colonial administrators to
use aliens in commerce and trade for various reasons. And although
2 9The main goals of the Act are contained in Government of Ghana,
Ministry of Information, Ghanian Business Promotion Act. (GPC/A271),
August 1970.
30 Ghanaian Times, January 13, 1971, p. 3.
I
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independence was achieved in 1957, alien firms had so entrenched
themselves that viable Ghanaian firms did not have a chance to
thrive. Nor was Kwame Nkrumah, after coming into power between
1957-1966, interested in this line of politics, since some of the
issues involved in the Ghanaian Business Promotion Act run counter
to Pan-African politics which was his main preoccupation. In the
Ghanaian case therefore, there was an event, i.e. a new civilian
government sparking off an economic expectation, and the expecta-
tion was confirmed by the mass deportation of alien merchants and
traders in late 1970. Coupled with this are government promotional
programs to provide the necessary financial and technical support.
In contrast, socio-anthropological and anthropo-psychological
theories and explanations cannot lay claim to a possible removal
of cultural bottlenecks by the Act, or to sudden changes in
personality attributes as a plausible reason for such a mass
supply response.
Some Negative Aspects of the Experience of the Five Countries
In the experience of the five countries discussed above, two
common negative aspects of entrepreneurial promotion programs are
discernible. First, the dearth of trained personnel in business
management and administration creates a time lag between implementa-
tion of entrepreneurial promotion policy and supply of efficient
entrepreneurs. Where such a policy causes the displacement of
more efficient alien businessmen, economic growth may be retarded
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in the few years following the implementation of the policy. If this
happens, such sectors as trade and specialized services usually
dominated by aliens may suffer severely. A few capable indigenous
businessmen may monopolize these sectors, causing unstable high
prices for several months. Kemal's regime experienced this problem
in the late twenties and early thirties,31 and Ghana is currently facing
the same problem. In Pakistan, the government deliberately discriminated
against British and Hindu businessmen in the issuance of import
licenses in the early 1950's, resulting in windfall profits for some
businessmen. 32
Second, incentives geared to entrepreneurial promotion interfere
with the working of the market mechanism, with the result that when
the incentives are withdrawn, some industries become less viable.
In the case of Pakistan for example, the removal of incentives by
late 1950's caused annual returns of certain industries to drop from
50-100% to 20-50%.33 Of equal significance are two interrelated
issues, namely the duration of the incentives, and choice of economic
sectors to receive the incentives such that the leading sectors are
not impaired when the incentives are withdrawn.
3 1Firouz Bahrampour, Turkey: Political and Social Transformation.
Brooklyn, N. Y.: Theo Gaus' Sons, 1967, p. 72.
3 2Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and
Private Incentives. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967,
pp. 32-36.
pbid., P. 39.
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Implications of the Five Cases to U. S. Minority Entrepreneurship
The relevance of the five cases to U. S. minority entrepreneurship
is constrained by the fact that entrepreneurial promotion in the five
countries had (or have) a strong political base, and in some cases,
e.g. Pakistan, Turkey and Ghana, it provides an essential pivot for
nation-building. This has been possible as a result of ethnically
homogeneous or less heterogeneous population of these countries. In
contrast, the U. S. political climate is such that economic advantages
are not easily bestowed on minority groups. Further, the need to
use entrepreneurial promotion programs as a basis for nation-building
is out of the question.
In any event, two major lessons can be learned from the five
cases. First, certain promotional programs such as development banks
and well-tailored technical assistance programs yield quicker entre-
preneurial supply responses than other programs. Within the last
five years, the thrust of minority business promotion in this
country has been a comparatively easy access to loans through con-
ventional banking channels. Also since 1968, SBA has been pushing
ahead its 8A program (i.e. assistance to minority businesses in the
procurement of federal contracts). Other avenues for promoting
minority entrepreneurship are yet to be explored. Specifically, the
use of development banks purposely geared to inner-city economic
development has been ignored. Besides, technical assistance programs
are too diffuse in scope and purpose to fulfill the present needs of
minority groups.
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The second lesson relates to the types of incentives usually
required by grassroots entrepreneurs. Incentives should be tailored to
meet the special needs of the arowinq number of black businesses. It
is important that the incentives be made as temporary as possible, for
the moment they become permanent black entrepreneurship will continue
34to have a very weak foundation.,
In the next section, we shall formally conceptualize how demand
determinants operate, and we shall also make a strong case for these
determinants as opposed to supply determinants, especially at the early
stages of economic growth and development. In our analysis, we shall
treat demand determinants as a single variable without soecifying the
merits and demerits of individual determinants such as loans, technical
assistance, business education, etc.
A Demand Model of Grassroots Entrepreneurship: A Graphical Analysis
Assumptions: The followingassumptions underlie the model, that:
1. The size of economically backward groups (or minority dis-
advantaged groups) in the society is not too large to prevent a possi-
ble "take-off" of economic development. As truly backward nations,
in statu nascendi, have drastically decreased in number since the
last World War, the problem of cultural roadblocks in entrepreneurial
development is assumed to be not severe.
34An oft-quoted example is the practice of SBA awarding minority en-
terprises contracts eyen though they often bid higher than their
competitors.
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2. The nation has a monetized economy, as opposed to a barter
system, thus making room for responses to market incentives.
3. The socio-political climate does not seriously impede
occupational mobility. Where immobility exists, it is assumed that
it could be dealt with through legislative sanctions or administrative
fiats.
4. The number of people who engage themselves in business in
any given period provides encouragement to others with high expecta-
tion to go into business also. In other words, the response of supply
to demand generates a "demonstration effect" which ipso facto increases
the supply of entrepreneurs.
5. The government is willing to allocate funds for entrepreneu-
rial promotion.
6. The government keeps corruption and administrative ineffi-
ciency at a minimum.
7. Potential entrepreneurs have access to a minimum amount of
information.
Graphical Representation
In Fig. 1, the ordinate represents the dollar allocation of
government funds for entrepreneurial promotion , expressed as a pro-
portion of the total budget for a given planning period. The "entre-
preneurial budget" is allocated for such competing programs as loans,
education in entrepreneurship, technical assistance and administrative
support. The abscissa indicates the number of entrepreneurs supplied
in a given planning period. Thus for each level of budget allocation,
the composition of promotional programs will ensure that a "projected"
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number of entrepreneurs will be supplied. In this connection, it is
important to note that a higher level of budget allocation will not ne-
cessarily yield more entrepreneurs; rather for a given budget, a
judicious selection of programs supported by articulated administra-
tion will determine the rate at which entrepreneurs will be supplied.
OS1 is a supply curve representing the supply schedule for dif-
ferent levels of allocation. The two budget allocations, EI and E0'
produce ON and ON entrepreneurs respectively. It is evident that the
difference between the two levels of allocation, i.e. the extra amount
of money expended to produce additional entrepreneurs, NI N, reflects
decreasing returns to investment. Expressed in another way, along seg-
ment K K on the supply curve, the capacity of the economy to produce
more entrepreneurs by providing additional funds (E 1 E0 ) is constrained
by the fact that either promotional programs can only be expanded at
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an increasing marginal cost, or new programs yield very little benefits.
This is evidenced by the almost vertical shape of the supply curve
above point K0.
Fig. 2 shows a family of supply curves representing different plan-
ning periods. Of striking significance is the gradual change in the
shapes of the curves as the economy develops. As pointed out above,
OS 1 representing the initial planning period, assumes a vertical shape
at higher levels of allocation, but subsequent supply curves gradually
flatten out, with less concave bases to the origin. To illustrate the
significance of the shapes, let us consider four of them.
In the first planning period, budget allocation OE, translated
into promotional programs, yields ON1 entrepreneurs. The allocation
for the second planning period yields ON2 and the corresponding supply
Fig. 2
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curve is Y2S2. Suppose the government fails to make provision for
promotional programs during the second planning period, then we should
expect the number of entrepreneurs in the economy to fall below the
level supplied during the first planning period as indicated by OY2 '
Thus Y 2N measures the number of entrepreneurs who are likely to be
out of business should the government fail to allocate funds for the
second planning period.
On the other hand if the government continues to allocate funds,
the entrepreneurial capacity of businessmen will be enhanced to the
extent that if promotional programs are curtailed or are temporarily
halted during an advanced stage of development, the number of entre-
preneurs will not reduce but will rather increase. In other words,
continuous administration of the programs tends to yield a "demons-
tration effect" which propels the economy towards a higher level of
entrepreneurship. To illustrate this point, consider Y S , i.e. the
supply curve for the fourth planning period. If the government were to
continue allocating funds for promotional programs, then budget level
OE will yield ON entrepreneurs. Assuming that during this period the
government decides to suspend the programs, the number of entrepreneurs
that will remain in business will be equal to OY . Thus, as a result
of the "demonstration effect" the number of entrepreneurs in the econo-
my will increase by an amount equivalent to N3 Y At any rate, the
economy loses potential entrepreneurs equal to Y N. In short the econo-
my stands to lose whenever promotional programs are halted or severely
curtailed.
At an advanced stage of economic development, such promotional
programs as subsidies to disadvantaged entrepreneurs, dissemination of
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trade and other items of information and administrative overheads will
still be required. However,, it is argued here that as a proportion of
the national budget, the entrepreneurial budget will gradually decrease
over time as the gross national product increases.
In Fig. 3, a family of demand curves has been drawn to demonstrate
how entrepreneurial programs generated by budget allocations relate
to entrepreneurial supply. Curve t represents the demand schedule
during the first planning period, t2 the second planning period, etc.
Curve sI represents the supply schedule during the first planning pe-
riod, s2 the second planning period, etc. A point worth emphasizing is
the fairly inelastic nature of both demand and supply curves at the
early stages of development. The inelasticity is attributed to several
economic and socio-cultural constraints. Thus their slopes must of ne-
cessity remain steep.
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Let us assume that we can project for several planning periods
the level of entrepreneurial budgets, and that we can also predict the
behavior of the government with respect to investment decisions on en-
trepreneurial promotion. On the basis of these assumptions, it is
possible to derive an aggregate demand curve for the economy as a
whole. Needless to point out, an infinite number of such curves can
be drawn, depending on the basis of our predictions of the investment
behavior of the government. Fig. 3 shows such a curve.
Fig. 4 depicts the relative effectiveness of programs created
by different levels of allocation. On the basis of our ealier assump-
tion that each level could be tailored to the supply of a specific
Fig. 4
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number of entrepreneurs, we can measure both expenditure levels and
their attendant entrepreneurial supply on the ordinate, and planning
periods on the abscissa. The expenditure level at each point on an
expenditure curve should be interpreted in terms of combination of
programs, with the result that some combinations are more effective
than others.35 It is evident from the diagram that of all the expen-
diture paths, path 1 is the most effective, and path 5 the least
effective.
In conclusion, one may question practical realities of some fea-
tures of the graphical analysis. For example, how real is the assump-
tion that for each level of budget allocation we can roughly estimate
3 5 In mathematical terms, the area under each expenditure curve can be
expressed as an integral function, so that the larger the area, the
more effective the combination of programs. Without attempting to
solve the following equation, we can symbolically express the effec-
tiveness of each path as foll ws:
yrT
Maximize = (W,Nt /(%,q,r,s,Nt-1,t) -
C ~ -d t
E t(%,q,r,s)e d )dt
where \ = objective function, viz entrepreneurial
supply.
W = weight attached to the selected programs
N = entrepreneurs supplied in the present
t planning period.
% = proportion of annual national budget
for promotional programs.
q,r,s = proportion of entrepreneurial budget
earmarked for different programs.
(The number of programs could vary).
Nt-l = number of entrepreneurs supplied in the
previous planning period.
t = duration of the planning period.
E = level of present expenditure.
-d=
e = rate of discount.
M 0 M M M I
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the number of entrepreneurs that can be supplied. However, we can-
not gainsay the fact that promotional programs,under proper adminis-
36
trationcan increase the level of entrepreneurship in the economy,
and in our attempt to conceptualize this tendency, we have resorted
to the orthodox demand-supply approach.
36in this connection, the position of the government is analogous
to that of a monopsonist.
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Economic Viewpoint
One of the exploratory writings with respect to the role of
expectation in economics was initiated by G.L.S. Shackle.3 7  He
explains that the decision of an investor about whether investment
should be made in one out of many feasible projects is determined by:
(1) the expected gain or loss from each project (focus-values), just
as a gambler treats his indifference curve; (2) date at which he
expects the business to be in operation (focus-outcome), and (3) a
projected date in future when the attractiveness of the project will
increase or decrease (potential surprise).3 8
Although the investor is supposed to act rationally by his
judicious evaluation of market conditions, he must also be a man
with unfailing intuition and reliable powers of prediction to make
the right type of judgement. The small number of people with such
a mental calibre especially in the early stages of development may
partly explain the slow rate of growth of entrepreneurial class, or
the rather low level of business operation in developing nations,
or among educationally disadvantaged groups in society. However,
the main problem with the expectation approach is that it takes the
market as given and relegates to oblivion all the institutional or
external factors which influence day-to-day and long-run business
operations, i.e. what has been referred to earlier as determinants
37G.L.S. Shackle, Expectation in Economics. Cambridge: University
Press, 1949.
38Ibid., Ch. 3, pp. 59-76.
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of effective demand. Hence the approach is supply-oriented.
Another viewpoint is presented by H. Leibenstein.39 He postu-
lates three conditions that determine the growth of entrepreneurship:
(1) The size of entrepreneurial class. The size does not only deter-
mine the importance and prestige of the group, but also the extent
of the contacts and the degree of familiarity that potential entre-
preneurs can have with members of the entrepreneurial group. (2) The
level of per capita income. He states: "the lower the level of
per capita income, the smaller the supply of entrepreneurship in
response to the demand that may exist.''40 (3) The rate of growth
of per capita income.
Without taking into account the pattern of income distribution,
the level of per capita income as a condition is vague. Suppose the
top ten per cent of a nation's population are high-income families
the majority of whom are businessmen, and that they control 80% of
the wealth in the nation. In this case, it is evident that the
growth of entrepreneurship and the pattern of income distribution
would be different had most of the businessmen come from the middle-
class, constituting 30% of all families. Although the size is an
important factor, it makes a lot of difference how much of the
nation's wealth the entrepreneurial class controls. This will affect
39 H. Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth. New
York, John Wiley and Sons, 1959, Ch. 9, pp. 121-135.
4 0 Ibid., p. 126.
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their attitude toward other groups, politics and the government. It
will also influence their willingness to let others rise up the entre-
preneurial ladder. Further, Leibenstein does not tell us how critical
indigenous investment is to the growth rate criterion. It is
decisively important whether or not indigenous investment, vis-a-vis
foreign investment, plays a leading role. Reliance on much foreign
investment would require political stability to realize a desirable
growth rate. Besides, the sectors in which foreign investment takes
place would greatly determine the rate of diffusion of entrepreneurial
spirit among the indigenous people.
To a large extent, Alec P. Alexander supports Liebenstein's
viewpoint, except that he postulates three complementary conditions,
namely, the availability of capital market, management and flow of
information in the decision-making process. Although these comple-
mentary conditions shed more light on the problem, the above
comments on Leibenstein's viewpoints apply here.
Among a few economists who have attempted to weigh both demand
and supply influences is A. 0. Hirschman.42 With respect to supply,
he points out the pitfalls of both the "group-focused image of
change'' and the "ego-focused image of change" that inhibit economic
progress. On the one hand, the group-focused image of change leaves
4 1Alec P. Alexander, "The Supply of Industrial Entrepreneurship,''
op. cit.
42Albert 0. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1958, Ch. 1, pp. 1-28.
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little room for individual enrichment but seeks after collective
benefits, and consequently it is "incompatible with any large-scale
development aiming at a fundamental transformation and modernization
of an economy.' 3 On the other hand, the ego-focused image of change
is often disguised in the nature of sheer luck, e.g. lotteries, and
outwitting of others, and it also obstructs the development of the
innovative individuals or entrepreneurs.
By referring to "cooperative component of entrepreneurship,"45
i.e. the ability to engineer agreement among all interested parties,
enlisting the cooperation of official agencies in such matters as
custom duties, permits, exchange control regulations, ability to
develop an appropriate administrative mechanism, successful handling
of labor and public relations, etc., Hirschman actually throws light
on some of the major determinants of demand, so essential in register-
ing supply responses. In short, the existence of investment oppor-
tunities do not ipso facto create demand for entrepreneurs, as some
economists would make us believe. The quality of institutional
arrangements or Hirschman's "cooperative component" dictates the
pace at which these opportunities could be seized. We cannot agree
more with W. Arthur Lewis when he affirms that ''it is also possible
that there may be institutional changes permitting greater freedom
lbid., p. 13.
44Ibid., p. 16.
l45 bid., p. 17.
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of maneuver, without the underlying economic factors having changed.'46
Socio-Anthropological Viewpoint
Relying on two inter-related theories of action and roles formu-
lated by Talcott Parsons and his colleagues, both Alexander
Gerschenkron 8 and Alec P. Alexander 9 have attempted to link the two
theories to the development of entrepreneurship. The theory of action
stipulates that the orientation of an action defines what specific
social roles should be performed by individuals and the relation of
individual's roles to one another. Such a "need-disposition structure
which controls one's responses to the expectations defining one's
various roles is therefore one of the most fundamental aspects of any
personality...." 5 0 Furthermore, through positive and negative
4SOp. cit., p. 147.
4 7Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (eds.), Toward a General Theory
of Action, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, especially
Part 2.
4 8Alexander Gerschenkron, ''Social Attitudes, Entrepreneurship, and
Economic Development,'' EEH, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1953-54), pp. 1-19.
4 9Alec P. Alexander, ''The Supply of Industrial Entrepreneurship," op.
cit.
5 0Parsons, et al.; op. cit., p. 148. We may also note here Hoselitz's
argument that in facieties where "ascription of roles" predominate,
social mobility is essentially possible not for individuals but for
only the stratified groups; but where "achievement of roles" pre-
dominate individuals within any group may experience mobility, still
leaving distinctions and differences between the stratified groups
unchanged. See Bert F. Hoselitz, "Social Stratification and Economic
Development," International Social Science Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2
(1964), p. 248.
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sanctions (reward values and retribution values) the system ensures
that role expectation is complied with. Hence, a conclusion is drawn
that the: value system; becomes the crucial determinant of action. 5 1
As the theory of role expectation defines which roles individuals
in society should perform, Gerschenkron thinks the role theory fits
more into static social systems, and that it does not help us inter-
- 52pret or explain the process of change. He finally reaches a conclu-
sion that social attitude toward entrepreneurs do not significantly
affect the processes of industrialization unless they are allowed to
become crystallized in governmental action.53 In relating the role
theory to the supply of industrial entrepreneurship, A. P. Alexander
argues that role expectations are normatively defined along a
positive-negative continuum. Consequently the entrepreneurs' position
on the scale will condition the development of entrepreneurship.54
The major pitfall in the application of the two theories to the
development of entrepreneurship is that social systems change
over time. And if this is so, we are still left in doubt as to
how role expectation changes over time. We need to know those
mechanisms and strategies which can be employed to make
5 1The explanation is that value systems do not change readily, so
that economic development must break through the barriers of
routine prejudice and stagnation, among which diverse attitudes
towards entrepreneurship are important elements. For an amplifi-
cation of this point, see Gerschenkron, op. cit., p. 9, et seq.
52O 
. cit., p. 3.
53 lbid., p. 15.
54See his 'Supply of IndustrialEntrepreneurship," op. cit., p. 143.
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the changes conducive to entrepreneurship fast enough. 5 5
Ralph Linton56 specifically refers to the constraints and obliga-
tions imposed by the extended family system as disincentives to
individual economic profit. He affirms: "the greater the opportuni-
ties for individual economic profit provided by any socio-cultural
situation, the weaker the ties of extended kinship will become."57
This is definitely an understatement of the real facts.5 8  It is not
in all circumstances that the extended family system undermines
individual economic profits. There are historical and contemporary
instances in such countries as Nigeria and Ghana where financial and
moral support given by members of the extended family to individuals
in business turned dying enterprises into booming ones. Cocoa farmers
in new cocoa areas of Ghana who migrated there from other parts of the
5 5Thomas C. Cochran aptly points out that unless the dominant cultural
themes and the resulting types of sanctions and social roles are
understood, any assumed chain of causation is merely descriptive of
a sequence rather than explanatory of real causal interaction. See
his point of view in "Role and Sanction in American Entrepreneurial
History,'' in Hugh G. J. Aitken, Explorations in Enterprise. Cam-
bridge, Harvard University Press, 1965, pp. 93-112.
56 Ralph Linton, "Cultural and Personality Factors Affecting Economic
Growth," in Bert F. Hoselitz (ed.), The Progress of Underdeveloped
Areas. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952, pp. 73-88.
571bid., p. 84.
58 See, for example, Hirschman's arguments to the contrary in "Obsta-
cles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act,"
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 8, No. 4 (July 1965),
pp. 385-393. He explains that some of the obstacles we regard as
impediments to development are really not impediments at all.
Sometimes they are blessings in disguise, or they could be lived
with.
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country are known to have received financial support of one form or
another initially from the extended
to find members of the extended fami
ships in some tropical African count
Our fears about socio-cultural
the development of entrepreneurship
in his sober appraisal of the fact t
and class structure may exist, they
ment could protect property rights,
and if administration of laws could
equitable manner, regardless of infl
family.59 In fact it is not rare
ly entering into business partner-
ries.
influences militating against
are allayed by Bert F. Hoselitz
hat although rigidities of caste
could be mitigated, if the govern-
regardless of claims of privilege,
be assumed in an impersonal and
uences of social class and economic
power. In this way, he contends, objective conditions are being
created for industrial entrepreneurship.60 He further adds that crea-
tion of climate for entrepreneurship depends ''on the one hand on
establishing social institutions which make possible objectively the
exercise of independent individual enterprises, and on the other
hand, on allowing the maturation and development of personalities
whose predominant orientation is in the direction of productivity,
working and creative integration."61
5 9 See some of the accounts given in Polly Hill, Migrant Cocoa Farmers
of Southern Ghana. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963,
pp. 185-187.
60Bert F. Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth. New
York: The Free Press, 1960, p. 154.
61 Ibid. With reference to Latin America in particular see Louis
Kriesburg, "Entrepreneurs in Latin America and the Role of Cultural
and Situational Processes,'' International Social Science Journal,
Vol. 15, No. 4 (1963), pp. 581-594.
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Opinions thus seem to confirm that socio-cultural impediments
to the development of entrepreneurship can either be overcome or do
not pose serious threats to people's attitude toward entrepreneurship.
This leaves us with two problem areas. The first is the development
of social and economic institutions and incentives to facilitate the
development of entrepreneurship, i.e. the determinants of effective
demand for entrepreneurship. The second is the development of person-
alities whose value orientation can accommodate innovative types of
entrepreneurship. We shall turn next to some of the major issues
which have been raised in connection with personality development.
Anthropo-Psychological Viewpoint
David C. McClelland has attempted to link both economic growth
and development of entrepreneurship with motivational characteristics
of individuals, or more accurately, ''need for achievement.''62 His
thesis is based on Freudian theory which traces the degree of the need
for achievement to child rearing practices and to parent-child
relations. The n-achievement theory attempts to demonstrate that
some parental attitudes encourage early self-reliance and a high level
of aspiration. These parental attitudes reflect values embedded in
the total culture of a society and all its attendant ideologies.
Referring to the level of entrepreneurship in developing nations,
he asserts:
62David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society. New York: Van
Nostrand, 1961.
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Because they are often low in n-Achievement, they do
not have a steady flow of entrepreneurial talent upward
from the lower middle class which creates new businesses,
and must recruit their business leaders primarily from
the upper class wher9 the capital and opportunity to go
into business exist. 3
The need-achievement thesis has gained support in some quarters.
In his study of a sub-set of 84 spin-off companies from M.I.T. labora-
tories, Edward B. Roberts attempts to determine the factors affect-
ing new enterprise success, using the following indices: average
sales, sales growth, projected sales, a weighted performance that
combines company age and profitability with sales growth, Dun and
Bradstreet ratings, and the entrepreneur's self-evaluation of the
company's success. Finding close correlations between these factors,
he proceeds to identify indices that separate higher performers from
lower performers, namely, degree of technology transfer, educational
level, business function, concern about personnel matters and the
existence of a marketing department. Next he introduces ''personality
factors" that seem to correlate with high entrepreneurial success.
On the basis of a Thematic Apperception Test,65 he arrives at a
6 3bid., p. 256.
6 4 Edward B. Roberts, ''A Basic Study of Innovators; How to Keep and
Capitalize on Their Talents," Research Management, Vol. I1, No. 4
(1968), pp. 249-266.
65TAT was used in an interview of Michigan businessmen study by Roger
Coup, in relation to, inter alia, their personal input that keep
their business alive. For details, see Orvis Collins and David
G. Moore, op. cit., pp. 33-38.
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conclusion that the high performers have a high need for achievement
and a moderate need for power, while lower performers have a low need
for achievement and high or low need for power.
In spite of the apparent usefulness of the theory in some research
endeavors, its pitfalls cannot easily be overlooked. To begin with,
it places entrepreneurial functions on the upper class (see above
quotation of McClelland). But it is equally true that low-income
families who start out as petty-traders, hawkers, servicemen, etc.,
achieve higher social status when they become big merchants and
industrialists. Another reservation is that it uses social stratifi-
cation as a major point of reference,66 and therefore underscores
the value orientation of ethnic groups, e.g. in the choice of occupa-
tions, irrespective of their social class. As an illustration, we
need really persuasive arguments to convince ourselves why the Ibos
and the Ibibios of Nigeria are more enterprising than other tribal
qroups in Nigeria, or the Kwahus in Ghana, apart from the oft-
quoted reason that they belong to minority groups, and feeling
discriminated, usually turn to business to succeed in life. On
this point John R. Harris, in his study of 265 industrial entrepre-
6 6 In elaboration of this point, McClelland imposes two conditions:
(1) if the minority are predominantly middle class, and (2) if
they are prevented from entering higher prestige occupation. See
McClelland, op. cit., p. 280.
6 7The Kwahus, numbering probably less than 100,000 in a country of
8.5 million people have for several decades been most enterprising
sub-group within the larger Akan linguistic group.
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neurs in Nigeria, makes it clear that it is impossible to distinguish
among social, psychological and economic theories of entrepreneurial
supply and consequently the differences in economic structure of the
regions, exposure to western education and "modern" occupational
experience could be a plausible explanation.
Some objections have been raised by Fritz Redlich in connection
with certain underlying implications of the theory. One of these
implications is that people with a high n-achievement are inclined
beforehand to go into business, and the two are not the same by any
means. 7 0 He also questions why McClelland does not separate achieve-
ment orientation from all other motives, since in reality there is
no single motive which determines the actions of men, but rather a
multiplicity of motives drawing men hither and thither.71
Alexander's objections are equally persuasive. He doubts
whether a society with a high need for achievement necessarily breeds
a large number of entrepreneurs, and whether the level of the need for
achievement affects occupational choices. 7 2  In all probability, it is
6 8 John R. Harris, "Some Problems in Identifying the Role of Entrepre-
neurship in Economic Development,'" EEH, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Spring 1970),
p. 367.
69Fritz Redlich, "Economic Development, Entrepreneurship and Psycholo-
gism: A Social Scientist's Critique of McClelland's Achieving Socie-
ty," EEH, Vol. I, No. 1 (Fall 1963), pp. 10-35.
7 0 Ibid., p. 12.
71Ibid., p. 17.
7 2Alec P. Alexander, "The Supply of Industrial Entrepreneurship," op.
cit., p. 146.
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possible for individuals with characteristics of high need for achieve-
ment, e.g. concern for professional excellence and standards, to mani-
fest these traits in other occupational pursuits than in entrepreneur-
ship.
Everett G. Hagen approaches the issue of the relationship between
personality development, economic development and entrepreneurship
from a slightly different angle. He explains in his theory of "with-
drawal of status respect" 7 3 how the development of innovative or
creative personalities is centered around revolt of some group in
society against the traditional order. The revolt, he asserts, is a
process in personality development occurring in the home environment
of infancy and childhood, leading to creativity and diversity of
functional roles which the non-elite can play. As a corollary, in
traditional societies which cling to old values, the elite tend to
be self-centered groups who do not only look down upon those below
them, but also expect them to perform little "symbolic representational
function." In such societies, he contends, the type of personalities
that emerge are both authoritarian and non-innovative. To alter such
traditional societies, the non-elite's position and function must be
changed through a change in home environment in the course of a few
or several generations. As he elaborates elsewhere, the change
comes about when "a group that had a secure place in a traditional
society comes to feel through a historical change that its values or
7 3Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change, Homewood, The
Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962, especially Parts 2 and 3.
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its contributions to society or both are no longer fully respected." 4
The resultant effect is to cause sequential changes in personality
over several generations, causing individuals to (1) be more creative
than their predecessors, and (2) to give up traditional values.
The difficulty in interpreting the fundamental changes in
motivation, ideology or customs over several generations is a real
one.75 Resentment and revolt against the traditional order and
challenge against the powers of the elite can take many forms. One
form is the search for creativity and independence and this in turn
according to Hagen, causes innovative type of personalities to emerge.
However, innovation is usually interpreted in terms of technological
progress where such progress is embedded in value orientation and
societal goals. But where such an orientation is absent creativity
and innovation could take other forms.
Further, the theory of ''withdrawal of status respect'' does not
explain outstanding contributions of marginal or minority groups
to the development of entrepreneurship in certain societies. Though
such groups are usually associated with innovation, yet how they fit
74Everett E. Hagen, a reply to Gustav F. Papanek's paper on "The
Development of Entrepreneurship," AER, Papers and Proceedings,
Vol. 52, No. 2 (May 1962), p. 60.
7 5Gustav F. Papanek has raised some doubts about the theory in
connection with the development of entrepreneurship in Pakistan.
See his "The Development of Entrepreneurship," AER, Papers and
Proceedings, op. cit. Similar doubts with respect to the experi-
ence of Greece have been expressed by Alec P. Alexander, "Indus-
trial Entrepreneurship in Contemporary Greece: Origins and Growth,"
EEH, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 1966), pp. 101-120.
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into the theory is subject to question.
Lastly, a major shortcoming of the theory is that it does not
spell out the role of public policy in the process of personality
development. As an illustration, building of educational institutions
and health facilities, and the introduction of cash crops in some
traditional societies could in one generation alter societal values,
all of which are bound to affect both parent-child relationships and
societal values. Needless to emphasize, the theory therefore attempts
to throw light on supply and not demand for entrepreneurs.
However, we cannot easily ignore the significance of anthropolog-
ical, social and psychological viewpoints in explaining the develop-
ment of entrepreneurship. They do suggest that cultural influences,
motivational factors and personality traits should be considered in
our appraisal of the determinants of demand for and supply of
entrepreneurs.
In the next five chapters, we shall explore the implications of
our demand hypothesis with respect to black entrepreneurial develop-
ment in the U.S. To streamline our discussion, we shall state some
of the implications in the form of specific hypotheses. Other
hypotheses (nos. 4 and 5 below) not specifically related to demand
determinants are also included to throw more light on contemporary
black enterprises. Our hypotheses are:
1. That since the Civil War, the efforts of the Federal govern-
ment to advance the economic well-being of the black population have
been piecemeal; and moreover they have been influenced by (a) short-
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term response to economic recessions or crises, and (b) by the wind of
political change, spearheaded by local political interests, the white
business power, and trade unions.
2. That genuine forms of black leadership have never addressed
themselves adequately to the problems of black entrepreneurship fed
on white market, but instead they have, for the most part, followed
a policy of reconciliation with white business and political leadership
and with white liberals to solve black economic problems; or out of
frustration some black leaders have favored a policy of economic self-
sufficiency that breeds more poverty.
3. That the so-called ''successful" black entrepreneurs, unlike
the educated black elite or the successful white business elite, do
not belong to any elite class, but are first generation urban entre-
preneurs whose lack of business tradition and experience subjects
them to various public assistance programs.
4. That there has been a transfer of entrepreneurship from the
white business sector to the black ghettoes; and that the success of
a black entrepreneur is greatly dependent upon his work experience
and satisfaction in the white business sector.
5. That the so-called successful black entrepreneurs are per-
forming better than others precisely because they are exploiting their
socio-cultural roles as members of community organizations to further
their economic and occupational goals.
We shall consider in the following three chapters how effective
public policies, i.e. demand determinants, have been in promoting
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entrepreneurship among the black population in the U.S., and the
extent to which the socio-cultural and socio-economic environment
has favored and reacted to the development of black entrepreneurship.
It is a task which will take us into the economic history of the
black population since the Civil War, so that we may appreciate the
major historical and policy-oriented factors that account for the
current status of black entrepreneurship.
PART I I
BLACK ENTREPRENEURSHIP: AN HISTORICAL APPRAISAL
While it is a great truth to say that
the Negro must strive and strive
mightily to help himself, it is
equally true that unless his striving
be not simply seconded, but rather
aroused and encouraged by the initia-
tive of the richer and environing
group, he cannot hope for great success.
W. E. B. DuBois (The Souls of
Black Folk,
p. 58)
CHAPTER FOUR
SOUTHERN AND FEDERAL INFLUENCES IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The extent to which any sub-group within a racially heterogeneous
society attains a stable entrepreneurial success depends partly on
equality of opportunity embedded in the economic system, partly on
deliberate public policy specifically geared to correcting possible
inequities in the system, and partly on the sub-group's cultural
history. Thus viewed from the angle of American Negro economic
history, economic opportunities Negroes have been exposed to since
the Civil War, the impact of the Southern social environment, and the
attitude of the Federal government toward economic well-being of
Negroes are decidedly the most crucial historical factors underlying
the current level of entrepreneurship among them. Our main task
in this chapter is to examine the significance of each of these
factors in the development of black entrepreneurship.
The Agricultural Sector and the Development of Black Entrepreneurship
Our major proposition in this section is that the slow development
and current level of black entrepreneurship is the result of the
failure of the agricultural sector to generate a sustained flow of
capital into non-agricultural enterprises. A number of studies have
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attempted to demonstrate that the agricultural sector is a poor source
of entrepreneurial transfer to the urban economic sector.I Some of
these studies underestimate the immense investment in urban real estate
and petty commercial ventures by prosperous or enterprising farmers,
especially in Latin AmericE and tropical Africa. Further, well-to-
do farmers are known in these world regions to provide good education
fcr their children, some of whom eventually settle in urban areas as
first generation urban entrepreneurs, relying sometimes on parental
contributions in starting their businesses. The contribution of
agriculture to urban entrepreneurship could therefore be both direct
and indirect. Hence it is argued here that under ideal conditions,
agriculture could be a potential source of capital for urban entre-
preneursh i p.
In 1860, the Negro population in U.S. stood at 4,441,830,2 and
See for example the comments of Yusif A. Sayigh, that unlike other
economic sectors he finds that the farmers in his sample were
recruited from the landlord class only. See his Entrepreneurs of
Lebanon. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1962, p. 80. T. C.
Cochran also finds that his Puerto Rican business leaders were
recruited from business and professional classes, with a few from
among wealthy landowners, but none from the laboring or artisan
class. See his The Puerto Rican Businessman, op. cit., pp. 120-121.
J. J. Carrol similarly notes that the Filipino manufacturing class
is characterized by intragenerational occupational mobility and that
American firms have been the main source of entrepreneurial transfer
for those who do not belong to the manufacturing class. See his
The Filipino Manufacturing Entrepreneur, og. cit., p. 84.
2 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Negro Population 1970-1915. Washington,
D.C.: U.S.G.P.0., 1918, p. 58.
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the Southern states probably contained well over 85% of them. In
1890, the first time census figures on occupations by race became
available, three million Negroes ten years of age and over, or 3/5
of the entire Negro population, were wage earners, and of this group
3/5 were in agriculture. The South alone contained 96% of the agri-
cultural wage earners. 3 Thus at Emancipation, probably over 3/4 were
in agriculture.
In the light of the Post-Civil War conditions in the South,
opportunities for economic advancement and maximum display of entre-
preneurship were brighter in agriculture than in any other economic
activity. Why, we may ask, were Negroes not able to hold on to these
opportunities? A full answer to this question covers this and the
next chapter, but confining our discussion to agriculture alone in
the following section, we shall endeavor to explain the constraints
imposed on agricultural opportunities by conditions of wage labor,
the tenancy system and its attendant credit system.
3 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Special Report on the Statistics of
Occupations, 1890. Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., p. 18.
4
For a discussive account of the progress Negroes made in agriculture
during the period 1890-1930, see Lorenzo J. Greene and Carter G.
Woodson, The Negro Wage Earner. New York: Russell and Russell,
1930, pp. 36-74. Literature on Reconstruction is replete with the
varying dimensions of the economic opportunities that were avail-
able. For a concise account of such opportunities in agriculture
see Thomas J. Woofter, Jr., Negro Migration: Changes in Rural Organi-
zation and Population in the Cotton Belt. New York: W. D. Gray,
ch. 3, pp. 52-68. The dubious nature of the opportunities have been
challenged by W. E. B. Du Bois in his Black Reconstruction in America.
New York: Atheneum, 1969 (reprint), Ch. 7, pp. 182-236. As we shall
later see, most criticisms against the Freedmen's Bureau in relation
to conditions of Negroes pertain to the limited economic and to some
extent political advantages the Bureau bestowed on the freed slaves.
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1. Conditions of Wage Labor
Efforts of the Freedmen's Bureau to establish uniform wage
rates on all plantations met with an extremely limited success. On
several plantations, wage rates or other arrangements that served as
a proxy for wages were so unsatisfactory and unconducive to private
savings that it required the notorious black codes5 to ensure regular
supply of Negro labor. Randle in his well-documented study of
tenancy and farm labor in Mississippi in the 1890's came to the
conclusion that a substantial number of Negro farm workers consumed
more than they earned, and that the average Negro family became
poorer and poorer after the War than before. In support of this,
he points out that before the War an able-bodied Negro in northern
Mississippi was hired for an equivalent monetary expense of $200-250
a year plus his board and clothes. By 1910 he was receiving about
5Black codes, including vagrancy and apprenticeship statutes, were in
vogue throughout the South, starting from 1865. They differed in
purpose and severity of punishment. But in general, most statutes
were geared to constant supply of black labor to plantations. The
laws required both tenants and laborers to abide by contracts signed
with plantation owners. Failure to abide by the contracts usually
resulted in harsh punishments. The enforcement of poll tax of $1.00
per head for Negroes in some states compelled the unemployed to work
to meet their tax burden. Negro criminals also got their share of
the black codes. They were sometimes employed in public works or
contracted to plantation owners who required farm labor. For a dis-
cussion of the role of the codes in Post-War Southern agriculture,
see James S. Allen, The Negro Question in the United States. New
York: International Publishers, 1936, p. 56 et seq.; Du Bois, Black
Reconstruction, op. cit., pp. 196-197.
6E. H. Randle, Characteristics of the Southern Negro. New York: The
Neale Publishing Co., 1910, ch. 3. Had the Bureau agreed to land-
lords' offer of $7 a month for male laborers and $5 for female labor-
ers, the freed slaves would have been worse off than in the days of
slavery. See James S. Allen, op. cit., p. 55 et seq.
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half that amount plus board.7 The decline in wage rates in the South
at the turn of the century is supported by the Department of Agricul-
ture's study of 215 plantations, which shows that wage labor in 1913
received $12-16 a month plus board or $18-25 a month without board. 8
Under conditions of declining wage rates while both cost and
standard of living moved in the opposite direction, it is not surpris-
ing that a class of wealthy farm laborers never emerged and that the
proportion of farm laborers declined more rapidly than other classes
of farm workers. To amplify this point, while in 1860 almost all the
807,000 Negro farm workers representing 71.3% of all farm workers in
the South were laborers, by 1910 they formed only 15.4% and 11.5% in
1930. In contrast, the proportion of Negro tenants rose from 22.7%
in 1910 to 23.1% in 1930.9
We must also reckon with the psychological impact of Emancipa-
tion Proclamation of January 1863, which automatically created a large
pool of unschooled, aimless but freed slaves who chose to become
''temporary vagabonds'' to express their newly won freedom. To several
Randle, ibid., p. 128.
C. 0. Brennan, Relation of Land Tenure to Plantation Organization,
U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bulletin No. 1269. Washington,
D.C.: U.S.G.P.0., 1924, p. 27. An interesting aspect of the form
in which wages were paid was a breakdown of wages into (a) materials
supplied, which was usually 20%, and (b) cash. See John Lee
Coulter, ''Agricultural Laborers in the United States,'' Annals of the
American Academy of Pol. and Soc. Science, Vol. 40, (March 1912
p. 43.
9Thomas J. Woofter, Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation
(a research monograph for the Works Progress Administration).
Washington, D.C., 1936, Table 3, p. 11.
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of them, the desire to become small landowners through confiscation
of former masters' lands, a rumour spread throughout the South during
the War, far outweighed all economic advantages of job security entailed
in sedentary wage labor. To some also, farm labor was a mere extension
of slavery, since on a number of plantations the slave masters of the
pre-War years became landlords after the War, maintaining the same
farm workers. For all these reasons, tenancy emerged as Negroes' only
hope of effective participation in the economy.
2. The Tenancy System
Until the 1920's, agriculture in the South was synonymous with
cotton, cultivated mainly under tenancy. In fact, as late as 1920,
66.4% of all plantations in 11 Southern states were being operated
under tenancy.10 The rise of tenancy after the Civil War was a direct
outcome of the failure of wage labor to meet labor requirements of the
plantation economy. The historical association of Negroes with the
cotton plantation economy made them a central element in the tenancy
system. To give a proper orientation to our discussion, we shall
first identify the three major groups of tenants 1 associated with the
cotton plantation economy.
10Brennen, op. cit., Table 3, p. 71.
1 1For a descriptive account of the tenancy system see ibid.; Woofter,
Negro Migration, op. cit.; Woofter, Landlord and Tenant on the
Cotton Plantation, op. cit.; Lewis C. Gray, ''Southern Agriculture,
Plantation System and the Negro Problem,'' Annals of the American
Academy of Pol. and Soc. Science, Vol. 40 (March 1912), pp. 90-99;
James S. Allen, op. cit., ch. 3. The definition of the three classes
can be found in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Negro Population 1790-1915,
op. cit., pp. 568-569.
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The first group comprised share-croppers who suppl ied the labor
and one-half the fertilizers used, while land, cabins, tools, work
animals and their feed, seed, garden plots for croppers' own use and
the other one-half of fertilizers used were furnished by the landlord.
In exchange, the croppers received 50% of the harvest, and out of
their share the landlord deducted for all food, clothing, shelter,
fertilizers and other supplies received during the season.
Of the three groups, share-croppers had the least entrepreneurial
opportunities. Day-to-day decisions and supervision resided with the
landlord. They actually did not control any means of production, and
their prosperity usually depended on four features: (a) desire to
cultivate their own food crops, (b) family size which determined the
supply of additional labor, (c) the level of cotton prices, and (d) the
fairness of the landlord. 1 2
The second group comprised share-renters who furnished their
labor, work animals, tools and seeds, while the landlord provided
land, buildings and fuel. Where fertilizers were used, the cost was
met in proportion to each party's share of the crop. In return the
share-renter received between 1/4 - 1/3 of the harvest. By virtue
of his control over part of the means of production the renter could
exercise some entrepreneurial decisions although he was still under
12The fairness of the landlord in promoting the economic interest of
his tenants, i.e. by giving them their due share of the output was
a crucial factor in landlord-tenant relations. Most tenants could
just break even. For a further discussion of this issue, see Gray,
ibid., pp. 96-97.
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the supervision of the landlord. However, since a majority of share-
renters did not have the financial means to meet the cost of supplies,
they depended on the landlord to fulfill contract requirements, and
therefore they frequently fell into the same "obligation trap" as the
share-croppers.
The third major group was made up of cash-renters who paid a
fixed rent per acre in cash or a fixed amount of harvest as their
rents. In contrast with the other two groups, they were responsible
for all inputs. Where they were indebted to the landlord for supplies
advanced to them, some amount of supervision was exercised. By con-
trolling means of production, and by taking various entrepreneurial
decisions, they formed the real base for the growth of black entrepre-
neurship outside the small landowning class.
Growth of income among tenant classes in the four decades preced-
ing the Second World War was so negligible that it is debatable
whether tenants were in a position to save enough to buy their own
lands. In 1913, for example, the average income of share-croppers
was $333, but it fell to $312 in 1936. Share-renters commanded an
average income of $398 in 1913, while cash-renters in the same year
received an average income of $476. But in 1936 both classes averaged
only $417.13
Moreover, between 1900 and 1937 when tenancy reached its peak
in the agricultural sector, the rate of growth of tenancy among Negro
families compared with white families was negligible. To amplify this
1 3Woofter, Negro Migration, op. cit., p. 74.
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point, 75% of Negro agricultural labor force in the South were tenants
in 1900, but by 1937 the proportion had increased to only 77%. During
the same period, the proportion of white tenants of the total white
agricultural labor force in the region rose from 36% to 46%. 14
15Proponents of the agricultural ladder t.heory fail to provide us
with a convincing explanation of the numerical decline in Negro land-
ownership during the two comparatively prosperous decades 1910-1930
when in the seven leading cotton states the proportion of Negro
landowners of the total agricultural labor force fell from 5.9% to 5.1%.
On the other hand, the whites' share also fell from 25.1% to 23.0%
during the same period, but whereas a white landowner "losing out"
Public Affairs Committee, Farmers Without Land (Publication No. 12).
New York, 1937, p. 13.
15The theory sought to explain that the increase in the number of
tenants between 1900 and the beginning of the Second World War was
an indication of occupational mobility by which a farmer climbed
from the landless laboring class to a position of P full-fledged
landowner. The theory assumed that tenants were recruited from the
laboring class and not from the small landowning class who lost out
through debts. This assumption was not quite correct. For
example, outside the South the number of farmers between the ages
25 and 35 declined from 652,000 in 1910 to 449,000 in 1930; yet the
ratio of tenancy among farmers of this age increased from 47 to 59%
in the same period. See ibid., p. 8. For an advocacy viewpoint on
the theory, see Woofter, Negro Migration, op. cit., pp. 24-26. The
1925 U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1925, indirectly suggests that the
theory did work in the 1920's. The report indicates that out of
nearly 194,000 colored farm owners in the South, more than 1/4 of
them had purchased their farms since 1919. And of the 612,250
tenants in 1925, 616,710 or about 7/8 had rented their lands since
1919. See U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1925, p. 88 et seq.
16These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina and South Carolina.
17Woofter, Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation, op. cit.,
Table 3, p. 11.
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could easily convert his status to that of a cash-renter or a farm
manager, a Negro landowner confronted with bankruptcy usually found
himself lower on the occupational ladder.
An important point to be noted in connection with landownership
among Negroes is that its growth depended largely on improvements in
tenancy under normal and stable market conditions undisturbed by
periods of exceptionally good cotton prices. Hence, assuming that
landowners had found it economic to hold on to their lands at the
beginning of this century because of easy access to credit and good
cotton market conditions, occupational mobility would have been more
constricted for Negro tenants and a large proportion of them
probably would not have had any chance of retaining their jobs. The
main reason was that major improvements in cotton prices and credit
financing attracted more whites into tenancy but spelt doom for
Negroes, simply because some plantation owners preferred white
tenants, if available. Land speculation also tended to be rampant
on such occasions. This meant that the best opportunities for Negroes
to have strengthened their rural entrepreneurial base occurred during
the period 1865-1900 when labor shortages, low agricultural land
values and more stable cotton prices provided the necessary condi-
tions for Negro landownership.
To be sure, decline in landownership due to increasing opera-
tional costs, stagnant tenant incomes, excessive land speculation
and lack of easy credit after the turn of the century clearly
decided the fate of rural black entrepreneurship, the development
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of which would have provided a firmer foundation for urban black
entrepreneurship. Of these factors, 8 the credit system, intricately
woven into the cotton plantation economy, created the most excruciat-
ing roadblock to rural black entrepreneurship. To this issue we now
turn.
3. Credit System1 9
Before the development of modern banking, merchant credit, using
agricultural output as lien, was a major source of finance for planta-
tion agriculture. In most cases, landlords obtained credit directly
from merchants and later from both merchants and banks, and the land-
lords in turn provided tenants with credit and necessary advnaces to
purchase various inputs. Rarely could tenants borrow directly from
either a bank or a merchant. On the 237 plantations studied by
Brennen, 98% of the Negro tenants and 90% of the white tenants were
18Environmental and social factors nonetheless were equally decisive.
Rupert B. Vance's study shows a close relationship between distri-
bution of races on the one hand, the soil characteristics and
types of agriculture on the other. Poor soils on which Negro fami-
lies were found were characterized by decades of monoculture, soil
erosion and leaching especially on the sandy soils. All these
required heavy expenditures in fertilization which many farmers
could not afford. See Rupert B. Vance, Human Geography in the
South. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1932,
ch. 5, pp. 77-108. The social factors will be dealt with later
on.
19 For an interesting discussion of the system before the Second World
War, see C. 0. Brennen, op. cit., pp. 60-65; Woofter, Landlord and
Tenant on the Cotton PlanatTon, ch. 4, pp. 49-64; Myrdal, American
Dilemma, op. cit., pp. 232-234; L. C. Gray, Southern Agriculture,
op. cit.; David L. Wickers, Farmer Bankruptcies, 1898-1935 (Circu-
Tar TF3 414, U.S. Department of Agriculture), Washington, D. C.,
September 1936.
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supplied with advances.20 He also found out that in 1920 and 1921,
the average amount of credit advanced to share-croppers was $289,
and $555 to share-renters.21 In essence, the advances amounted to
about 90% of the tenants' potential income, leaving barely 10% for
their own use.
The credit system had a number of defects. First, it led to
perpetuation of debt22 for both tenants and landowners. In the seven
cotton states studied by Woofter, mortgage debts on both plantations
and small farms increased by 167% from 1910 to 1920, 33% during the
period 1920 to 1925, and 8% from 1925 to 1928.23
Second, it created disincentives for tenants to save, and con-
stituted the main impediment against various forms of capital accumula-
tion among Negro farm workers most of whom through sheer illiteracy and
thriftlessness did not know how to budget, reduce operational costs
and to meet credit requirements. This brought in its train the
inevitable "exploitation of sheerest type, high prices for supplies,
high interest charges, sometimes falsification of accounts."2 4
20 Brennen, o . cit. , p. 61-62.
21 Ibid.
22 For a quantitative analysis and inter-regional comparison of the
incidence of bankruptcies across the nation, see Wickers, op. cit.
2 3Woofter, Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation, op. cit.,
p. 51.
24Gray, "Southern Agriculture," op. cit., p. 96.
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The third and probably the worst outcome of the credit system was
the practice of peonage by which Negro farm workers indebted to their
landlords were compelled by law to be retained until the debts were
paid by offering their labor. Merchants or banks held the first lien
against the total crop output. Thus, in times of low prices, the
tenant was first to be affected and usually could not break even.
According to Raper and Reid, loans advanced in the late 1930's by
landlords commanded interest rates of 10% for three months, or an
equivalent of 35% per annum. 25 The negative effect of the credit
system and the attendant peonage practice on the economic progress of
Negroes is summed up by Lewis C. Gray thus:
The vicious system which forces the Negro to
hypothecate his labor to obtain credit results
inevitably in divorcing the planter's interest
from those of his tenant. The Negro is retained
chiefly by keeping him in debt. Not only does
this intensify the tendency to petty exploita-
tion, but Negro thrift becomes contrary to the
planter's interest.2 6
Even when the Supreme Court of U. S. declared peonage unconstitutional
in 1911, some Southern states got round the issue by passing laws to
the effect that landlords who employed Negroes indebted to other
landlords automatically became responsible for the debts.
2 5Arthur F. Raper and Ira De A. Reid, Sharecroppers All. Chapel Hill:
Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1941, p. 22.
26 Gray, op. cit., p. 97. For a vivid account of the disadvantages of
peonage, see George K. Holmes, "Peons of the South," Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 4 (Sept.
1893), pp. 265-274.
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In short, the credit system was a stumbling block against the
rise of tenants on the agricultural ladder. For both landlords and
tenants, it did not provide any motivation for diversification and
innovative farming since it was tied to specific marketable crops
approved by merchant creditors and banks. The tenancy and credit
systems no doubt conspired against Negro entrepreneurship, but the
two economic institutions could not have thrived without a conducive
and fertile civic environment to support them for nearly three genera-
tions. A brief look at this environment may provide us with a
greater insight.
The Impact of the Southern Tradition
The problems of the American Negro spring from two main sources:
his color and his slave history. Of the two, color is a more decisive
factor. The Irish and Italians, for example, were probably one shade
better off economically than Negroes after Reconstruction, but they have
reached a position of even electing Presidents from their ranks.
Probably it is color and not so much religion nor political ideology
which is the greatest enemy of mankind. The South carries a stigma
of its own simply because the black and white cultures converged in
the region to share a common experience under capitalism which
accords due respect to and perpetuates the "dynasty of the affluent
privileged class."
Before the Civil War, the landlord had complete responsibility
for the welfare of his slaves. The plantation economy engendered
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a set of mores which were not easily dislodged after slavery was
abolished. These mores were fed on a social structure that in
was an outcome of both the slave institution
economy. When slavery was finally abolished,
entrenched in a three-tier social structure. 2
landed aristocracy. At the bottom were vast
poor whites. In between the two were small 1
and self-sufficient yeomen. As separate as t
sense of unity and dedication to the biologic
"survival of the fittest" gave both rich and
rallying point, with the Negro serving as the
explains that the Civil War had the effect of
secessionist states,29 and although abolition
and the agrarian
the economy was firmly
7 At the top were the
numbers of Negroes and
andholding independent
hese classes were, a
al precept of the
poor whites a common
common foe.28 Cash
uniting the eleven
of slavery was not the
2 7 For a description of the three classes, see William H. Nicholls,
Southern Tradition and Regional Progress. Chapel Hill: Univ. of
North Carolina Press, 1960, pp. 34-42.
28This is clearly reflected in the politics of the South. Pro-
fessor Key explains the situation in the following way: "In its
grand outlines the politics of the South revolves around the posi-
tion of the Negro. It is sometimes interpreted as the politics of
cotton, as a politics of free trade, as a politics of agrarian
poverty, or as a politics of planter and plutocrat. Although such
interpretations have a superficial validity, in the last analysis
the major peculiarities of Southern politics go back to the Negro."
See V. 0. Key, Southern Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949,
p. 5. James M. Dabbs has remarked that democracy was more widely
practised among Southern whites in the post-bellum years than any-
where else in the country. See his The Southern Heritage. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1958, ch. 15.
29W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941,
pp. 65-70. On this theme see Key, op. cit., pp. 3-12.
itself
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prime cause of the War,3 0 by being made one of the War aims later,
Negroes automatically became victims of the wrath of the secessionists.
In brief, the ''Southern tradition," characterized by an
agrarian way of life, rigidity of the social structure and involuntary
conspiracy of whites to keep blacks at the bottom of the social ladder
prevented the growth of Negro landowning class. Admitting that thrift-
lessness and infrugality was sufficiently widespread among Negro
families and could have militated against them in their bid to partake
effectively in the agrarian economy, the more ambitious had no way of
overcoming the vestiges of slavery. Raper in his study of Greene and
Macon Counties, Georgia, vividly files this report.
Landownership - even now - can be most exacting
and highly selective procedure: the would-be-
owner must be acceptable to the white community,
have a white sponsor, be content with the pur-
chase of acreage least desired by the whites, and
pay for it in a very few years. 3
He goes on to explain that Negroes who had purchased more than 25
acres, nearly nine-tenths reported that they bought their parcels
C. Vann Woodward identifies three aims of the War as (a) to keep the
country united, (b) to ensure freedom, and (c) equality among citi-
zens. There was no problem in keeping the union, but the crux of
the matter pivoted on the two democratic principles - freedom and
equality which often ride on a collision course wherever white and
black races are compelled to share a common cultural heritage. See
his The Burden of the South. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ.
Press, 1960, pp. 69-87.
3 1 For an incisive discussion of agrarian values underlying the South-
ern tradition see Nicholls, op. cit.; Cash, op. cit., James M. Dabb,
op. cit., Edwin Mims, The Advancing South. Garden City: Doubleday,
Page & Co., 1926.
32Arthur F. Raper, Preface to Peasantry. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North
Carolina Press, 1936, p. 122.
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from white men, mostly through the whites' own initiative.
Of equal significance was the relative poverty of the region.
The gap between the North and the South did not begin to close until
after the First World War. In 1880 for example, per capita wealth
based on property values was $376 for the South compared with $1,186
for the rest of the nation. Also combining all the property values,
the South's total wealth was 27% of the Northeast States.33 In an
environment stricken with poverty, the rich were tempted to hold on
to what they had by maximum exploitation of both poor whites and the
black population. The Northern capitalists, in their capacity as
merchants and creditors of the plantation system and as forebearers of
Southern industrialization, played no small part in the "exploitation
game." The use of black workers by the Northern capitalists in
Northern factories, railways and other areas of economic activity to
break strikes was part and parcel of the game.34
It is to be noted that the Southern tradition could not have
survived all these decades without the tolerance and sometimes the
sanction of the federal political machinery of which it is a part.
33C. Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History, og. cit., p. 17.
It should further be noted that in 1900, the South still maintained
its 37% share of value added by manufacture as it did in 1860, al-
though its per capita income remained at 43% of the rest of the
nation between 1860-1900. See Nicholls, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
34 For a rather brief account of how Northern capitalists induced
black workers to migrate to Northern cities, see Carl Kelsey,
''Some Causes of Negro Migration" in Charities Organization Society,
Negroes in the North. New York: Charities Publication Committee,
1905, pp. 15-17.
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We shall briefly examine in the next section the attitude of the
Federal Government during two critical historical periods when
through legislation and administrative fiats the tide could have been
turned in favor of the poor.
Federal Attitude Toward Black Entrepreneurship: Historical Cases
Our hypothesis as stated in Chapter 3 is that since the Civil War,
the efforts of the Federal Government to advance the economic well-
being of the black population have been piecemeal; and, moreover, they
have been influenced by (a) short-term response to economic recessions
or crises, and (b) by the wind of political change, spearheaded by
local political interests, white business power and trade unions.
An implicit assumption underlying the hypothesis is that the
Federal Government alone has the resources and the will to solve
black socio-economic problems, and that state and local political
powers and more powerful economic institutions do not only lack the
initiative but are also disinterested. The state and local political
institutions unquestionably see the problem as a national one. Since
the Civil War, the federal political machinery has constantly assumed
that the private sector is powerful enough to solve economic problems
of Negroes and the only occasions well-intentioned programs have
been designed with specific foci by Washington to combat economic
hardships among Negro families have been periods of economic and
political crises. These periods are (a) the Reconstruction era,
(b) the Depression years of the 1930's and (c) the early 1960's when
93
the Democrats were called upon to offer a well-tailored answer
to the Civil Rights Movement, and out of this emerged the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. We shall confine our discussion briefly to the Recon-
struction and Depression periods and explore how the Federal political
machinery saw black economic problems.
The Reconstruction and Negro Economic Progress
Before the Emancipation Proclamation in January 1863, the Radical
Republicans in Congress successfully influenced the passage of the
Confiscation Act of authorizing the President to seize all estates,
property, money, stocks, credits, etc., belonging to the rebels in the
Confederate States. In March 1865, the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen
and Abandoned Lands (Freedmen's Bureau) was established by law under
the War Department to manage the confiscated and abandoned lands, to
supervise the supply of labor to plantations, to supervise labor
relations between the freedmen and their employers, and to organize
relief and other social welfare services for refugees and the freedmen.
The Act also provided that branches of the Bureau be established in
each of the Southern states under a military commissioner.
The Freedmen's Bureau Act, had it been aimed at bringing about
profound economic improvements of the freedmen and the white refugees,
could have served as a landmark in bridging the wide economic gap
between the rich and the poor in the region.35 To all intents and
3 5For best references on the nature and evaluation of the activities
of the Bureau itself within the framework of Reconstruction, see
Paul S. Pierce, The Freedmen's Bureau. Iowa City: Univ. of Iowa
Press, 1904; George R. Bently, History of the Freedmen's Bureau.
Philadelphia: Univ. of Penn. Press, 1955.
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purposes, it was geared to a political goal36 and lacked any long-term
economic purpose. To begin with, Emancipation was proclaimed in
January 1863, but it took Congress over two years to agree on an
economic plan 3 7 for the freedmen and the refugees.
Second, the Act made it clear that redistribution of the confis-
cated and abandoned lands as gifts to the freedmen and refugees was
not contemplated. Rather, it authorized the military commissioners to
assign 40 acres to the needy families at an annual interest rate of
6% based in 1860 land values.38 Altogether about 900,000 acres were
under the control of the Bureau in 1865, and considering the fact that
the freedmen alone numbered about 3.5 million, not to speak of over
400,000 land-thirsty white refugees, a Negro family of five could
hardly have obtained an acre of farmland. To make things worse, in
selling these farmlands the best lands went to large operators and
Northern speculators.3 9 . Assuming that enough lands were available
We should note that the final Act was a compromise between the plan
devised by the Radicals in Congress to weaken the power of the
Southern landed aristocracy and the plan of President Andrew Johnson
and the Conservatives to bring the Confederate States back to the
Union. For a balanced account of the attitude of President Johnson
toward the Bureau, see Eric L. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Recon-
struction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, especially
chs. 5-7; Robert Cruden, The Negro in Reconstruction. Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969, chs. 1-2; Du Bois, Black Reconstruc-
tion, op. cit., ch. 7.
3 7James S. Allen, Reconstruction, the Battle for Democracy. New York:
International Publishers, 1937, p. 50.
_bid., p. 51.
39 Before the passage of the Bureau's Act an experimental program in
resettlement had been tried in three districts under "Yeatman Plan''
passed in Congress in July 1864.
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for ambitious, needy families to farm, they were too poor to buy lands
and farming equipment on their own. However, the greatest blow received
by the Bureau in its land redistribution program was an executive order
of September 1865, Circular No. 15, authorizing the Bureau's Commissioner,
Oliver Howard, to restore to pardoned rebels all abandoned and condemned
lands not actually sold.40 In some extreme cases, President Johnson
himself restored lands when he realized that the Bureau's officials were
dragging their feet. 1
Congress sought to pacify the landless yeomen, refugees and the
freedmen by the passage of the Homestead Act in 1866, affecting
unsettled lands in Alabama, Florida, Arkansas, Mississippi and Missouri.
But the resistance put up by planters in these states was so vehement
that by the late 1860's only 4,000 refugees were known to have
benefitted from the Act.42 In fact the resistance should have been
foreseen, in view of the fact that the landless were always seen by
the rebel planters as allies of the Union army. There was only one
practical course open to the Federal Government: outright purchase
of land from legal owners for redistribution.
Third, what made the Bureau's scope of authority over the
economic destiny of the freedmen and the refugees shortsighted was
its exclusion from the War Department's budget allocation during the
first year of its existence. It was told to survive on the income
40G. R. Bentley, op. cit., p. 95.
41 Ibid., p. 101.
42P. S. Pierce, op. cit., pp. 129-131.
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from the sale of confiscated lands. Du Bois sums up the problem of
the Bureau thus:
It was so limited in time that it had small chance
for efficient and comprehensive planning. It had
at first no appropriate funds, but was supposed to
depend on the chance accumulations of war time....
Further than this it had to use a rough military
machine for administering a delicate social prob-
lem. 43
As far as Andrew Johnson and his conservative Republican followers were
concerned, the Bureau was an ephemeral organization created to meet
exigencies of war, and was therefore programmed to die with full
restoration of the Confederate States in the Union. Probably the most
useful work done by the Bureau was the recruitment of jobless Negroes for
wage labor and regulation of wage rates, supported largely by its
court functions which made it possible for the freedmen to exercise
their civil rights under the 13th Amendment.45 The Bureau was
ultimately compelled to focus its energies on reducing extreme hunger
and destitution among its client population. It is no wonder then that
it was never prepared to establish a minimum wage rate, believing that
the market mechanism was under the circumstances superior to public
.146
regulation.
The failure of Congress to come up with a meaningful and long-
43Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 223.
44Pierce, op. cit., p. 132.
45For an account of how the courts operated, see Bentley, op. cit.,
pp. 152-168.
46Pierce, op. cit., p. 138.
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range land ownership plan for the freedmen and the refugees and the
limited resources of the Bureau reflected the ambition of Andrew
Johnson to satisfy all the desires of the Southern planters and the
landed aristocracy for the sake of the Union. 7 The alliance that
developed in the 1870's between the Radicals (i.e. the abolitionists
as well as the protectors of the freedmen), and the ex-Rebels, cul-
minating in the election of President Hayes, foreshadowed a century
of economic doom of American blacks. In the next section, we shall
take a brief look at how the Federal Government handled black economic
problems during the Depression, another period of economic crises.
Southern Tenants and the New Deal
The Great Depression provides us with a good example of how sensi-
tive the federal legislative and executive machinery is to the economic
problems of the poor. The Depression exerted its toll on all economic
sectors, but low-class workers such as Southern cotton tenants probably
suffered most. Needless to emphasize, economic problems of Southern
tenants in the Depression pivoted on the Negro. According to two
surveys authorized by the Works Progress Administration in relation to
problems of plantation agriculture, technological changes alone caused
47Note also that his unflinching support for the 14th Amendment basing
suffrage on ownership of real estate, possession of fixed income and
level of education was a clear indication of his rejection of Negro
political freedom.
4 8 For circumstances leading to the union between the two opposing camps.
see C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction. Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1951.
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an 8% drop in the demand for labor such that the number of resident
families per 1,000 acres of cropland decreased from 37 to 34 during
1934-1937. A 1937 President's Committee on Farm Tenancy candidly
remarked that ''no agency with adequate powers has been charged with
correcting undesirable relationship to the land and the consequences
of system of land tenure.''50 Instead of highlighting how Negro farmers
and farm workers fared under Federal economic relief programs51 in the
Depression, we shall briefly discuss the activities of the Cotton Section
of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration52 which attempted on a
49Major findings of the study are contained in T. J. Woofter and A. E.
Fisher, Plantation South Today (a study prepared for WPA). Washing-
ton, D.C.:U.S.G.P.0., 1940, pp. 7-18. It is worth noting that in
1930 nearly 4/5 of all Negro farm workers did not own land, as com-
pared with 3/4 at the turn of the century. Of the non-landowning
class 3/5 were share-croppers. See Arthur F. Raper and Ira De A.
Reid, Sharecroppers All. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina
Press, 1941, p. 64.
5 0National Resource Committee, Farm Tenancy. (Report of the Presi-
dent's Committee.) Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.0., Feb. 1937, p. 11.
51Important economic programs that benefitted Southern farmers but will
not be discussed included (a) The Farm Credit program (1933) to pro-
vide low-interest credit to farmers through locally organized Produc-
tion Credit Corporations; (b) Rural Rehabilitation (1934) under the
Federal Emergency Relief Administration to advance credit to farm
families; (c) Farm Security Administration (1937) to provide 3% in-
terest loans to tenants, amortized over a 40-year period.
5 2 For a comprehensive account of the activities of the Cotton Section,
see David E. Conrad, The Forgotten Farmers: the Story of Share-
croppers in the New Deal. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1965;
Edwin G. Nourse, Joseph S. Davis and John D. Black, Three Years of
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1937; Raymond Wolters, Negroes and the Great
Depression. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Corp., 1970, pp. 3-82;
T. J. Woofter, The Landlord and the Tenant, op. cit.; Henry I.
Richards, Cotton Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1934.
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broad scale to deal with problems of Southern tenants.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was designed purposely to
boost up agricultural prices through crop production control. In
brief, the Act authorized the administering agency, the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration (AAA), to disburse benefit payments to
individual farmers who voluntarily chose to restrict the production
of specific crops to an agreed per cent of their total acreage. The
intention of the government was to pass on the benefit payments to
processors and consumers of cotton. In 1934, however, an amendment
was made specifying that 40% of the land of participating farmers be
kept out of production in exchange for rental payment of 3.5 cents
for each pound of cotton not produced and additional "parity payments''
of not less than one cent per pound.
No doubt, the adjustment program increased the income of cotton
farmers in the three years (1933-35) the program was put into effect. 5 3
Partly as a result of the program, the price of a pound of cotton was
selling for 9.4 cents on December 1, 1933, as compared with 5.7 cents
per pound a year earlier. The gross income from cotton seed increased
from $431 million in 1932 to $670 million in 1933.54 Thus the inten-
tion of the program to increase the overall income of farm workers
was unquestionably a good idea. However, the real problem was created
by the wording of the Act which left enough room for the Secretary of
5 3For an account of the income effect of the program on farmers, see
Nourse, Davis and Black, op. cit., pp. 293-301.
54 Wolters, op. cit., p. 10.
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the Department of Agriculture to maneuver. For example, it permitted
him to make regulations with the force of law to control the planting,
harvesting and marketing of commodities through contracts and agree-
ments, to adjudicate appeals from his own decisions and so forth. 5 5
The contracts and agreements signed with landlords left much to be
desired. The landlords, by virtue of keeping the books and managing
the sale of crops, held the economic destiny of tenants and laborers in
their hands. Instead of ensuring that tenants received a fair share
of the adjustment benefits, the AAA's cotton contracts permitted only
the landlords to receive the benefits, out of which tenants also
received their individual shares in accordance with their contract
agreements with the landlords. In practice things did not happen this
way.56 The only precaution taken by AAA to ensure that tenants were
treated well was that it could request landlords to show receipts for
payments distributed to tenants, and where foul play was suspected,
landlords could run the risk of having their benefits suspended. Not-
withstanding this caveat, Raymond Wolters estimates that on a hypo-
thetical forth-five acre farm, the income of the landlord rose by
73% between 1932 and 1935, compared with 27% for share-croppers.
5 7
55Conrad, op. cit., p. 36.
5 6There were several cases in which landlords applied tenants' benefits
to outstanding debts. Later AAA tightened contract agreements to
minimize this tendency. See Conrad, op. cit., p. 66. Even then, AAA
was relaxed in connection with tenants' share of benefits for un-
ploughed acreage, conditions under which tenants could be evicted,
etc. See Wolters, op. cit., pp. 21-38, and Conrad, op. cit., ch. 4.
5 Wolters, op. cit., p. 22.
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Inasmuch as we may want to accuse AAA for indiscreet administration
of the program by favoring landlords in contract agreements, much of the
blame should be put on the political machinery of Roosevelt. David E.
Conrad rightly poses the problem this way:
Not a voice was raised (in Congress) to protest
that drastic acreage reduction might mean the
difference between a bare living and no living
at all for marginal and submarginal farmers. No
one warned that it would bring about the eviction
and displacement of thousands of tenant farmers
and share croppers and the firing of many farm
hands.58
Of course, working at the back of the scene was President Roosevelt who
wanted to abide by his campaign promises to farmers to whom he owed
part of his election victory. Sidney Baldwin quotes the President as
saying: ''One of the first things I am going to do is to take steps to
restore farm prices. I am going to call farmers' leaders together,
lock them in a room, and tell them not to come out until they have
agreed on a plan.'59 Roosevelt was obviously more interested in the
landed class than disadvantaged tenant and laboring classes.
And so, without benefitting a majority of tenants,60 the program
was brought to an abrupt end in 1935 in the midst of an administrative
chaos. 61
58Conrad, op. cit., p. 36.
59 Sidney Baldwin, Poverty and Politics. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North
Carolina Press, 1968, p. 50.
6 0Conrad reports of a 1933 study by Harold Hoffsomer, indicating that
in one Alabama county 43% had received benefits, but three-fourths
of them had used the money to pay debts, and 60% of these had been
forced to do so by their landlords. Op. cit., p. 81.
6 1This is referred to as the purge of the Triple-A in February 1935,
and it affected mainly the legal branch. See Richard S. Kirkendall,
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In other economic programs (of the 1930's see footnote 51) tenants
and small landlords were equally unfortunate. It was for this reason
that the National Resource Committee proposed a comprehensive program
in 1937 to help tenants and marginal farmers. The program included
(a) methods of facilitating acquisition, improvement and disposition
of land, and for purchasing of stock and equipment; (b) a loan scheme
(c) measures to help marginal landowners losing their farms through
foreclosure; (d) farm rehabilitation; (e) measures to discourage land
speculation; (f) program to retire marginal lands from their present
use, and (g) upgrading the standard of living of laborers.62 It is
not certain whether these recommendations were actually followed
before the outbreak of the War. At any rate, the Committee made its
report in February 1937 when the economy had started to recover and
the policy-makers probably fell into the usual temptation of letting
the market mechanism and entrepreneurial supply determinants take care
of the economically disadvantaged.
All this is not to say that the federal political machinery was
always insensitive to the economic needs of Negroes in the pre-War Il
years. At least available records show that the Department of
Agriculture was active in the extension work. By 1923, 15 Southern
states were being served with extension programs on 28,606 Negro
Social Scientists and Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt.
Columbia: Univ. of Missouri Press, 1966, pp. 101-105.
62For a full discussion of the recommendations, see The National
Resource Committee, Farm Tenancy, op. cit., pp. 11-24.
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farms, supported by 5,807 demonstration projects. 6 3 But compared with
farm credit and other facilities available to large planters, federal
support for Negro landowners before the Second World War was in fact
miniscule. To illustrate this point, federal expenditure on extension
services to Negroes rose from $4,184 in 1908 to only $385,085 in 1923.64
Another beneficial federal program worth mentioning was the Federal
Loan Bank, where both blacks and whites could borrow to purchase live-
stock, fertilizer, land already purchased or negotiated for, to settle
mortgage loans, to undertake drainage schemes, and so on. Counties were
divided into 12 districts, and loans were advanced through a nation-
wide association called the National Farm Loan Association, the member-
ship of which was a condition for receiving loans varying between
$100 and $10,000. How Negroes fared under this program is generally
not clear.
Two periods in the economic history of Negroes have sketchily
been projected to demonstrate that the present-day low economic status
of Negroes has greatly been shaped by the cultural milieu and by
public policy that constantly neglected the need and the necessity
to design economic programs specifically for the underprivileged in
critical periods when they could have gained most from federal
assistance. A political system that assumes that the entrepreneurial
supply mechanism, i.e. sheer presence of economic opportunities, can
63See J. A. Evans, Extension Work Among Negroes, Department of Agricul-
ture, Circular 355, Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.0., September 1925.
6 4 Ibid., p. 6.
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be relied upon at all times, or this failing, entrepreneurial ''demand
motivations'' such as the Reconstruction land restoration and AAA
programs, should be showered mostly on economic leaders to make them
behave in a manner conducive to political stability and cohesion,
is tempted to relegate to oblivion the needs of the poor. This was
certainly the case in the U.S. pre-War II economic scene. For, as we
saw in chapter two, grassroots entrepreneurship feeds largely on
demand motivations. The role of these motivations should be borne in
mind as we proceed in the next chapter to examine the impact of the
trade union movement and Negro leadership in the development of black
entrepreneurship.
CHAPTER FIVE
TRADE UNIONS, BLACK LEADERSHIP AND
BLACK ECONOMIC PROGRESS
Trade Union-Negro Relations Before World War 11
Trade unionism can influence the development of black entrepreneur-
ship in two ways: first, access to union membership ensures a minimum
job security and better wages through collective bargaining; and second,
worthwhile work experience in unionized firms can lay a foundation for
independent entrepreneurship.
It is often said that as late as the 1930's, only 10% of American
workers were members of unions, and therefore discrimination against
Negro workers by local unions could not have severely affected Negroes
in procuring jobs. However, the point is that it was this small group
that proved powerful enough to influence the hiring practices and other
labor policies of corporations.
The involvement of Negroes in the trade union movement dates back
to the Reconstruction era when in 1869 Negroes were represented at the
convention of the National Labor Union (NLU). Although the NLU adopted
a more liberal attitude toward Negro workers at the national level, at
the local level it was quite a different story. In fact, the forma-
tion of the National Labor Convention of Colored MenI in 1869 was in
it is to be noted that this was not the first Negro trade union. The
first, the American League of Colored Laborers, was formed in New York
in July 1850. See Charles H. Wesley, Negro Labor in U.S., 1850-1925.
New York: Vanguard Press, 1927, p. 55.
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response to the discriminatory practices of local unions.2 Spero and
Harris explain the animosity between black and white workers in the
decades following the Civil War thus:
The two races must not mix or compete, but if econo-
mic pressure does throw them into competition,
Southern society seeks to minimize the situation by
ranking the white man's job above the Negro's. This
of course, is seldom a conscious operation. The sys-
tem, the result of long established social habit,
works automatically. 3
Further, the strong affiliation of Negro workers with the Republi-
can party resulted in Negro political and labor leadership fusing
together in such personalities as Governor P. B. S. Pinchback,
Alexander Crummel, Frederick Douglass and J. M. Langston. Conse-
quently, Negro workers became ar easy target for discrimination by
both the Democratic Party and the Knights of Labor, an amalgam of
skilled craftsmen and tradesmen that was replaced in 1886 by AFL. In
the North, the plight of Negro workers was aggravated by the tactics
of employers using them to break strikes. Therefore, in the eyes of
Northern white workers, Negro workers were mere opportunists and not
allies.
It is important to stress that until the Second World War, Negro
urban workers were best represented in those non-agricultural occupa-
tions to which they had traditionally been attached, especially in
2Ibid., pp. 157-165.
3Sterling D. Spero and Abram L. Harris, The Black Worker: The Negro
and the Labor Movement. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1931, p. 170.
4 For an account of this alliance, see Wesley, op. cit., pp. 156-191.
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lumbering, cotton milling and stevedoring. In lumbering, for example,
the second most important occupation for male Negro workers, 60% of
the 260,000 persons employed in the industry in the South were Negroes
in 1909. Yet, the ratio of unskilled Negro workers to skilled ones
was 9:2. In the sawmills, they outnumbered the whites by a ratio of
6:4 on unskilled jobs, but whites outnumbered blacks 2:1 on skilled
jobs.5 The persistence of poor working conditions was due to limited
unionization in the entire industry. Workers were virtually impotent
to form unions because labor was cheap, and could be drawn from the
tenant class. In 1928, for example, weekly wage rates ranged from
only $8.48 to $11.90. In fact, by 1933, local unions existed only on
the West coast.
Herbert J. Lahne also files a similar report on the cotton mills
in the South where 80% of the laborers were Negroes, but in actual
cotton manufacturing, they accounted for only 8% of the job slots in
1920.7 Similar instances abound in other occupations, but it suffices
to note that in the absence of worthwhile work experience, and under
conditions of entrenched occupational immobility, desire to enter
independent entrepreneurship was only a dream in the minds of a
5Vernon H. Jensen, Lumber and Labor. New York: Farrar & Rinehard,
1945, pp. 76-77. See also John C. Howard, The Negro in the Lumber
Industry, Report No. 19, Industrial Research Unit, Univ. of Penna.
Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1970.
6 lbid., p. 83.
7Herbert J. Lahne, The Cotton Mill Worker. New York: Farrar and
Rinehart, 1944, pp. 81-82.
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majority of Negro workers. In a nutshell, limited skills and restricted
economic opportunities to which a majority of Negro workers were ex-
posed conspired to produce low-level entrepreneurship in pre-World War I
years.
Herbert Q. Northrup has identified five factors that determined
union racial policies during the first part of the century, namely
(1) industrial environment, (2) the philosophy of the union and/or its
leaders, (3) availability of labor in terms of employment opportunities,
(4) the degree of the national union control over its local affiliates,
and (5) the racial policies of rival unions. He cites as an example the
case of the automobile and iron and steel industries where unionism
could not succeed until the industrial form of organization was adopted
by CIO. Since the bargaining strength of industrial unions depended on
their ability to enroll all workers in an industry, vis-a-vis craft
unions, Negroes had to be admitted freely.8
Nevertheless, we must be cautious in imputing Negro occupational
immobility to the discriminatory practices of unions. To begin with,
unionization was meaningful to the extent that the Negro workers were
educated and skilled enough to enhance their bargaining power. But
this was not the case. Loosened from their plantation environment
into a technology-ridden urban environment, opportunities for better
jobs would normally have been limited in absence of trade unionism.
Second, urbanization of the Negro did not occur on a large scale until
8 See Herbert R. Northrup, Organized Labor and the Negro. New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1949, pp. 232-235 et seq.
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the First World War. Before then, trade unionism would have been more
meaningful in the agricultural sector, except that the plantation-
tenancy institution simply did not lend itself to collective bargaining.
During the first quarter of this century, the Negro worker was
torn between, on the one hand, the contempt of the white worker and
the ephemeral tolerance of the employer so long as the latter found the
Negro willing to accept low wages for temporary jobs and to stay away
from strikes; and, on the other hand, the helplessness of the political
machinery to solve the Negro labor problem through legal means. For
one thing, the battle was not so much between Negro workers and the
unions as between the employers and the unions, especially in the
pre-Depression years when effective labor laws were non-existent to
control collective bargaining. To all intents and purposes, the
federal political machinery was simply content to devote its energies to
minimizing employer-union conflicts. To have added the Negro problem
to its priority list would have caused a political mess. In any event,
Negro workers found CIO a better ally than AFL, which did not only
neglect its Negro members but also continued to encourage the formation
of segregated unions.9 Especially in the South, this was made possible
by the disfranchisement of Negroes in the 1880's and the passage of
several Jim Crow laws. As a matter of fact, until the passage of labor
laws in the 1930's, the national Executive Council of AFL was so weak
9For a comprehensive treatment of the involvement of Negroes in the
trade union movement, see ibid.; Spero and Harris, op. cit.; Ray
Marshall, The Negro and Organized Labor. New York: Wiley & Sons,
1965; Wesley, op. cit.; Northrup, op. cit.
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that it could not intervene in local wage and other disputes until
requests were made by local unions.
Recent Trends in Union-Negro Relations
The merger between CIO and AFL in 1955 constituted a landmark in
union-Negro relations. With its traditionally more liberal attitude,
CIO was able to persuade AFL to mitigate its discriminatory practices
after the merger. Yet in spite of C10's efforts, it ''did not decisively
affect patterns of employment, pay, promotion or apprenticeship oppor-
tunities in the craft unions.',10 Although 2 million out of the 18
million union members are Negroes, in such powerful unions as trans-
portation, construction and skilled trades, Negro representation is
virtually insignificant. This has caused N.A.A.C.P. to file within
the last seven years 700 complaints against unions in federal agencies,
and 1,600 cases against employers and employment agencies for such
reasons as: refusal to employ Negroes, systematic exclusion of
Negroes from apprenticeship programs, and the use of hiring halls and
referral systems to prevent non-union Negroes from bidding for jobs. 11
Needless to emphasize, continued discrimination within the rank and
file of local unions could in the long run adversely affect the
development of black entrepreneurship. As an illustration, in spite of
10Sumner M. Rosen, ''The CIO Era, 1935-55,'' in Julius Jacobson, The
Negro and the American Labor Movement. New York: Anchor Books,
1968, p. 206.
1lFortune, The Negro and the City. New York: Time Inc., 1968, pp. 105-
06.
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AFL-CIO commitment to racial equality and the efforts of the federal
government to break down the barriers of discrimination, only 3% of
recruits in apprenticeship programs were Negroes in 1968. In the same
year, Negroes working in factories earned 32% less than their white
counterparts, and Negro truck drivers received 42% below white wage
rates.12
Since the AFL-CIO merger, the attitude of labor leaders toward the
racial question is one of "superficial tolerance," greatly influenced
by the changing political attitude toward the Negro problem. The
issuance of the Fair Employment Practices Order by President Roosevelt
in 1940, the Supreme Court ruling on school segregation in 1954 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 have greatly influenced the behavior of
union leaders, although they continue to yield to the pressures of
local unions to restrict unionization of blacks. The policy of "super-
ficial tolerance'" is constantly revealed in the speeches of the
leaders.13 For example, when George Meany, the President of AFL-CIO,
appeared before the Select Committee on Labor of the House on May 7,
1968 (H.R.12280), he was not in favor of the National Manpower Bill
of 1968 (H.R.16303-05) designed to provide 220,000 jobs in the
private sector for the unemployed through a tax credit system, and
80,000 jobs in the public sector. His fears were that the already
employed workers might lose their jobs. The strong lobbying of
12Ibid.
13See Herbert Hill, ''The Racial Practices of Organized Labor: the
Contemporary Period,'' in Jacobson, op. cit., pp. 286-357.
112
AFL-CIO and opposition from other quarters have almost killed the bill,
and it clearly reflects some of the intractable issues implicit in the
upgrading of the economic status of Negroes.
The initiative of the national AFL-CIO Executive Committee to
effect change has been crippled by local unions to the extent that the
AFL-CIO constitution requires them to voluntarily comply with anti-
discrimination federal statutes. While we continue to doubt the
genuine interest of the trade union movement to bring about a radical
change in attitude toward Negro workers, black leaders and race-advance-
ment organizations have a decisive role to play in shaping Negro-
related economic policies in both the private and public sectors. How
this role has evolved in the past is our concern in the following
section.
The Role of Black Leadership
In contrast to such minority groups as Jews in Western Europe,
Lebanese in West Africa and Indians in East Africa whose social and
economic progress has been fostered by ethnic solidarity and self-
help, American Negroes have probably suffered from dissension and
poor leadership more than from all the forces of racial discrimination
and prejudice. Since Emancipation, Negro leaders have never learned
to speak with one mind, especially on matters which affect their
social and economic lives. In the main, many have fallen victims
to intrigues, egotism and poor manipulation of Negro civic life with
the result that they have easily played into the hands of those who
least desire to promote their social and economic progress.
1113
The history of different forms of Negro leadership is replete
with diametrically opposed strategies to achieve economic goals. Our
hypothesis is that genuine forms of black leadership have never
addressed themselves adequately to the problems of black entrepre
neurship fed on the white market, but instead black leaders have for
the most part followed a policy of reconciliation with white businesses,
political leadership and white sympathizers to solve black economic
problems through employment programs; or out of frustration some have
favored a policy of economic self-sufficiency that breeds more poverty.
Before the turn of the century, two schools of thought on black
economic development prevailed. One school advocated for economic
solidarity and a close working relationship between working classes
of all races. Within this group were such personalities as Frederick
Douglass and John R. Lynch, who favored "colored' alliance with Knights
of Labor, the predecessor of AFL. The other school placed emphasis
on racial solidarity, racial pride, thrift and economic cooperation.
The basic argument of this school was that through hard work in
farming and business, thrift and wealth, coupled with high morality
could lead the black race to attain high social status, gain the
respect of other races, and thereby achieve civil and political
rights. To this group belonged men like John W. Cromwell and Booker T.
Washington. As discussed below, the influence of the second school
was carried over into the present century, while the first school was
14For an interesting discussion on these schools of thought, see August
Meier, Negro Thought in America 1880-1915. Ann Arbor: Univ. of
Michigan Press, 1963, pp. 207-247; Howard Brotz (ed.) Negro Social
and Political Thought, 1850-1920. New York: Basic Books, 1966.
-
1 14
destroyed before the end of the century by an intricate maze of
political machinations and conflicts with trade unions.15 In the
light of our hypothesis, we shall concentrate on the development of
three nation-wide Negro organizations that have exercised marked impact
on Negro economic progress. These organizations are the National Negro
Business League, the N.A.A.C.P. and the National Urban League.
The National Negro Business League was founded in August,1900 in
Boston by Booker T. Washington to promote black entrepreneurship. By
1915, 600 branches of the League had been established in 36 states,
with a total membership of 5,000. It functioned through both local
branch offices and "business missionaries," numbering 10,000 by 1917.17
The missionaries were charged with the responsibility of preaching the
doctrine of economy, thrift, home and farm ownership, industrial and
business enterprise to all Negroes who would listen. Booker T.
Washington held a strong bel ief that through land ownership and
farming and through entrepreneurship, the Negro could be emancipated
economically and gain the respect of the white population.
15Reference has already been made to the alliance that developed between
the Republican Party and Negro leaders who were also in control of
leadership in the Negro trade union movement. It was this alliance
that ultimately led to the loss of not only Negro political power
through disfranchisement, but also bitter anti-Negro feelings among
white trade unions, especially AFL.
16For a short history of the founding of NBL see the National Negro
Business League, Annual Report (for 1915-17). Nashville: Sunday
School Union Print, 1915, 1916 and 1917.
17Ibid., (1915) , p. 4.
18For Washington's position on other race-related issues, see his Up
From Slavery. New York: Doubleday & Sc., 1963 (edition), ch. 5.
See also B. T. Washington, 'Why Should Negro Businessmen Go South,"
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As August Meier explains it, B. T. Washington became great and
powerful not because he initiated a trend, but because he expressed it
so well. 9 A point worth emphasizing is the "conciliatory attitude"
he adopted in propagating the gospel of black entrepreneurship. He did
not reject white economic supremacy, but instead believed that the low
status of Negroes was the result of their apathetic attitude toward and
unpreparedness for the economic role they were expected to play. Thus
throughout his public life, he tended to stress at least three specific
themes: (1) that matters related to political power and civil rights
should be relegated to secondary importance; (2) that to achieve moral
and economic progress, the necessary trades and skills had to be
mastered; (3) that moral and economic achievement was a gateway to other
achievements, including political power.
To achieve these goals, he adopted specific strategies. First,
he founded in 1881 the Tuskegee Institute, an industrial and agricul-
tural institute, as a stepping stone to help those who desired to
acquire necessary trades and skills. Later, he helped propagate
Negro education along these lines. Second, he promoted Negro entre-
preneurship and fostered Negro economic co-operation, out of which grew
many business and professional associations that later were affiliated
20
with the League. Although his "back to the land" message demonstrated
in Charities Organization Society, Negroes in the North, New York:
Charities Publication Committee, 1905. Also see Brotz, op. cit.,
pp. 351-463.
19Meier, op. cit., p. 99.
20 Examples of such associations were The National Negro Retail Merchants'
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his preference for rural agricultural development with less pronounced
undertones of economic segregation, yet he did not abhor urban Negro
entrepreneurship, which according to his strategy could be promoted
through co-operation and self-help. Indeed, his urban strategy derived
its strength from a type of economic self-sufficiency that could not
be justified by the economic base theory. His plea for economic self-
help was analogous to the development of a semi-closed economy based on
importation of goods which had to be paid for with extremely limited
foreign exchange earned by those working outside the economy. We may
recall that the influence of the National Business League on Negro
economic development did not decline until the Great Depression, so
that at a critical period of at least thirty years (1900-1930) when
Negroes could have perforce sought after economic integration with the
rest of the U.S. economy, a majority of them were led to believe that
a viable but segregated economy would enable them to enter the U.S.
market at a subsequent date from a position of improved economic
strength. Washington, no doubt, was insensitive to the fact that
the U.S. economy works in such a way that a group's economic power
is judged on the basis of what it can contribute incrementally within
the system and not outside it. Further, he underestimated the
forces of racial discrimination and prejudice, that in part were an
Association of the U.S., The National Negro Insurance Association,
the National Negro Press Association, The National Negro Funeral
Directors' Association, etc. See National Business League, Annual
Reports, op. cit.
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outgrowth of the slave tradition. In short, his strategy meant that
the Negro was going to be judged on the presentation of himself as a
competitive, rational, economic man after entering the economic system.
It is argued here that it was the "gospel" of economic self-
sufficiency and self-help preached during probably the most critical
period in urban Negro economic experience that gradually obliterated
their bid to participate effectively in the urban economy; and that
it was this failure to lay an early foundation which has subsequently
created more difficulties in integrating the ghetto economy with the
rest.
Another flaw in Washington's strategy was its implicit acceptance
of alleged inferiority of the Negro, by asking him to give up three
things: namely, political power, insistence on civil rights, and
higher education of Negro youth (vis-a-vis industrial and agricul-
tural education).21 Du Bois has severely questioned the rationale
behind Washington's position on this score, especially when the Negro
was at the same time (1) being disfranchised, (2) facing a legal
creation of a distinct status of civil inferiority; and (3) experi-
encing steady withdrawal of aid from institutions for his higher
22
training. The birth of N.A.A.C.P. was to a large extent an epitome
of the discontent some Negro leaders harbored in their hearts for the
National Business League's accommodative position on civil rights.
21
W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk. Chicago: A. G. McClurg &
Co., 1931, pp. 52-53. For a detailed account of his position on the
Negro problem, see Brotz, op. cit., pp. 483-549.
221 bid.
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Du Bois, one of the founders of N.A.A.C.P. confesses thus:
...but if that reconciliation is to be marked by
the industrial slavery and civic death of those
same black men, with permanent legislation into
a position of inferiority, then those black men,
if [they] are really men, are called upon by
every consideration of patriotism and loyalty
to oppose such a course by all civilized methods,
even though such opposition involves disagreement
with Mr. Booker T. Washington.2 3
This brings us then to the activities of NAACP, formed officially
in May 190924 in New York by both black and white races. The original
aim was to secure civil rights for Negro citizens of America, justice
in courts and equal opportunity in economic, social and political
spheres of American life. 25 The Association has been faithful to
its initial goals, although achievements in its legal battles and
protests against discrimination in jobs, education, housing and use
of public places have been uneven.
Our main concern is to determine its contribution to black
entrepreneurship and black economic development. Between 1910 and
1930, annual reports of the Association indicate that various appeals
were made to employers and unions to end discrimination in employ-
ment and wages against Negroes. A major step was taken in the fall
23Ibid., p. 55.
24The Association grew out of the Niagara Movement founded by Du Bois
in 1905 purposely to pursue "Negro freedom and growth." For an
account of the history of N.A.A.C.P., see Robert L. Jack, History of
N.A.A.C.P. Boston: Meador Publishing Co., 1943; Langston Hughes,
Fight for Freedom. The Story of the N.A.A.C.P. New York: W. W.
Norton & Co., 1962. Charles F. Kellogg, N.A.A.C.P. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.
2 5The founding is well documented in Kellogg, og. cit., ch. 1.
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of 1931 to establish an intelligence mechanism within its branch
offices to look into the problem of (1) benefits accruing to Negroes
from public expenditures; (2) unemployment relief funds; and
(3) employment of blacks by ghetto-based white firms.2 6
The next line of attack occurred at various times in the 1930's
when it chose to confront white-dominated unions. AFL and CIO were
approached on several occasions to abolish segregation and discrimina-
tion in the treatment of Negro workers. This resulted in the adoption
of an official policy to end discrimination in various unions.2 7 At
the same time, the Federal Government was confronted to legal ize
equal job opportunities and wages created by the New Deal Program.2 8
The battle to end discriminatory practices in employment and
wages in both the public and private sectors was again carried to the
White House during the War, and President Roosevelt responded in June
1940 with an Executive Order No. 8802, banning discrimination on
account of race, creed, color or national origin in industries holding
war-related government contracts, and in training opportunities in
war-oriented industries.29 The Order also set up a Committee on Fair
Employment Practice (CFEP) to investigate and take action to remedy
complaints about discrimination.30 Next, in August 1948, President
2 6N.A.A.C.P., 22nd Annual Report,, 1931. New York, 1932, p. 33.
2 7 Jack, op. ci t. , p. 56.
28N.A.A.C.P., 27th Annual Report, 1936. New York, 1937, pp. 9-11.
2 9N.A.A.C.P., Annual Report, 1940. New York, 1941, p. 4.
301bid.
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Truman also signed another Executive Order No. 9980 forbidding dis-
crimination in the federal service on account of race, color or
religion. Again, CFEP was re-instituted by President Truman, and
he went further to establish a Committee on Government Contracts,
CGC, charged with the responsibility of eliminating job discrimina-
tion by private employers operating under government contracts. The
CGC was continued during the Eisenhower administration under Vice
President Nixon. It was through this Committee that the Association
constantly sought to redress its grievances in the 1950's. 3 2 Worthy
of note was the fact that pressures from the Association and the
efforts of the White House to minimize discrimination in jobs led to
the establishment of Commissions on Fair Employment Practice in a
number of states.
N.A.A.C.P. reached a new plateau in its economic activities in
1952 when it requested AFL and CIO to do two things: (1) to support
the Association's civil rights program, and (2) to provide funds
to support its operation.33 At this point a rapprochement between,
on the one hand, liberal whites firmly attached to the Association
and the black leaders, and, on the other hand, the two national
trade unions was almost complete. By this move black leaders in
the Association resigned themselves to the fact that "reconcilia-
tory measures" geared to employment opportunities and better wages
3 1N.A.A.C.P., Annual Report, 1948.
32N.A.A.C.P., Annual Report, 1954.
3 3N.A.A.C.P., Annual Report, 1952.
New York, 1941, p. 4.
New York, 1955, pp. 43-44.
New York, 1953, p. 69.
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offer the brightest hope for black economic progress. In other words,
they have taken the economic system as given, and instead of building
upon it by specific measures of economic production, i.e. through
black entrepreneurial promotion, they were prepared to work within
it and change it from within. This belief was confirmed when around
the middle of the century it created within its organization a labor
department to oversee matters related to employment opportunities
and vocational training.34 While the Association has never denounced
independent black entrepreneurship, they have not attempted to
promote it in any meaningful way.
The National Urban League was founded in New York in 1911 to
cater for the needs of Southern Negro migrant workers unaccustomed not
only to the problems of Northern cities, but also to industrial
workers' way of life. A significant feature of the history of the
Association was the firm coalition between white businessmen who
needed cheap Negro labor and conservative black leaders allied with
B. T. Washington in the North.3 5 Thus, it started primarily as a
service agency whose activities were confined to job procurement for
the migrants, their housing and related social welfare problems and
training of black social workers.
34The Association has been interested since 1957 in vocational and
technical training, and this indirectly may have a long run impact
on black entrepreneurship. See its Annual Reports, 1957, pp. 47-48;
1958, pp. 52-53; and 1960, p. 41.
3 5August Meier and Elliot M. Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto.
New York: Hill and Wang, 1966, p. 196.
122
A major contribution of NUL to Negro economic progress has been
in the field of employment, and by 1963, it had branch offices in 70
cities of 100,000 or more carrying on this major function. However,
in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement it has been compelled to
follow action programs "designed to motivate the youth to stay in
school, to expand the housing supply for the Negro population, to
eliminate racial barriers in the employment and promotion of qualified
Negroes, to strengthen Negro family life, and to stimulate self-help
among Negro citizens in solving their problems.36 To achieve these
goals, NUL has adopted the tactics of (1) measures to wipe out
traces of discrimination against blacks, and these include increased
communication and negotiation between black leaders and employers,
government, politicians and trade unions; and (2) measures to
educate and inform blacks about opportunities in employment, housing
and social welfare. 3 7
The economic activities of the three associations represent
what other race advancement organizations, excluding the extreme
militant groups, are trying to achieve. The tactics of the Congress
for Racial Equality, for example, is similar to those of NUL, except
36Whitney M. Young, "The Urban League and Its Strategy," The Annals
of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 357
(Jan. 1965), p. 103.
37 1bid.
38The organization was started in 1941 by James Farmer. For a brief
account of its strategy, see Marvin Rich, "The Congress for Racial
Equality and Its Strategy," The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, ibid., pp. 113-118.
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that its protest marches and sit-ins, especially in the 1940's and
1950's gave it a distinctive character of its own. Further, it is
closer to the masses of Negroes by virtue of its growing involvement
in basic community needs such as neighborhood play grounds, street
and traffic lights, voter registration drives, and building code
enforcement.
No Negro race advancement organization has addressed itself
adequately to a type of economic integration that can assure blacks
that they will in the course of time attain an increasing share of the
urban economy. The National Negro Business League has not left a
lasting imprint on contemporary black economic development, precisely
because it failed to deal with civil rights issues.39 Of late, the
Urban League is moving toward the tactics of "black power" advocates,
because it has discovered that the old tactics of manipulating human
relations between white business and disadvantaged blacks are out of
tune with the realities of black economic and political conditions
in the society. Similarly, N.A.A.C.P. has come to realize that
winning the battle in court does not automatically give rise to
black economic advancement - hence its present concern for employment
and vocational training programs. Nevertheless, it is apparent that
39The activities of NNBL are now limited to 50 cities where it is
involved in community development through its Project Mainstream
which is a type of urban renewal of the ghetto core. It has
recently been receiving grants from EDA to provide technical and
other services to black businesses and to institute business
management programs.
40See Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto Dilemmas of Social Power. New
York: Harper & Row, 1965, pp. 213-215.
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the leadership in these most popular organizations resides with the
Negro elite, i.e. Du Bois's 'talented tenth," who are frequently out
of touch with the masses. We are therefore left with a groping desire
for a type of leadership that can tap the entrepreneurial potential
within the ghetto, while at the same time improving job opportunities
for blacks in the white business sector, and pursuing civil rights
goals.
Our brief examination of the impact of the trade union movement
and strategies of race advancement organizations suggest that socio-
economic factors other than "demand determinants" have influenced the
availability of economic opportunities for Negroes. It further
illuminates some of the shortcomings of the determinants in the
American society, especially the weakness of administrative and
legal instruments to deal with discriminatory practices of trade
unions.
In both chapters 4 and 5, the institutional constraints and
demand determinants in the development of black entrepreneurship
have briefly been outlined. As we proceed in the next chapter to ac-
count in an extremely brief manner a century's economic progress and
entrepreneurial achievement of the black race, the institutional
constraints will constantly reveal themselves. We should therefore
bear in mind the socio-economic environment in which the impact of
the Southern tradition, the passive stand of the federal government
toward Negro economic problems, the hostile attitude of white-
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dominated unions and political powerlessness of black leaders conspired
to determine the pace of black entrepreneurial development.
CHAPTER SIX
TRENDS AND FACTORS IN BLACK ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Pre-Civil War Black Enterprises
Prior to the Civil War, entrepreneurship among Negroes was
confined to the free Negroes, 3,777 of whom were black masters of
slaves in U. S. in 1830. 2
estate. In Philadelphia,
value of real estate owned
Most of the wealth in real
free Negroes were tolerate
states their entry into ce
and this affected the rate
in farming, real estate or
extremely limited opportun
The main source of wealth came from real
for example, Du Bois estimates that the
by Negroes in 1847 was about $400,000.3
estate was in the Northern states where
d to some extent, but in the Southern
rtain occupations was generally resented
at which they could amass wealth either
personal services. In towns, they had
ities to enter skilled trades and conse-
quently they engaged themselves in such personal
barbering, tailoring, running of horse stables,
drinking bars. "In fact there was hardly a town
services as
restaurants and
in the old South
1Free Negroes were those Negroes who could buy their freedom, or who
were voluntarily set free by their masters.
2Abram L. Harris, The Negro as Capitalist. Philadelphia: American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 1936, p. 4.
3W. E. B. Du Bois, The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study. New
York: Shocken Books, 1967 (reprint), p. 36.
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that did not look to the colored man for its barbering." Another
area of economic activity which attracted a number of freedmen was
truck gardening on fertile lands located near urban markets.
Several factors militated against the grwoth of free Negro
entrepreneurship5 and these included:
(a) difficulty in obtaining capital and credit;
(b) low wages and competition from poor whites and European
immigrants;
(c) prohibition against owning certain types of property;
(d) occupational restrictions;
(e) denial of the right to sue;
(f) restrictions against their participation (before and
after the Civil War) in the pioneering of the Midwest,
Southwest and West; 6
(g) limited civic and educational opportunities.
We should note that economic polarization between blacks and
whites existed before the outbreak of the Civil War, and that post-war
4A. L. Harris, op. cit., p. 10. For a detailed account of the econo-
mic and social conditions of free Negroes, see E. Franklin Frazier,
The Negro in the United States. New York: MacMillan, 1949, Ch. 4.
The use of Negroes in pre-Civil War period in industry is well docu-
mented in Robert S. Starobin, "The Economics of Industrial Slavery,"
Business History Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Summer 1970), pp. 131-174.
5 1bid., p. 24 et seq.
6Until the passage of Kansas-Nebraska Bill in 1854, Congress had the
right to prohibit slavery anywhere. The spread of slavery from the
South to other states automatically increased the population of free
Negroes since some slaves worked hard to buy their freedom. For the
spread of slavery, see Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, op. cit.,
pp. 42-48.
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racial strife merely cemented the polarization. A specific example
was the rise of church-based mutual-aid financial institutions,
attributed to the limited access free Negroes had in borrowing money
from white financial institutions.7
Decline in Agriculture and Growth of Urban Negro Population
The census of 1890 report shows that 56.2% of the Negro wage
earners were in agriculture. Although the number in agriculture con-
tinued to increase until 1920, yet proportionately, their share of
the agricultural labor force continued to decline. (See Table 6-1
and Fig. 6-1). Of course the decline wasnot peculiar to the Negro
population, for in 1820 farm labor force in the U.S. represented
70% of persons employed in all occupations, as compared with 6% in
1960. However, in the case of Negroes, a proportionately large
number of them were in agriculture until the Great Depression,
and for the purpose of understanding the development of black entre-
preneurship, the identification of economic and technological
factors (other than the institutional factors discussed in the last
chapter) that caused Negroes to lose their only economic stronghold
seem pertinent to our task in this chapter.
The first of these factors was the great attraction of urban
employment opportunities and their attendant high wages. The
wage rate in the agricultural sector between 1890 and 1910 ranged
7A. L. Harris, op. cit. , p. 21.
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TABLE 6-1
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS BY TENURE AND COLOR
IN THE U.S. , 1900-1964
1900
White Nonwhite
1910
White Nonwhite
1920
White Nonwhite
1930
White Nonwhite
1940
White Nonwhite
100.0 100.0
26.9
0.2
72.9
68.2
1.0
30.8
100.0 100.0
26.1
0.2
73.7
67. 1
1.2
31.6
100.0 100.0
24.5
0.2
75.2
62.6
1.0
36.4
100.0 100.0
22.2
0.3
77.5
65.0
0.7
34.3
1950
White Nonwhite
100.0
77.2
0.5
22.3
1964
White Nonwhite
100.0 100.0
35.9
0.1
64.0
84.1
0.6
15.3
100.0
56.7
0.2
43.1
This includes both full-time and part-time owners.
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census: Census of Agriculture 1964: Color, Race and Tenure of Farm
Tenant
Class
Total
Owners
Managers
Tenants
100.0
69.4
1.2
29.5
Tenant
Cl ass
Tota 1
Owners
Managers
Tenants
100.0
28.0
0.1
72.0 N-,
Operator. 1968, Ch. 8, Table 5.Vol. I I, U.S.G.P.0.,
FIG. 6-1 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS BY TENURE AND
COLOR 1900-1964
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between 300 and 75c a day during the regular season, and between 60e
and $1.00 a day plus board during the harvest season, as compared
with urban wage rate of $1.50 a day for unskilled jobs available in
Southern cities.9 Coupled with this was the unattractive nature of
rural working conditions which did not change for several decades after
Emancipation.I0 Woofter has argued that lack of protection and equal
justice before the law in rural South, evidenced by summary trials
accorded to Negroes, was repulsive enough to generate rural-urban
migration. 11
The second factor was the psychological desire and sheer impulse
to experience urban economic life, and to witness the stories told by
friends and relatives returning from the North on visits. Kelsey puts
it vividly thus:
Possibly he hears the boast that in the North a
Negro may enter a restaurant and be waited on by a
white girl. He cares not that the skilled trades
are closed to him. He isn't a skilled laborer.
In a childish way he pictures the wonders of the
new world - reflected in the new fashions of his
friends - and resolves in some way to get there;
a very natural and healthy state of mind. 12
8Lorenzo Greene and Carter G. Woodson, The Negro Wage Earner. New
York: Russell and Russell, 1930, p. 53.
91bid., p. 134.
10 Kelsey, op. cit., p. 15. Du Bois commenting on rural working condi-
tions estimated that in 1912 about one-quarter of Negro farm laborers
were tied to plantation work through peonage. See his ''The Rural
South,'' The American Statistical Association, Vol. 13, No. 97 (March
1912), p. 18. Holmes argues that Negroes were materially better off
under slavery than under post-slavery plantation system. See his
''Peons of the South,'' op. cit., pp. 71-72.
11 Woofter, Negro Migration, op. cit., pp. 142-144.
12Kelsey, op. cit., p. 16. A parallel example existed in the former
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To most of the Southern migrants therefore, the farm cabin was too
inferior to the Southern town cabin or the crowded Northern ghetto
apartments they had to share with relatives or friends.
The large waves of migration were nevertheless augmented by
the practice of Northern businessmen,
the North to work in their factories
centers were opened in the South for
given their transportation fares. A
the sponsor was usually all that was
The third major factor could be
adjustment," i.e. the capacity of thE
a given population, with the level of
After decades of intense cultivation,
depletion, which reached its peak at
inducing Negroes to migrate to
or homes. A number of employment
this purpose and recruits were
compulsory one-month service to
required in agreements. 1 3
referred to as "ecological
natural environment to support
farming technology unchanged.
severe soil erosion and soil
the turn of the century
especially in the Piedmont states, reduced the geographic extent
profitable cotton cultivation. At the same time, the boll weevil
struck over much of the cotton region and consequently even if
there had not been urban employment opportunities, the surplus ru
labor might have been diverted into other rural-based economic
activities.
of
ral
British colonies in Africa and West Indies which used to generate
large waves of immigration into Britain. Studying and working in
Britain carried with it a high social prestige, a symbol of the
cultured gentleman.
13Woofter aptly refers to this practice as "artificial stimulation."
See his Negro Migration, op. cit., p. 120; see also Kelsey, op.
cit., p. 17.
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Fourthly, the tightening of immigration laws and the return of
many European migrants to their homelands during the First World
War, coupled with industrial jobs created to meet the needs of the
War, enabled even the unskilled migrants to find good-paying urban jobs.
Lastly, technological innovations within the cotton industry,14
such as the mechanical harvesters in place of hand picking and snapping,
and subsequent introduction of planting and weed control have displaced
a large number of Negro farm workers. Table 6-2 below is most
revealing.
TABLE 6-2
PER CENT OF COTTON HARVESTED BY MACHINE AND
BY HAND FOR SELECTED YEARS
1962 1957 1950
Machine 70 32 8
Hand 30 68 92
Source: Calvin L. Beale, "The Negro in American
Agriculture" in John P. Davis, The
American Negro Reference Book. Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967; extracted
from Table 1, p. 166.
14
For an account of some of the technological changes, see U. S.
Bureau of the Census, Census of Agriculture - 1959, Vol 5, Part 6,
ch. 3.
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Another technological factor has been the opening up of new
cotton areas in the Southwest, using irrigation and capital-intensive
techniques; and under better climatic conditions than the South, the
Southwest has increased its share of U. S. cotton output from 2% in
1919 to 34% in 1959. 15
Of equal technological significance has been the improvement in
cotton cultivation in terms of yield per acre. Besides, intense
competition from the new cotton areas in Africa and Asia and from
synthetic fibers has not only reduced the overall cotton acreage in
the nation but has also weakened the dominant position of the U. S.
in the world cotton trade. The technological influences and external
competition have caused the total cotton acreage in the nation to
decrease from about 43 million acres in 1929 to less than 15 million
16
acres in 1959. Thus, tied to the cotton economy, the Negro farm
worker has to seek refuge in the city. 17
With the decline of cotton tenancy, the only hope for landless
Negro tenants in love with rural life lies in the growing regular
farm work and rural non-agricultural jobs such as quarrying and
saw-milling. With respect to Negro landowners, recent successes in
the tobacco, maize and soybean cultivation and possibilities of
15Beale, op. cit., p. 167.
16Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of Agriculture - 1959, Vol. 5,
Part 6, p. 40.
17The impact of technological changes on tenancy has indeed been over-
whelming. For example, in the Mississippi delta, the number of white
and nonwhite tenants decreased from 83,000 to 33,000 within five
years, 1954-1959. See Beale, op. cit., p. 194.
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competing effectively in market
agricultural entrepreneurship.
gardening 18open a
But this will not
new frontier in
be possible unless
the major problems facing small farmers in general are prappled with
in a more systematic manner. These problems pertain to reorganiza-
tion of small farm units into economic units, provision of extension
services, access to credit and diversification of crop production
to cope with market trends. To achieve all these, as Nicholls so
aptly makes his case, the Farmers Home Administration, created speci-
fically to meet the needs of the small farmer, must rise to the
occasion, since its resources "have been so small that they have
spread too thinly to contribute significantly to the drastic community-
wide reorganization of agriculture...." 1 9
Of the six crops which come under the federal farm price-
support program, cotton, tobacco, peanuts and rice are Southern farm
products. It has been contended that the program does not significant-
ly raise the income of small farmers since they have little to sell.
Nor has the minimum acreage allotment which compels planters to cut
back their output been of much help to small planters in contrast
with large planters who can diversify their production to include a
variety of farm produce.
In a similar vein, the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights recently
pointed out that in order to further the course of Negro agriculture,
18For an account of strides being made in these products, see Beale,
op. cit., pp. 168-169, 183-184.
19Nicholls, op. cit., p. 173.
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agencies of the Department of Agriculture have to put an end to the
practice of following local patterns of segregation and discrimination
in disbursing federal funds. 2 0
Growth of Urban Negro Entrepreneurship
Growth of urban Negro employment and entrepreneurship especially
before the Great Depression was aided by a pronounced deterioration of
rural conditions. Without a rapid growth of urban Negro population,
urban black entrepreneurship would have experienced a severe setback
simply because the average black businessman has since Emancipation
catered to mainly blacks. Three distinct periods in the development
of urban black entrepreneurship can be identified. The first is 1863-
1890, a period in which Negroes freed before the Civil War and a few
ex-slaves trained as artisans and craftsmen by their masters held the
reins of urban entrepreneurship. The second is 1890 to the Second
World Was when a rather feeble foundation for black entre-
preneurship was laid, only to be weakened further by the Great
Depression. The post-Second World War Period marks a third phase.
Owing to the post-war natioral economic reconstruction, urban unem-
ployment among Negroes was fairly low between 1946-1956, but post-
Korean War economic recession caused more discontent among Negroes
who felt increasingly alienated from the mainstream of the urban
economy. Their protests consequently won them the Civil Rights Act
2 0U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Equal Opportunity in Farm Programs -
An Appraisal of Services Rendered by Agencies of the Department of
Agriculture. Washington, D. C., U.S.G.P.O., 1965, p. 100.
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of 1964, which has opened a whole new chapter in black economic develop-
ment. In the next three sections, we shall briefly consider the three
phases.
1. The Negro and the Urban Economy: 1863-1890
The urban-based artisans, craftsmen and traders, offshoots of a
small class of ex-slaves and freed Negroes, could not achieve much
during this period for three principal reasons. First, they were
improperly trained to compete effectively on the labor market. Second,
the enactment of black codes also affected urban Negroes.21 In South
Carolina for example, black codes stipulated that Negroes could not
practice the trade or business of an artisan, mechanic or shop-keeper,
or take up other urban employment on his own accord unless a permission
was sought from a judge of the district court.22 Third, immigration
from Europe sharply reduced employment and entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties for Negroes. Competition for jobs aggravated racial conflicts,
and the use of blacks as strike-breakers further increased the dis-
content of trade unions. At the same time, such anti-Negro movements
as the Ku Klux Klan also intensified their harassments especially
in the South to such an extent that many white employers simply had
to succumb to their pressures. 2 3
2 1 For variations in the codes as applied to the urban Negro worker, see
Raper and Reid, Sharecroppers All, op. cit., ch. 9.
2 2Charles H. Wesley, Negro Labor in the United States. New York:
Vanguard Press, 1937, p. 121.
2 3Raper and Reid, Sharecroppers All, op. cit., pp. 124-130.
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2. The Negro and the Urban Economy: 1890 to the Second World War
This was a period when urban Negroes, encouraged by the
educational programs and other activities of the National Business
League, NAACP and the Urban League attempted to establish them-
selves as a distinct but weak economic entity. As Table 6-3 shows,
agriculture, domestic and personal services, i.e. the lowest paying
jobs, jointly accounted for 87.4% of the Negro labor force in 1890,
and this was partly due to the fact that 3/5 of all Negro wage earners
could neither read nor write, and could therefore not effectively
compete for skilled jobs. The dominance of the two occupational
categories was more pronounced in the case of female workers, 97% of
whom were engaged in them in 1890. The proportion decreased
by only 2.4% between 1900-1910, and further 5% between 1910-1920.
Besides, competition from newly arrived immigrants, coupled
with low education and increasing hostility of trade unions
continued to keep many Negroes from high paying jobs.2 4
24Greene and Woodson, op. cit., p. 77. This is clearly borne out
by Du Bois' study of the occupational structure of Philadelphia
Negroes in 1896. For example, he found that 73% of females and
78% of the men aged 21 years and over in Ward 7 were employed as
domestic servants and laborers. See his Philadelphia Negro, op.
cit., ch. 11.
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TABLE 6-3
OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF NEGROES
Occupation
Agriculture
Domestic and Personal
Services
Manufacturing and
Mechanical
Trade and Transport
Professional
TOTAL
Number
1,728,325
956,754
208,374
145,717
33,994
3,073,164
IN 1890
% Share
56.2
31.2
6.8
4.7
1 .1
100.0
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Negro Population 1790-
1915. Washington, D.C. : U.S.G.P O, 1918, Table 20.
However, between 1910 and 1930 impressive gains in manufacturing
and mechanical jobs as well as in trade and transport mitigated the
dominance of agriculture, domestic and personal services. (See
Table 6-4). The greatest gains in these categories were in (a)
lumber and wood industry due to excessive exploitation of Southern
forests; (b) coal and iron mines, especially in Alabama, Tennessee
and Georgia; (c) blast furnaces of iron and steel mills; and (d)
automobile industry. Less significant gains occurred in textile,
food and meat-packing industries.25 As one may expect, most of the
2 5 For a fuller account of some of these gains see ibid., pp. 204-223;
Myrdal, op. cit., ch. 13.
TABLE 6-4
DISTRIBUTION OF GAINFULLY EMPLOYED 10 YEARS
BY RACE AND OCCUPATION 1910-1930
1910
Wh i te Neg ro
1Wj
Wh ite
Agriculture 23.6 54.6 18.8
Forestry and Fishing 0.6 0.7 0.7
Extraction of Minerals 3.8 1.2 3.5
Manufacturing and 34.9 12.6 37.8
Mechanical
Transportation and 6.9 4.9 7.4
Commun icat ion
Trade 10.4 2.3 11.1
Public Service 1.2 0.4 1.8
Professional Service 4.7 1.3 4.8
Domestic and Personal
Services 9.7 21.6 7.5
Clerical 4.2 0.4 6.6
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population:
Occupation. Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1933,
)20
Neg ro
44.2
0.7
1.5
18.7
6.5
2.9
1.0
1.7
22.
0.
100.
1930,
8
0
Vol.
Table 1.
1930
White Negro
15.2 36.1
0.6 0.6
2.5 1.4
35.8 18.6
7.4
13.
1.
6.
7
7
2
9.7
7.2
100.0
V, General
7.2
3.3
0.9
2.5
28.6
0.7
100.0
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gains were in the North. The relatively higher hourly wage rates for
urban jobs (excluding the services), tightening of immigration laws
during the First World War, employment opportunities during the War,
and post-war economic boom in the early 1920's contributed immensely
to Negro economic advancement. On the contrary, racial segregation
and discrimination in the use of public places and in hiring practices
of firms became increasingly entrenched at the turn of the century.26
But this was a blessing in disguise in that it promoted black entre-
preneurship. Increase in the number of Negroes engaged in domestic
and personal services from 21% to 28.6% in the period 1910 to 1930
(see Table 6-4) marked the emergence of the urban ghetto market
that has persisted till today.
Gains in trade and transport during the first two decades pre-
ceding World War I were the result of accelerated railroad construc-
tion, especially in the South. Talbe 6-4 also shows that in the
more skilled and lucrative jobs, namely professional, public and
clerical categories, Negroes almost "marked time" during the 20-year
period.
E. Franklin Frazier has shown that occupational differences that
existed between Southern and Northern Negroes in the 1920's reflected
differences in economic and political opportunities in the two
regions.27 This reason thus accounted for the higher occupational
26 Charles E. Silberman, "Economics of the Negro Problem" in Eli
Ginsberg, The Negro Challenge to the Business Community. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1964, p. 21.
27E. Franklin Frazier, "Occupational Classes Among Negroes in Cities,"
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 5 (March 1930), pp. 718-
738.
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status of Northern Negroes in post World War I period.
The growth of independent black entrepreneurship in this period
was a marked achievement, in comparison with the previous period. At
the first national Negro conference on city problems held in Atlanta
in 1896, it was estimated that there were about 5,000 black enter-
prises. The conference gravely doubted the 8,216 Negro enterprises
reported by the 1890 population census. Du Bois' survey of 1,684
Negro enterprises reported at the conference indicated that the
average amount of capital invested in each was under $3,500.28 Types
of enterprise represented in the survey included 432 small grocery
stores, 166 general merchandise, 162 barber shops, 80 funeral homes,
68 saloons, 64 drugstores and 61 restaurants. 29 As seen from the
above list, retail and personal services predominated, and even by
1950, they comprised about 3/4 of all Negro-owned enterprises. The
number of enterprises declined very fast at the beginning of the
Great Depression. According to Johnson's estimate, about 25,000
were in existence in 1929, with net sales of $3,935, and gave employ-
ment to only 12,651.30
An important feature of the development of black enterprises
during the period was the growth of the Negro Press and financial
28W. E. B. Du Bois (ed.), ''The Negro in Business,'' Proceedings of the
Conference for Investigation of City Problems, (held in Atlanta,
Georgia, May 26-27, 1896), Atlanta University Publications No. 4.
Atlanta: Atlanta University Press, 1898, p. 19.
29 Exact figures quoted in Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie, op. cit., p. 132.
30Charles S. Johnson, The Economic Status of Negroes. Nashville:
Fisk University, 1933, p. 15.
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institutions, including commercial banks, insurance companies and
savings and loan associations. The press and the financial institu-
tions, especially insurance companies, are even now regarded as a
symbol of black achievement in business. The two groups of business
have performed better than the rest because they fulfil special
needs in the social and economic lives of Negroes, in addition to
the protected market they enjoy. The Negro press talks about issues
which the general press often evades, and the financial institutions
fill a vacuum created by discriminatory practices of non-Negro
banks. Further discussion on the development and problems of the
financial institutions will be pursued in a subsequent section.
In sum, the moderate growth of black entrepreneurship before the
Great Depression was the result of an interplay of four major
factors. The first, as pointed out earlier, was the rapid rate of
increase of urban Negro population. (See Table 6-5 and Fig. 6-2
below). Second, the growth of Negro family incomes was moderate
enough to support a segregated Negro market dominated by residen-
tial retail stores and personal services. The third factor was the
development of Negro banking, which provided the much needed finan-
cial aid to businessmen, the majority of whom could not borrow from
white banks. Lastly, as we saw in the last chapter, race advance-
ment organizations provided the necessary moral support to a popula-
tion that was not very sure of its place in the urban economy.
3 1Frazier, op. cit., p. 53.
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TABLE 6-5
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION RESIDING IN
URBAN AREAS BY RACE:
1870
27.5
13.4
1930
57.6
43.7
1880
30.3
14.3
1940
57.4
48.6
1890
38.4
19.8
1950
64.3
62.4
1870-1960
1900
43.0
22.7
1960
68.5
73.2
Source: Daniel 0. Price, Chang ing Characteristics of the Negro
Population (Bureau of the Census monograph). Washington,
D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1969, Table 1-3, p. 11.
One of the greatest tragedies of black economic development is
that economic gains attained in times of economic boom or in normal
times are quickly dissipated during recessions, with the result that
a large number of families have to start all over again after the
recessions. The effect of the Great Depression on Negroes was
too severe to enable a majority to recover before the Second World
War. To cite a specific case, in a study conducted in Philadelphia
in 1933 to determine the relative employment effects of the Depres-
sion on blacks and whites, 39.7% of the white labor force was found
32 For a concise account of the economic status of Negroes during the
Depression, see Charles S. Johnson, op. cit.
White
Negro
White
Negro
1910
48.7
27.4
1920
53.4
34.0
.d
1960
1950
-
1940
w
C
,)
1930
oF- 
N.
<
 00 
1920
-
1910
C:
u
c
c
<- 
1900
u
 
1890
1880
1870
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10
%
 R
esiding 
in 
Urban 
Areas
146
to be unemployed, compared with 56.0% for Negroes.33 The number of
Negro-owned banks in the country decreased from a peak figure of 35
in 1924 to about 12 in 1934. Thus, the end of World War I ushered
urban Negroes into a new phase of entrepreneurship and economic
development which is the subject of the next few paragraphs.
3. Post-War Trends and Factors in Black Entrepreneurship
Enough has already been written on post-war economic conditions
of Negroes34 and hence we shall make a few remarks on significant
trends in occupational mobility, and proceed to identify the salient
trends and factors in present-day black entrepreneurship.
A trend toward upward occupational mobility for a social group
usually paves the way for rewarding entrepreneurship. In general,
there is a definite trend toward upward occupational mobility for
Negroes. In specific terms, whereas in 1940 59.52% of Negro females
were employed as household workers, by 1960 only 35.74% were in this
occupation. Further, 1.2% of employed Negroes were engaged as clerks
in 1940, but the proportion increased to 6.3% in 1960. Similarly,
3 3The study was conducted by J. H. Willits and is briefly reported
in ibid., p. 19.
34Probably the most important reference is Herbert R. Northrup et al.,
Negro Employment in Basic Industry. Philadelphia: University of
Penn. Press, 1970. See also Parsons and Clerk, The Negro American,
op. cit., Part II; John P. Davis (ed.), The Negro American Reference
Book, op. cit., chs. 4 and 5; D. 0. Price, Changing Characteristics
of the Negro Population, op. cit., chs. 3-5; Arthur M. Ross and
Herbert Hill (ed.), Employment, Race and Poverty. New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967.
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while the operatives category engaged 9.3% of all employed Negroes in
1940, its share rose to 18.56% in 1960. However, we find that in
more skilled categories, namely managerial, professional and technical,
only slight gains were achieved. One exception, however, is the
female professional group which increased its proportion of the total
employed Negro females from 4.27% to 7.16%. This was principally due
to increase in the number of female teachers and nurses. Negro males,
on the other hand, made only a very slight gain in the professional
and technical category, increasing their share of the total employed
Negro males from 1.82% to 3.10% as compared with a rise from 5.92%
to 10.93% for white males during the 20-year period. 3 5
Table 6-6 summarizes the distribution of Negroes in United States
self-employed businesses in 1950 and 1960. It clearly indicates that
Negroes were under-represented in all the 13 categories of business,
as compared with their 11% representation in the total population.
As one may expect, retail alone accounted for 64.74' of the total
Negro self-employed businessmen in 1950 and 56.69% in 1960. The
next important category was personal services which in 1950 accounted
for 9.98% and 9.37% in 1960. In 1950 therefore, retail and personal
services alone out of the 13 categories represented three-quarters of
self-employed Negro businessmen. This proportion fell to two-thirds
in 1960, signifying a trend toward an increasing involvement in
other lines of business.
35 For a detailed discussion of major trends and inter-regional com-
parisons, see D. 0. Price, op. cit., pp. 115-130.
TABLE 6-6
NEGRO SELF-EMPLOYED BUSINESSMEN 1950 - 1960
Type of Business
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation
Communication, utilities,
sanitation service
Wholesale trade
Retail
Banking and other finance
Insurance
Business service
Automobile repair, service
and garage
Miscellaneous repair
Personal services
Other
Total
Number
3,390
1,050
2,430
270
2,640
38,730
90
600
570
870
450
5,970
2,760
59,820
1950
% of U. S.
Total
1.76
.48
4.92
6.66
.45
1.55
1.52
1.47
1.61
5.89
3.26
2.81
1960
Number
3,978
1,376
1,241
82
2,610
26,303
41
794
890
1 ,083
414
4,349
3,239
46,400
% of U. S.
Total
1.70
.81
3.19
1.69
1.
2.
1.
2.
% Change
1950-1960
-0.06
.33
-1.73
-4.97
.37
-0.26
.05
.85
92
59
19
60
37
2.77
2.10
3.29
3.31
2.32
4:-
1.30
.49
-2.60
-0.05
-0.49
Source: U.S. Census, 1950, Occupational Characteristics, Vol. IV, Special Reports Part I.
Washington, D.C.: 1956, Table 3; U.S. Census, 1960, Occupational Characteristics,
Final Report PC(2)-7A. Washington, D.C., 1963, Table 3.
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Proportion-wise, Negroes were best represented in three cate-
gories, namely communication, utilities,
transportation (4.92%)and personal servi
they had lost grounds in all the three.
were made during the decade in six out o
last column of table), and it seems that
1960-1970 decade. Other changes in the
a positive growth in (a) construction as
which permits SBA to subcontract federal
(b) personal services which offered the
more accessible SBA loans; and (c) oil,
services which have received an impetus
sanitation services (6.66%),
ces (5.89%); but by 1960
At any rate, slight advances
f the 13 categories (see
this trend continued in the
last decade probably included
a result of SBA 8A program
jobs to minority contractors;
easiest outlet for currently
automobile and associated
from liberalization of
corporate franchises.
In spite of recent progress of blacks in entrepreneurship,
the place of the small businessman in the U.S. economy is gloomy,
and this in itself spells pessimism about the potential growth of
black businesses. Between 1950 and 1960, the total number of self-
employed businessmen in the nation fell by 6.16% but among Negro
businessmen the decline was 22.4%.36 Though part of the decline
could be accounted for by change in corporate form of organization,
the fact remains that proportionately more Negroes left self-
employment for probably more secure employment elsewhere. Whether
the downward trend will continue is subject to conjecture.
36 See Table 6-6.
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Black Entrepreneurship and Black Financial Institutions
Although the rate at which financial institutions have developed
in the U.S. since World War I may be unparalleled anywhere in the
world, yet black enterprises have continued to operate outside the
mainstream of the capital market. More objectively, the problem could
be posed in this way: could black enterprises have developed on a
firmer footing had black financial institutions been sufficiently
efficient and reliable? Andrew F. Brimmer, one of the foremost
authorities on black financial institutions has this to say:
"...competition from Negro-owned banks can make just that margin of
difference which will encourage leading institutions serving the
general market to be somewhat more sympathetic and sensitive to
the financial needs of potential Negro customers.' 3 7
The history of black financial institutions goes back to the
Reconstruction era when in 1865 Congress chartered the Freedmen's
Savings and Trust Company. Initially its activities were limited to
Negro business and investment in government securities. Although
its peak deposit accounts reached nearly $20 million in 1871,38
it had to be closed by midsummer 1874 through bankruptcy, caused
by a Congressional amendment to its charter that permitted it to
invest its assets in notes and bonds secured by real estate. 3 9
3 7Andrew F. Brimmer, "The Negro in the National Economy," in John
P. Davis, op. cit., p. 307.
38Cruden, op. cit., p. 53.
39Ibid.
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Without doubt the Depression of 1873 contributed to its liquidation,
but the fact remains that the contempt of Southern state governments
for it, especially with its support coming from the Federal Govern-
ment and the fears entertained by planters that it interfered with
their established financial relations with sharecroppers contributed
to its downfall. 40
Negro banks were reorganized in 1888 in Richmond, Virginia, and
in Washington, D.C., and later in other cities. By 1905, no fewer
than 28 banks had been organized with some dying no sooner than they
had procured their basic furniture. A peak number of 35 banks were
known to have existed in 1924, declining to about 11 or 12 in the
whirlwind of the Depression. Altogether it is estimated that about
134 banks were organized before the Depression. The total assets
of these banks that survived the Depression was put at about $7 mil-
lion. Their growth and development were a combined effort of
fraternal insurance and burial societies and Negro churches. The
societies were fostered by the churches, and came into being as a
result of their need to develop their own financial institutions.
A majority of the banks died because they were over-capital-
ized and non-liquid. As Harris puts it: "The non-liquid character
of these banks, their high ratio of loans to earning assets and
the heavy fixed investment are the direct and indirect results of
40Ibid.
E. F. Frazier, Negroes in U.S., op. cit., p. 396. For an account
of the development of the banks before the Depression, see Abram
L. Harris, The Negro as Capitalist. Philadelphia: American Aca-
demy of Political and Social Sciences, 1936, pp. 46-61.
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the small volume of business which was essentially non-commercial in
character."42 The non-liquid character of the banks was mainly the
result of heavy investment in real estate or chattel property which
are normally more difficult to market, in contrast with government
and other securities. To illustrate the over-capitalized nature
of the banks, the ratio of capital investment to total deposits
averaged 18% in the state banks, but in the black-owned banks, the
ratio was 32.9% from 1903 to 1930. 4
Another handicap of the banks was their small size which tended
to increase their operating costs. This was one of the reasons why
they could not invest in low-yielding government securities.
Furthermore, they suffered from large outlays in physical assets
acquired through bad loans or defaults. Harris drives home an
interesting point that by limiting the scope and liquidity of the
bank's investments and loans, "the character of Negro businesses
becomes the fundamental factor in its instability and economic
weakness.'45 Frazier also adds: "But when one considers the nature
of the Negro business enterprises for which Negro banks would supply
credit and capital, the difficulty of conducting banks primarily for
Negro enterprises becomes clear. The crucial issue then is: Are
42Ibid., p. 60.
4 lIbid., p. 59.
4 4Myrdal, o . cit., p. 315.
4 5 Ibid., p. 172.
46 Edward F. Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie. New York: Collier Books, 1962,
p. 41.
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Negro banks small because Negro businesses are small or vice versa?
We thus end up with the chicken and the egg puzzle - a puzzle that
today confounds concerned black leaders.
Among the Negro financial institutions, life insurance companies
performed best of all. By 1939, there were 67 of them with 1,677,000
policy-holders. 7 Until recently, the mortality rate among Negroes
was high, and white insurance companies used this fact to charge them
higher premiums than white clients, and sometimes refused to insure
them. As a result of such discriminatory practices, Negro insurance
companies had the most protected market of all Negro enterprises.
Negro savings and loan associations, first organized in 1883,
were founded for similar reasons as the banks. By 1930, 70 associa-
tions were in existence, decreasing to 50 by 1938.48
At the end of 1963, there were 13 Negro-owned banks (increasing
by only two since 1931), 50 insurance companies and 34 federally-
insured savings and loan associations. They jointly had a combined
assets of only $764 million, or 0.12% of the total assets held by
similar financial enterprises in the country. 9 Due to the liberali-
zation of federal banking policy since 1964, six more banks were
chartered in 1964, and altogether more than 25 were in existence
47Myrdal, op. cit., p. 317. For a concise account of the development
of Negro Tnsurance companies, see Linda P. Fletcher, The Negro in
the Insurance Industry. Report No. 11, Industrial Research Unit,
Univ. of Penn. Philadelphia: Univ. of Penn. Press, 1970, pp. 124-
129.
4 8 Ibid., p. 315.
4 9Brimmer, op. cit., p. 297.
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in 1970.50
In spite of rapid improvements in American banking, Negro banks
have been slow in taking full advantage of these improvements. This
is partly the result of the conservative attitude of the clients they
serve. Savings accounts predominate over current accounts. For
example, in some of the minority banks in New York City, passbook
savings deposits account for 87% of the total deposits.51 In addi-
tion, personal loans received by some customers are usually too small,
for it has been estimated that a bank loses money on any loan less
than $300.52
Negro banks are still far from being competitive. A dollar
invested in Negro banks earns only 3/4 as much as it would in a
typical bank serving the community at large,53 and consequently they
are less able to attract all the potential customers in the black
community. Black capitalism for whatever it stands, is meaningless
unless black banks can develop to compete with other banks.
Although they continue to suffer from over-capitalization and
less liquidity of assets, there is a trend toward new forms of
investment. Whereas in the past a higher proportion of their
profits was retained to build up reserves and surpluses, in recent
years they have been investing more in securities, but less in loans
which yield higher profits.
50
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Building Minority Business Enterprise.
Washington, D.C., 1970, p. 30.
5 lTheodore L. Gross, op. cit., p. 52.
52 Ibid., p. 54.
53 Ibid., p. 305.
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The promising strides being made by Negro insurance companies
are worthy of note. They had total assets of $311 million in 1962
or 0.23% of all assets of the nation's insurance companies.54
Compare this with 0.21% of total banking assets owned by Negro banks.
Until now, Negro insurance companies have invested very little in
black businesses. The possibility of tapping this source for both
black businesses and other ghetto-based economic development programs
is worth considering.
In chapters 4 and 5, we attempted to demonstrate that the supply
of black entrepreneurship has been influenced by: (1) a hostile
Southern environment or the Southern tradition, supported to some
extent by Northern conservatism; (2) pre-World War I I passive federal
attitude which in many respects accommodated the Southern tradition.
In other words, "demand determinants" were simply not put to trial;
and (3) the trade union movement which constantly sought to exclude
Negro workers from employment opportunities. While the socio-
economic and political environment remained relatively hostile or
passive, black leadership was sufficiently divided with respect
to the adoption of an appropriate "modus operandi" to combat the
unconducive environment within which a majority of blacks had to
earn their living.
It is against this background that the marginal role played by
blacks in the urban economy was outlined in Chapter VI. In the
54Ibid., p. 309.
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next two chapters we shall proceed a step further to examine
empirically some aspects of black entrepreneurial problems as they
exist today.
PART I I I
A STUDY OF BLACK ENTERPRISES IN BOSTON
In the final analysis, the fundamental
reason that Negroes have not advanced
in business is the lack of business
success symbols available to them.
The culture has simultaneously unduly
emphasized achievement in business as
the primary symbol of success and has
blindly developed or imposed an all-
pervading racism that denied the Negro
the necessary opportunities for achiev-
ing this success.
Eugene P. Foley (The Negro American
p. 572)
CHAPTER SEVEN
MORE PROMISING BLACK ENTERPRISES:
SOME BASIC CHARACTERISTICS AND MAJOR PROBLEMS
Intentions of the Study
There is usually the tendency on the part of urban researchers
to generalize about the marginal nature of black enterprises in the
U.S. Yet we sometimes come across a few entrepreneurs who seem to
be doing well. In the view of the author, it is these few indivi-
duals who are likely to bring about positive changes in the develop-
ment of the ghetto. However, very little is known about these few
individuals. The study therefore aims at improving our understanding
of their businesses and behavior, and how they fit into the ghetto
economic scene. It should be emphasized that the study is only an
exploratory work, and further investigations in other cities are
needed to support, modify or refute some general statements and
"tentative hypotheses" generated by the study.
The study falls into two parts. The first part, Chapter VII,
will focus on the following themes: (i) general background informa-
tion on the businesses studied; (ii) a comparison between different
types of enterprise in terms of employment, employee benefits, wages,
equity capital, physical assets, loans, insurance, planning and
floor space; (iii) indicators of relative success; (iv) factors in
1See Appendix B for research methods used in the study.
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location; and (v) major problems.
The second part, Chapter VIII, will focus on the entrepreneur
himself as an organization maker. We shall attempt to define his
status in society, his relations with the black community, his
attitude toward investment, and his reasons for going into business.
Hopefully some of the hypotheses developed in Chapter III will be put
to test.
General Characteristics
1. Business Types and Location
The 52 enterprises studied can be grouped into seven categories,
as shown in Table 7-1. As one may expect, traditional types of enter-
prise, i.e. personal services, construction and real estate account
for 56%, followed by retail, 12%. The two predominantly black neigh-
borhoods, Roxbury and North Dorchester, contain 41 out of the 52
businesses (79%); the western part of the South End, which is gradually
increasing its black population, has four (8%), the Fenway and down-
town three (6%) each. The geographic distribution of the businesses
confirm our belief of the "inward-looking" character of ghetto
businesses. One distinguishing feature depicted by the geographic dis-
tribution is that majority of the enterprises occupy prime locations,
with some concentration in the vicinity of Grove Hall and Dudley
Station.This ispartly the result of the gradual withdrawal of white-
owned businesses from the black neighborhoods.
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TABLE 7-1
TYPES OF BUSINESS INTERVIEWED
Category
Construction and
Real Estate
Type of Business
construction cum real estate (8); con-
struction (2); plumbing (1); electrical
wiring (1); cement floor finishing (1).
Food & Catering
Manufacturing
restaurant and fast food
entertainment and special
restaurants (2).
apparel (3); electronics
goods (1).
(1); liquor,
services (1);
(1); leather
Personal Ser-
vices
Printing &
Advertisement
Retail
Transport and
Related Ser-
vices
barbering and hair-dressing (3); build-
ing maintenance (1); building security
service (1); funeral homes (3); laundry
and dry cleaning (6); nursing and rest
homes (2).
printing (2); printing and advertise-
ment (1).
men's apparel (1); hardware (1);
shoes (1); miscellaneous cultural
items (1); flowers (1); liquor and
beauty aids (1).
auto body repair (1); gas station (1);
trucking and furniture moving (3).
Total
Number
13
14
5
16
3
6
5
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2. Sex and Age
Males outnumber females by a factor of four to one. 42 out of
the 52 respondents are males. Females are found in only two out of
the seven categories. These two are personal services and manufactur-
ing. Traditionally more black males have gone into business than
females. For example, 21 out of the 52 respondents answered that
their fathers were in business at one time or another, while only
five of them said their mothers had been in business before. Simi-
larly in a study of 654 black entrepreneurs in four Tennessee cities,
female entrepreneurs composed 27.1% of the sample.2 This is not to
say that black males are better businessmen than females. The main
historical reason is that greater employment avenues in teaching,
nursing and until recently domestic work are usually available to
females more than to males, and until the last World War independent
entrepreneurship was not considered a prime occupation for an
average working female adult. However, of late, an increasing
number of black females have been going into business, largely as
a result of the so-called "search for Afro-American identity" which
has given rise to a variety of personal services geared to making
black "beautiful." Further, domestic work in white homes is now
regarded by many black females as an entrenchment of white superior-
ity and demeaning to the black race.
The average age of the 52 respondents was 42.8 years in the
fall of 1970. The youngest was 26 years old and the oldest was 60.
2 Schuster et al., op. cit.
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(See Q2, Appendix C, and Table 7-2 below.) In sum, 31% were less
than 40 years old; 46% were between 40-49 years, and 23% were 50 and
above. The average age of the female entrepreneurs was found to be
43.1 years, compared with 42.6 for males.
TABLE 7-2
AVERAGE AGE OF PROPRIETOR AND AVERAGE
AGE OF ENTERPRISE BY TYPE OF ENTERPRISE
Average Age Average Age
Type of Enterprise Number of Proprietor of Enterprise
Construction and Real
Estate 13 42.2 Years 11.9 Years
Food and Catering 4 47.2 9.5
Manufacturing 5 41.8 2.0
Personal Services 16 44.7 12.6
Printing and Adver-
tisement 3 41.0 11.7
Retail 6 35.8 7.5
Transport and Related
Services 5 37.6 7.4
Total Average 7 41.5 8.9
3Henceforth all references to questions in the questionnaire will
imply reference to Appendix C.
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3. Place of Origin
There is often the tendency on the part of the general public
to regard North American Negroes as a homogeneous population, differ-
entiated only by skin pigmentation. Probably they come from as many
diverse cultural backgrounds as one may find in a small African nation.
Blacks residing in the Boston metropolitan area comprise Southern
blacks influenced much by the "Southern tradition," the New Englanders,
blacks born in the Mid-west or the lake states, English-speaking West
Indian blacks, French-speaking West Indian blacks, Dutch-speaking
West Indian blacks and Africans, most of whom came here originally
as students. We shall later explore the significance of cultural
backgrounds among our 52 businessmen. 27 (58%) out of the 52 respond-
ents said they were born in the South, 16 (27%) are New Englanders,
six were born in other parts of the U.S. and three are West Indians.
The high proportion of Southerners reflects the general wave of
migration of blacks from the Southern states to the North since the
First World War. Most of the Southerners interviewed came to the
Boston area as adults, searching for jobs. Of the 16 New Englanders,
nine referred to themselves as "true Bostonians"; five come from
other towns in Massachusetts and two from Connecticut. One would
have thought that New England blacks, long introduced to the urban
business atmosphere and conditions, would strongly be represented
in the group. A plausible explanation for their weak representa-
tion is that they are on the average better educated than Southern
blacks, and as a result they have turned to such professional
mi
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occupations as law, medicine and teaching. At any rate, the author
came across old-time Bostonians in business, but they were not
selected for the study because they employ fewer than five persons.
Other New Englanders have found full-time occupations in community
organizations in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement. West
Indians also appear to be under-represented according to rumours
that they are the most shrewd black businessmen in the city.
4. Religion
The association of American blacks with Protestant denomina-
tions dates back to the days of slavery when Protestantism, vis-a-vis
orthodox Catholicism, was seen as a channel through which the aboli-
tion of slavery could be brought about. 5 Further, Emancipation
created a large body of non-denominational and confused blacks who
needed guidance, and hence evangelical churches had the opportunity
to convert them in large numbers and to perform more philanthropic
functions than the pre-Emancipation days. It is no wonder then that
36 (69%) of the respondents profess to different Protestant religions,
the most popular of which is the Baptist Church. Of the remaining 16,
4 On several occasions, one comes across blacks born here but of West
Indian parentage. Many of them claim to be West Indians, although
they have been to the Caribbean for short visits only.
5See Harry V. Richardson, "The Negro in American Religious Life," in
John P. Davis (ed.), The American Negro Reference Book. Englewood
Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1966, p. 398 et seq. See also Du Bois,
Philadelphia Negro, op. cit., ch. 12; E. F. Frazier, Negroes in the
U.S., op. cit., ch. 17.
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six are Catholics, four are Moslems, six are non-denominational and a
lonely Jew, who joined the Jewish religion because as she contends it
has something to offer to mankind.
5. Forms of Ownership
All the three forms of business ownership were encountered during
the interviews. Proprietors number 36 (70%), and of this number 19
have legally been incorporated, while 17 have not. There are only
three corporations, but partnerships number 13. 11 out of the 13
partnerships are two-man types, and the remaining two are four-man
and six-man types. It is worth noting that intra-family partnership
is not popular, in view of the fact that 11 out of the 13 partnerships
and two out of the three corporations were formed by friends. There
are two possible explanations for this.
business tradition among Negro families,
of a nuclear or an extended family becom
are very slim. Second, since 71% of the
migrated to the Boston region as adults,
migrated together with their peers with v
up. It is doubtful whether in the South
business organizations exist, apart from
study, for example, sole proprietors con
understand that the entire black history
First, owing to lack of
the chances of two members
ing "successful'' in business
businessmen interviewed
it is not likely that they
whom they could have teamed
widespread intra-family
farming. In the Tennessee
stituted 78.6%. We must
has been marked by family
disintegration. Slavery separated members of nuclear families; and
since the turn of the century large scale migration from the South
in response to better economic opportunities in the North and West
6Schuster, op. cit., p. 28.
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has further accentuated the disintegration process. Moreover, since
the Second World War, a substantial proportion of male members of
nuclear families are known to have fallen into the habit of leaving
their families in situations of economic hardship so that their
families may qualify for family assistance programs. For all these
reasons, the Negro nuclear or extended family, as a basis for various
forms of economic organization such as those we witness among the
Jews and other ethnic groups is yet to be born.
Our ''successful" or ''quasi-successful'' black entrepreneurs in
Boston are indeed "independent entrepreneurs.' 47 out of the 52
businesses were started from scratch by the proprietors or partners
themselves. (See Table 7-3). Some of the respondents explained that
TABLE 7-3
OWNERSHIP AND ORIGIN OF BUSINESS
Type of Started from Enterprise Enterprise
Ownership Total No. Scratch Bought Inherited
Proprietors 36 33 2
Partners 13 12 0
Corporations 3 _2 1 0
Total 52 47 3 2
on-going enterprises offered for sale in the ghetto are either in deep
financial trouble, facing a decline or are located in potentially
riot-prone blocks. Hence, it is considered not advisable to buy
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on-going enterprises in the ghetto. In some cases, as the respondents
explained, when enterprises are bought from white owners by blacks,
sources of supply and credit are not automatically extended to the new
owners, and this amounts to starting one's business from scratch.
Many blacks are therefore not keen on buying such businesses.
6. Age of Businesses
The average age of the 52 businesses was found to be 8.9 years
compared with 7 years for San Francisco black businesses.7 (See Table
7-2 and Fig. 7-1). 33 of the total businesses were started between
1946 and 1963. These were started from scratch by people who had to
rely mostly on their own resources, as access to conventional and SBA-
guaranteed loans was more constricted than at present. Some proudly
talk about how their businesses started from humble beginnings, with
almost no financial aid from any quarters, and how through determina-
tion and perseverance, they survived a plethora of odds, and eventually
succeeded.
Only one enterprise started before 1946, and 18 came into being
after 1963. At the start of the study, it was the belief of the
author that over 50% of the businesses would date from 1964 onward
as a result of the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of that
year and also in response to "soul searching" fomented by the Civil
Rights Movement which received new roots in the early 1960's.
Surprisingly, an undisclosed but extremely few loans had been made
7Pact Inc. Black Businesses in San Francisco. San Francisco, Nov.
1968, p. 39.
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to minority groups by the end of the 1967 fiscal year. Even then
between July 1967 and June 1968, 60 SBA loans were advanced to
minority businessmen in Boston metropolitan region, and 137 in the
1969 fiscal year. Assuming that all the 16 respondents in our study
who have received SBA loans obtained them after 1967, it could be
argued that SBA loans have not contributed to the start of viable
businesses - businesses capable of generating sufficient employment
from the beginning.
Inter-Enterprise Analysis
In designing a strategy for the development of black enterprises,
one of our main concerns should be directed towards incessant inva-
sion into the larger urban market, so that "balance of payments'',
i.e. inflow of income from white consumers and business sector, may
be in favor of the ghetto sub-economic system. If we accept this
proposition, then at least two implicit issues have to be grappled
with: (1) developing the capacity of black enterprises to compete
with white enterprises on equal terms; and (2) geographic dispersion
of black enterprises so that they may no longer bear the stigma
that goes with the ghetto environment.
Viewed from this angle, black enterprises fall neatly into two
groups. The first group which we may refer to as the "less
8The information contained in this paragraph was received from the
Roxbury branch office of the SBA. The author extends his gratitude
to the officers who kindly made the information available.
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competitive sector" comprises two out of the seven categories identi-
fied in the study (see Table 7-1), and
real estate, and personal services. We
this grouping. Personal services have
the black community for patronage. Wit
real estate, renovation of black homes,
realtors and insurance agents have in t
continue to keep a majority of white fi
hoods. Further, much of the money avai
comes from federal and other sources to
the greater the involvement of black bu
community construction projects and by
tion they face, the more beneficial it
economic system. As we shall later not
these are construction and
cannot dispute much about
traditionally depended upon
h respect to construction and
and the monopoly black
he sale of homes will
rms away from black neighbor-
lable to black contractors
rebuild the ghetto. Hence
sinesses in housing and
implication the less competi-
is for the ghetto sub-
e, even in this group, the
market is not as protected as it is generally believed to be.
Residential integration is gradually turning black consumers of
personal services away from their traditional black sources to
white sources. Similarly, new black entrepreneurs are emerging in
newly integrated residential blocks to take advantage of better-
salaried white families. Another opposing force is the pressure
from labor unions compelling black firms to hire white workers in
the name of total integration. In any event, the fact remains that
competition in this sector will always be at a low ebb, with enough
room for more efficient businessmen to hold the reins of rewarding
entrepreneurship.
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The other five categories of enterprise form another group which
we may conveniently refer to as "more competitive sector." With
rapid elimination of barriers of discrimination, these types of
business have become vulnerable to competition from white firms
located within and outside the ghetto areas.9 Blacks can choose to
eat anywhere they want; they can walk into any retail store and expect
to be treated with the same respect accorded to whites. Black con-
sumers can do business with white printing houses or ask for trans-
portation services from outside black neighborhoods. In short, the
dichotomy has more far-reaching planning implications than appear on
the surface. For example, SBA loans are given indiscriminately
to potential businessmen, irrespective of which of the two sectors
they want to invest in, and yet we have not given much thought to the
rate at which expansion in each sector should proceed. Nor have we
studied the growth potentials of each in relation to a given urban
economic structure.
It is formally proposed here that one of the meaningful ways
of devising an economic development strategy for the ghetto is to
adopt the suggested two-sector approach for the purpose of harnes-
sing the optimum opportunities embedded in a market structure
characterized by varying degrees of competition. In our statistical
comparisons to be attempted in the following sections, we shall
9A typical example is supermarket which Gordon F. Bloom has
described in his article, Black Capitalism and Black Supermarket,
(Working Paper, Sloan School of Management, M.I.T.), July 1969.
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frequently refer to the two sectors, and some of their salient
features. One advantage we shall derive from reclassifying the seven
categories into two sectors is that we shall avoid having many zeros
or numbers less than 5 in cells of our contingency tables, and in
this way chi-square, phi-square and other measures of association
shall preserve their true values.
1. Employment and Wages
Table 7-4 nd Fig. 7-2 above) throw light on employment levels
in each of the 7 categories. The highest employment encountered was
120 persons in the personal service category. An average of 13 em-
ployees per enterprise is very small by American standards. Let us
consider first the less competitive sector. An average employment
of 17 in construction and real estate is encouraging, and this is
due in part to federal policy to involve black contractors in federal
contract awards. On the other hand, personal services with an
average employment of 16 is deceptive. The median employment is
only 6. 15 out of the 16 enterprises in the category have an
average of only 9, but the sixteenth firm employs as many as 120
persons, and consequently it increases the overall average for the
category.
Needless to emphasize, the average employment of 12 for the more
competitive sector underscores its employment potential, especially
in manufacturing and transport. Manufacturing with the highest
average of 18 deserves a special comment. It is the youngest among
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TABLE 7-4
AVERAGE AGE OF ENTERPRISE AND
EMPLOYMENT BY TYPE OF ENTERPRISE
Average
Average Employment
Age of Per Enter-
Type of Enterprise Number Enterprise prise
Construction and
Real Estate 13 11.9 Years 17
Food and Catering 4 9.5 11
Manufacturing 5 2.0 18
Personal Services 16 12.6 16 a
Printing and
Advertisement 3 11.7 10
Retail 6 7.5 8
Transport and
Related Services 5 7.4 12
Total Average 7 8.9 13
a Had there not been one enterprise in this category employing 120
persons, the average for the remaining 15 would have been 9.
the seven categories. All the five enterprises were established in the
late 1960's in response to liberalization of SBA loans. With the ex-
ception of one, four broke off from their parent white companies,
relying on the same production techniques, but operating at a much
smaller scale. All are labor-intensive, as Table 7-1 indicates, and
the level of skill required in them is fairly low such that they can
.W
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rely safely on black and white semi-skilled labor. Three out of the
five firms employ predominantly whites. Asked why they do not employ
many blacks, the proprietors gave the same explanation that the
average black worker, still haunted by the slave mentality, prefers to
work for a white firm even though he may not receive a better wage.
Further, the proprietors emphasized that most less educated black
workers are not willing to subject themselves to disciplined routine
types of work characteristic of manufacturing processes. Hence, under
slight fatigue and boredom, they fall victims to absenteeism and un-
ceremonious quitting of jobs. In fact, the three proprietors started
with a substan tial number of black workers, but later they turned
to non-black workers, especially whites and Chinese. However, one
of them still employs over 50% blacks.
In a nutshell, we can generalize that a majority of black
enterprises in Boston, employing five or more persons and at least
two years old, rely on male black labor, working full-time and whose
level of skill is about 10% skilled, 55% semi-skilled and 35% un-
skilled. Table 7-5 below illustrates some employment features.
TABLE 7-5
SOME EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS
Number of Enterprises Employing
None 100% 75-99% 50-74% 25-49% Less than 25%
Male Labor 3 4 19 12 9 5
Full-time
Workers - 28 11 9 4 --
Unskilled
Workers 25 4 4 7 6 6
The study does not find any association between the level of
employment and the sector of enterprise (.701). Tables 7-6 and 7-7 below
convey the same message.
TABLE 7-6
EMPLOYMENT IN LESS COMPETITIVE AND
MORE COMPETITIVE SECTORS
No. of firms
with 5-8
Sector workers
No. of firms
with 9-16
wo rke rs
No. of firms
with over 16
workers
Less Competitive
Sector
More Competitive
Sector
16
11
TABLE 7-7
EMPLOYMENT BY TYPE OF ENTERPRISE
Number of Businesses Employing
Type of
Enterprise
Construction and
Real Estate
Food and Catering
Manufacturing
Personal Services
Printing and
Advertisement
Retail
Transport and
Related Services
Persons
4
2
2
12
2
3
9-16
Persons
2
1
3
17 and Over
Persons
4
1
2
2
0
0
2 2 1
Total
7
8
6
4
29
23
Total
13
4
5
16
3
6
5
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Based on the average wage levels in the seven categories, the
study reveals that an average worker is likely to receive less than
$500 per month. (See Table 7-8 and Fig. 7-3 below.) Although this is
higher than what an unskilled worker receiving a minimum legal wage
rate of $1.60 may make in a month, the fact remains that the most
promising enterprises in the black community are yet to demonstrate
their capacity to compete with comparable white firms in the labor
market.
The table shows that the most impressive record is depicted by
construction and real estate category, with an average monthly wage
rate of $683. The main reason for such a high average is that the
proprietors are bound by union regulations to pay union wages to
unionized workers. This is also true to some extent in transport
and related services, with particular reference to truck drivers.
Thus, this category ranks next to construction and real estate. The
lowest wage rate of $427 for food and cetering category could be
explained by the high percentage of unskilled workers employed in
it. It is hypothesized here that the existence of relatively low
wages in "better practised" black enterprises is a direct response
to high cost of management which is indirectly covered up through
low wages, and this results in ever-weakening bargaining position
of black proprietors to compete effectively on the labor market for
better trained workers. It is a type of vicious cycle. Put in
another way, upgrading of wage levels per se through subsidies will
not improve the competitive position of black enterprises, unless
such subsidies are accompanied by improvement of management
I
TABLE 7-8
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE STRUCTURE
Category
of Business
Construction &
Real Estate
Food & Catering
Manufacturing
Personal
Services
Printing &
Advertisement
Retail
Transport &
Related Ser-
vices
Average Wage
*One respondent
Employment
Total Wages
Employment
Total Wages
Employment
Total Wages
Employment
Total Wages
Employment
Total Wages
Employment
Total Wages
Employment
Total Wages
$300
Monthly
or Less
i1
$2,750
11
$2,750
16
$4,000
5
$750
$301-450
Monthly
41
$15,375
7
$2,625
36
$13,500
141
$451-600
Monthly
42
$22,050
21
$11,025
36
$18,900
83
$601-750
Monthly
16
$10,800
1
$675
5
$3,375
14
Over $750
Monthly
116
$98,600
$52,875 $43,575 $9,450
7 4 1
25
$9,375
12
$4,500
refused to provide adequate information.
the category.
**Total wages shown for
16
$8,400
25
9
$6,075
20
$13,125 $ - $17,000
Data therefore apply to two
Total
Employ-
men t
215
40
88
254
12
50
62
Average
Monthly
Wage
$683
$427
$438
$433
$450
$477
$570
$495
out of the three in
all categories are estimated at mid-points of wage class intervals.
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capabilities, and this ipso facto will in the course of time eliminate
the labor subsidies.
2. Employee Benefits
Employee benefits are a good measure of economic security which
directly determines the competitive position of enterprises not only
in procuring suitable workers, but also in retaining them for longer
periods. In our study, none of the proprietors has signed a contract
with his or her workers. Asked why they have not, a common explana-
tion was that black workers are generally too unreliable to be
pampered with contracts. A few made mention of gifts at Christmas
and Thanksgiving, probably to maintain good working relationships.
An investigation was made into sick and vacation pay . Table 7-9
below provides us with a glimpse of variations that can be found in
the provision of these fringe benefits. Three interesting issues
emerge from the table. First, owing to fairly high wages in con-
struction and real estate, proprietors assert that fringe benefits
are awarded to persons who have stayed with them for some years.
Consequently availability of sick and vacation pay in this category va-
ries accordingly. Second, a proportionately high number of personal
services provide sick pay to workers, the reason being that working
hours and intensity of work do vary depending on both the number of
customers received each day and on the part of the week. Though
overtime payments are made where necessary, proprietors compensate
their workers with sick pay for extra hours put in from time to time.
1W
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TABLE 7-9
ENTERPRISES REPORTING
AND VACATION PAY
All Workers
Sick Vac.
Pay Pay
Some Workers
Sick Vac.
Pay Pay
None
Sick Vac.
Pay Pay
Less Competi-
tive Sector
More Competi-
tive Sector
Total
Cons. and
Real Est.
Personal
Services
The Rest
2 5 4 5 7 3
10 9 2 3 4 4
8
20
15
29 7
1
9
14
25
7
14
Third, the more competitive sector shows a p
enterprises reporting vacation pay.
them close for short periods in the
The
summe
roport i onate
main reason
r (and this
of certain enterprises in the less competitive sector), and workers
are remunerated accordingly.
The less attractive nature and limited number of employee
benefits reflects the depth of labor problems facing black enterprises.
In the Tennessee study, for example, only 3.1% of firms interviewed
reported sick pay; 2% said they had insurance, vacation with pay,
credit and other plans, and 13.5% reported the existence of pension
plans. 0 As we shall later discuss, labor problems lie at the root
10Schuster, op. cit., p. 45.
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of the marginality and sometimes the failure of black enterprises.
Thus any strategy to uplift their status should grapple with the
problem of not only low wages but also the limited employee benefits.
3. Equity Capital
Selected financial aspects of the seven categories of enter-
prise are summarized in Table 7-10. The average equity capital of
about $6,000 is higher than the average for SBA minority loan recipi-
ents in Boston. In the 1970 fiscal year, an average minority SBA
loan recipient put up $4,185 in equity capital, having risen from
$2,920 in 1968 and $3,840 in 1969. It is interesting to note that,
excepting two businesses which were inherited, none of the proprie-
tors received financial help from relatives or friends. Personal
savings account for almost all the seed monies reported. As a com-
parison, about 80% of 239 black businesses studied by Pact Inc.
were found to have been financed by the proprietors themselves.
12
The low average of $1,340 reported for retail is due to
suppliers' credit available to retailers. Transport and related
services category also shows low equity capital. Proprietors in
this category explained that there is often no need to start with
a large amount of seed money simply because it is less risky to
start with one truck and about two or three employees. The truck
11 These sums are the author's own estimates from an information
record of the Roxbury branch of SBA.
1 2 Pact Inc., op. cit., p. 5.
-'I
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TABLE 7-10
AVERAGE EQUITY, PHYSICAL ASSETS AND SALES
BY TYPE OF ENTERPRISE
Type of
Enterprise
Construction and
Real Estate
Food and Catering
Manufacturing
Personal Services
Printing and
Advert i sement
Retail
Transport and
Related
Total Average
Average
Number Equity
13
4
5
16
3
6
5
$ 5,100
13,325
11,400
6,870
1, 500 b
1,340
2,420
6,000
Average
Physical
Assetsa
$201,400
247,200
16,800
110,000
12,000 b
85,000
183,500
122,300
Average
Annual
Sales (1969)
$304,ooo
319,000
52, 0 00c
142,000
117,000
196,000
233,000
194,000
aThese comprise building, if it is owned,
inventory.
bOnly one out of the three respondents in
cThe largest of the five refused to answer
machinery, equipment and
the category answered.
; otherwise the average
would be higher. Also four of them work on contract basis for
other manufacturers and thus a substantial part of this sum may
represent actual profit.
dThis includes a substantial amount of inventory.
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could even be bought on hire-purchase terms. Similarly, garage
operators divulged that they started with small garages and a few
items of machinery and equipment that did not require much capital.
As indicated in the table, information on printing and advertisement
is not complete to elaborate upon.
The remaining four categories show higher than average equity
amounts. The high averages of $13,325 and $11,400 reported for food
and catering and manufacturing respectively are due to initial in-
vestment in capital stock. The proprietors in food and catering ex-
plained that at a given scale of operation initial investment in fur-
nishings, cold storage facilities and cooking appliances are large
and lumpy. Manufacturers in the study group also faced the same situ-
ation initially, except that they have been able to add gradually more
machinery and equipment after installing the basic ones.
The average for personal services ($6,870) is slightly higher
than the overall average. If we break the category into its
component parts -- funeral homes, nursing homes, laundry and dry
cleaning, hair-dressing and barbering -- one finds variations.
In general, funeral homes sub-category reports the largest amount
of seed money (about $35,00), while the least amount (under $1,000)
is reported by laundry and dry cleaning.
The average equity capital of $5,100 for construction and real
estate is fairly low as one may expect. This may be due to
(1) reliance on mortgage loans for most transactions, and (2) use
of subcontractors whose remuneration could be met through other
184
sources of finance until mortgage loans are ready. In essence, some
of the proprietors serve as mere intermediaries between the mortgage
market and small black firms in the building trades to whom they
subcontract.
An average equity capital of $6,000 for the whole group is
unquestionably small by American standards. A crucial question posed
here is whether the availability of more equity capital through a
public program will automatically increase the level of entrepreneur-
ship in the ghetto; or whether the restricted nature of the ghetto
market, the lack of managerial talents in the black communities and
other inhibiting factors militate against such a program. We shall
return to this theme in the concluding chapter.
4. Physical Assetsl3 and Loans
The rate at which physical assets are accumulated in black
enterprises vary from one type of enterprise to another. Since many
enterprises start small, a majority of black entrepreneurs are
initially confronted with a zero-sum game: which types of physical
assets should they invest in, versus the need to maintain en ough
working capital to carry them through the first 6-12 months during
which several show signs of impending failure.
13 1n soliciting information on physical assets, the question was
framed in the following way: "Suppose something happens, com-
pelling you to dispose of your business; for how much would you
sell your machinery, equipment, inventory and the building (if
you own it) such that you would be happy and the buyer would also
feel that he is not cheated?" In essence the respondent was being
requested to estimate the market value of the physical assets.
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Of the three major types of physical assets for which information
was sought, buildings rank first, followed by machinery and equipment,
including office supplies. Inventories are least important and may
account for less than 10% of the total physical assets reported by
respondents. With an average of $122,300 worth of physical assets per
enterprise (see Table 7-10 above), the total value of these assets
for 50 enterprises that responded is put at about $6.4 million. The
two categories, construction and real estate and food and catering
show the highest assets values for different reasons. In the case of
construction and real estate, 9 out of 13 entrepreneurs in the
category own their business premises, while in food and catering,
initial heavy investment in cold storage facilities and cooking
appliances, and to some extent in buildings, explains the high
assets value.
The fairly high average assets value of $183,500 reported for
transport and related services could be accounted for by three main
reasons: (1) all the five entrepreneurs in the category own their
business premises: (2) recent purchases of new trucks; and (3) at
least two (and possibly three) of them run taxi services. They
proudly call it "integrated operation," and by this they mean that
it is economicto run a taxi service if one owns his own garage or
has a trucking business.
In contrast, the manufacturing enterprises show a rather low
average of $16,800 in physical assets, and the main reason is that
they are all renters. Comparing the category's average assets
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value and its average equity capital, there is a difference of only
$5,000 and it seems as though the manufacturers either undervalued
their assets, or loans and profits have not contributed much in
building up the assets.
The average assets value for the personal services category
($100,000) is less than the total average, and this merely reflects
its time-honored limited capacity to generate sufficient income or
contribute significantly to black entrepreneurship. The average
for the category is low partly because inventory accumulation is
negligible and partly because the level of building ownership is
not high (9 out of 16) compared with transport or construction and
real estate.
An important question we should concern ourselves with is,
what proportion of physical assets could be attributed to loans and
equity capital? In Table 7-11 an attempt is made to determine the
relationship between physical assets on the one hand, and loans
and equity capital on the other. We are assuming here that loans
and equity capital form a substantial proportion of the total
investment in physical assets, and therefore physical assets-loan
cum equity capital ratios (see last column of table) should convey
to us in "physical terms'' the effectiveness in the use of loans and
equity capital. One major pitfall of the ratio derivation is that
it conceals profits which might have been ploughed back to build up
part of the assets; nor does it take into account gifts and
legacies. Further, not all loans are used in building up physical
TABLE 7-11
PHYSICAL ASSETS, LOAN AND EQUITY CAPITAL RELATIONSHIP, BY TYPE OF ENTERPRISE
Type of Enterprise
1. Construction and
Real Estate
2. Food and Catering
3. Manufacturing
4. Personal Services
5. Printing and
Advertisement
6. Retail
7. Transport and
Related Services
Total Average
Average Physical
Assets
(in $)
201,400
247,200
16,800
110,000
12,000
85,000
183,500
122,300
Average Loan Received
Since Business Started
(in $)
2
218,000
59,000
14,000
54,000
4,400
48,000
31,000
61,200
Average Equity
Capi tal
(in $)
3
5,100
13,325
11,400
6,870
1,500
1,340
2,420
6,000
Physical Assets-
Loan cum Equity
Capital Ratio
1- (2+3)
1:1.1
3.4:1
.66:1
1.8:1
2.03:1
1.7:1
1 .8:1
Information is available for only one out of the three enterprises in the category.
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assets. Some businessmen obtain loans for working capital. Moreover,
the older the enterprise, the larger the assets are likely to be,
ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, the ratio is useful as a crude mea-
sure of effectiveness in the building up of physical assets.
It is evident from the table that transport and related services
category, with a ratio of 5.5:1, shows the most impressive result,
followed by food and catering. The lowest ratio of .66:1 for manu-
facturing could be attributed to the age of the enterprises in the
category. The average age is only two years. But it also spells
some skepticism in that black manufacturers have historically not
been successful. Perhaps a better future holds for the new ones
coming into being, provided cooperation from white businesses
continues.
Table 7-12 summarizes loans received by 38 enterprises. With
the exception of construction and real estate, the remaining cate-
gories do not neatly fall into specific "loan brackets.'' However,
one can generalize that manufacturers are small loan receivers, and
this is attributed to two major reasons: (1) jobs are subcontracted
to four out of the five by white firms and in three cases they
are supplied with almost all their inputs; and (2) none of them has
invested in building. One could also generalize that an entrepreneur
in personal service is not likely to request more than $50,000 in
1oans.
It is encouraging to note that complaints about loans were limited
to (1) lack of working capital at critical periods, and (2) loans
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TABLE 7-12
LOANS RECEIVED, BY TYPE OF ENTERPRISE
Less than $20,000- $50,000
$20,000 49,999 and Over No Loan
Construction and
Real Estate 0 1 6 6
Food & Catering 1 1 1 1
Manufacturing 4 1 0 0
Personal Services 6 6 2 2
Printing and
Advertisement 1 0 0 2
Retail 0 2 2 2
Transport and
Related Services 1 2 1 1
Total 13 13 12 14
It is not that no loans have been received. Some realtors contend
that mortgage loans are automatically passed on to home buyers.
However, those who receive loans for rehabilitation of dwelling units
for renting regard their mortgage loans as actual loans.
for expansion. In Q130, they were asked, what do you think the
Federal Government can do to help you in your business? 33 of them
mentioned financial aid of one form or another, but mostly working
capital and expansion loans were emphasized. To a large extent, the
problem of working capital and expansion loans are symptoms of in-
efficient planning. Instead of ploughing back profits, a substantial
number of the entrepreneurs interviewed prefer to invest in other
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businesses, and this practice is regarded by the author to be one of
the most excruciating problems in the development of black entrepre-
neurship. We shall deal with this theme in the next chapter.
In general, respondents were satisfied with the time taken in
processing their loan applications. 15 out of the 38 major loan
recipients received their loans within one month after submitting
their applications. 11 others received theirs within 9-12 weeks.
However, there were 11 who said that it took them over three months
to receive their loans.
5. Annual Gross Sales
If we compare annual gross sales of enterprises in the Tennessee
study with the Boston study, the average annual sales for the seven
categories appear impressive. In the Tennessee study, 83.3% had gross
sales of $20,000 or less. In fact 51.1% had less than $5,000. 15  In
our study the average sales are $194,000. In all, only three
mentioned sales over $600,000. The highest average sales ($319,000)
are reported by food and catering, followed by construction and real
estate. (See Table 7-10 above.) As pointed out earlier, the
smallest sales in manufacturing could be explained by the subcontract-
ing arrangement under which four out of the five manufacturers work.
Needless to emphasize, gross sales per se do not reveal viability of
1 4Schuster, op. cit., pp. 25-27.
15 1bid.
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enterprises. Albeit, in absence of adequate data on gross or net
profits, high gross sales are good indicators of either potential
viability or good chances of receiving satisfactory profit margins.
In concluding the financial aspects of the study, tests of
levels of significance show that there is no relationship between
the two-sector classification of enterprises on the one hand, equity
capital, physical assets and gross sales, on the other. The results
of the tests are:
Relationship between sector
of enterprise and Level of significance
1. Equity Capital
2. Physical Assets
3. Gross Sales
6. Fire and Theft Insurance
The limited access black businesses
insurance is usually cited as a measure of
businesses.16 On the basis of our initial
entrepreneurs in our study group represent
preneurs in the city, it is not surprising
have to fire and theft
risk attending ghetto
proposition that the
the cream of black entre-
that 28 (54%) out of the
16For a vivid insight into the relationship between high crime rates
and inner city poverty areas, see The National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders, Report of. New York, Bantam Books, 1968,
pp. 266-267.
.209
.397
.675
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52 are covered by both fire and theft insurance; 20 (38%) have only
fire insurance. In fact only three have been rejected outright by
insurance companies.
Of equal interest is the fact that discrimination is more
evident in retailing, as only one out of the six in the category
has both fire and theft insurance. (See Table 7-13 below).
TABLE 7-13
FIRE AND THEFT INSURANCE BY TYPE OF ENTERPRISE
Type of Enterprise Fire Fire and Theft
Construction and
Real Estate 5 7
Food and Catering 3
Manufacturing 1 4
Personal Services 4 10
Printing and
Advertisement 0 3
Retail 5
Transport and Related
Services 2 2 N.A.=1
Total 20 28
17For a discussion of special problems facing black supermarkets,
as an example of retailing, see Bloom, op. cit., pp. 11-15.
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Manufacturing, printing and advertisement appear to fare best. A
common complaint heard was that rates are slightly higher than in
other locations. In other words, while insurance companies have
the tendency to deny black businesses insurance facilities, the more
able businesses can enjoy these facilities but only at a slightly
higher cost.
7. Planning Efforts
A majority of respondents indicate that in their own small
way they do some planning, but in actual fact the amount of planning
an average entrepreneur in our group does is not only piecemeal but
also myopic. (See Q112.) Only 11 out of the 52 respondents (21%)
revealed that they plan more than two years ahead; 6 said they plan
between one to two years, and as many as 20 (38%,) divulged that they
plan ahead one year or less. 14 (27%) of them confessed that they do
not plan at all, since they consider planning either too difficult
or unnecessary for the types of business they run.
Of equal significance is the fact that there is no established
pattern of planning within any of the seven categories. As an
illustration, one does not find that in manufacturing or retail,
the entrepreneurs plan three,six or twelve months ahead. Given an
identical market situation, given an identical set of problems
dictated solely by the ghetto environment, and with sizes (employ-
ment levels and gross sales) not drastically variegated from one
enterprise to another within the same category, excepting a few
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individual cases, it should be possible to draw a line of difference
in planning practice between different categories. But one sees no
evidence to this effect. Lack of adequate planning is part and
parcel of management problems which for several decades have plagued
black businesses. Careful and painstaking research is needed in this
respect, if black businesses are to make any headway at all. We shall
defer further discussion on this theme to the concluding chapter.
8. Floor Space
There are no hard and fast rules or established
estimating floor space needs of industrial, commercial
standards for
and wholesale
Within any particular city,
according to intensity
For example, in a downt
smaller by conventional
shopping center. Secon
activity to another. 0
cities, the number of s
(net) in an intensive
extensive industrial zo
industrial and wholesal
the
of land use in a giv
own area the amount
planning standards
d, space needs do va
n the basis of stand
q. ft. of space per
industrial activity
ne. An average of 1
e intermediate land
needs may vary, first,
en section of the city.
of space per worker is
than in a neighborhood
ry from one economic
ards used in several
worker ranges from 25
to over 200 (net) in an
00 - 120 sq. ft. for
uses is very common. 19
In planning practice, the importance of indoor and outdoor
18This includes only that part of the site intensively used, i.e.
the actual building site, parking and loading zone, access lanes, etc.
19 For an incisive discussion of space requirements of various urban
land uses, see F. Stuart Chapin, Jr., Urban Land Use Planning.
Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1965, pp. 383-456.
activities.
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space needs lies in meeting minimum public health and safety standards
and in coping with spatial dimensions of urban growth.
With this as background, the average of 425.5 sq. ft. per worker
for our 52 enterprises is very impressive. (See Table 7-14 and
Fig. 7-4 below.) The average of 169.1 sq. ft. for construction and
real estate is the lowest of all because generally construction workers
TABLE 7-14
AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT, FLOOR SPACE* AND FLOOR SPACE
PER WORKER BY TYPE OF ENTERPRISE
Type of Enterprise
Construction and
Real Estate
Food & Catering
Manufacturing
Personal Services
Printing and
Advertisement
Retail
Transport and
Related Services
Total
Number
13
4
5
16
3
6
5
Average
Employment
17
11
18
16
10
8
12
13
Average
Floor Space
Sq. Ft.
2302.7
6227.8
7800.0
3050
8033.3
2127.5
6780.0
5188.8
Floor Space
Per Worker
Sq. Ft.
169.1
556.9
429.4
264.5
732.2
251.2
575.0
425.5
Floor estimates are based
adjacent parking, loading
on the actual building floors,
and other spaces.
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and building repairmen do not require much office space. In general,
two major reasons explain the high floor space ratios among the enter-
prises studied. First, with the exception of four or five enterprises
the rest are located in less intensive residential land use areas
where rental or property values per square foot are low in contrast
with downtown areas. Second, riots and relocation of ghetto-based
white businesses have resulted in a high vacancy rate, and thereby have
drivendown rent and property values. With rents driven down, business-
men can afford to occupy more space than they could otherwise.
Albeit, in spite of the high work space ratios, parking, loading and
other open-air facilities are deficient. In the study group enterprises
with such facilities number about half a dozen.
Some Indices of "Potential Success'"
Conventional methods of assessing the viability and profitability
of enterprises have tended to rely on such indices as the rate of
return on investment, employment levels, value added, physical and
liquid assets, and so on. In assessing the performance of very small
and sometimes marginal enterprises in the ghetto, it is impractical
to resort to such conventional methods. Our purpose therefore is to
search for those cues which are indicators of ''promising performance"
instead of absolute viability in the light of the ghetto environment.
The following four indices seem to provide us with such cues.
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1. Use of Non-Black Labor
Engagement of non-black workers, especially whites, by black-
owned enterprises is a sign of ''potential success,'' provided their
services are indeed indispensable. As a rule, whites would not
work for black enterprises if the jobs available to them are insecure,
and if they cannot earn equivalent or even more wages than they can
expect in the white business sector. It is also believed that some
black proprietors employ whites just for the sake of having their
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services. The use of non-black labor in the enterprises studied is
shown below:
Number of Enterprises % of Blacks
19 100
20 80-99
8 60-79
40-59
2 20-39
2 Less than 20
Although only about 13 out of the 52 enterprises engage a size-
able number of whites, yet we cannot underestimate a greater measure
of efficiency than can be generated by having black and white workers
working side by side, under black proprietorship. Efficiency, defined
here in terms of satisfactory work performance per unit of labor
2 0 It is argued that it is one of the ways by which black proprietors
try to boost their egc.
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input, is generated through two major and somewhat indirect means.
The first may be termed ''imitation effect." Most whites working
for black-owned enterprises, with the exception of a few, referred
by union employment offices, are hired on account of their experience,
and consequently their black co-workers who often have not been
exposed to identical work experiences can learn from them in an atmos-
phere of mutual cooperation.
The second is the competitive atmosphere created on the one
hand by the desire of black workers to demonstrate that on their own
grounds they are good performers; and on the other hand, the white
workers, on alien grounds, are equally desirous to prove that they
are competent. The kind of mild psychic tensions created in the
minds of the two groups are in no way comparable with high tensions
that frequently mark the relationship between white supervisors or
foremen and their subordinate black workers engaged in white firms.
It is the contention of the author that the poor supervisor-black
worker relationship in white firms, characteristics of the JOBS
program, could be circumvented were the training of unskilled blacks
to take place in black firms under white supervision. The outline
of such a strategy will be discussed in the concluding part of the
study.
2. Access to Both Black and White Customers
A second index of success is the extent to which black enter-
prises draw on both black and white customers. It has long been
recognized that one of the main reasons why most black enterprises
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are marginal is the limited access to the richer white market. To
be sure, any meaningful strategy for reconstructing the ghetto economy
cannot overlook the question of economic integration that feeds
heavily on white clientele. It is argued here that "promising per-
formances" of some black businesses could "partly" be explained by
the access they have to the white market. It is no wonder then that
56% of the businesses interviewed have access to the white market.
23 (44%) out of the 52 respondents said they have mainly black
customers; 13 (25%) claimed they cater for predominantly white clients;
and the remaining 16 (13%) serve both. In Pact's San Francisco study,
comparable figures are: 60% all blacks, 4.5% all whites, and 36%
mixed.21 Economic integration does not seem to be confined to any
particular type of enterprise, with the exception of the five manu-
facturing firms which have a predominantly white market. Thus, in
testing the relationship between types of enterprise, and client
population, our estimate yields a s.l. of .425.
Among the 13 businesses catering for mainly white clientele
are (a) the five manufacturing firms; (b) building contractors who
are taking a maximum advantage of federal subcontracts to minority
firms (8A program), and who are also benefitting from neighborhood
projects sponsored by the city-hall and private agencies; and (c)
firms providing such specialized services as building security and
maintenance. Even personal services which traditionally have been
2 1Pact Inc., op. cit., p. 37.
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oriented towards the ghetto economy and the black population show
signs of making inroads into the white market. Eight of the 16 busi-
nesses in this category still serve blacks, but of the remaining eight,
five appeal to both clients and three to mainly whites.
It should be pointed out at this juncture that location of
businesses tends to be a critical factor in reaching the white market.
Those enterprises which claim predominantly white patronage, or part
of it, are located in downtown, in residentially mixed neighborhoods
such as the Fenway, or on major transport routes that lead out of
Roxbury and North Dorchester, the two predominantly black neighbor-
hoods. Without much doubt, careful siting of efficient laundry and
dry cleaning services, as well as restaurants, on black portions of
Columbia Avenue, Columbia Road, Tremont Street, Washington Street
and more secure parts of Blue Hill Avenue will attract a substantial
number of white clients.
3. Positive Changes
Our proposition here is that potentially successful businesses
in the ghetto have to go through positive changes that promote growth,
or are in themselves signs of growth. In Q114, the entrepreneurs
were asked, what significant changes have taken place in your business
since you started? With the exception of three who admitted a
decline in business and four who said they have not witnessed any
changes since they started, the remaining 45 are going through
various phases of growth. The changes that have occurred may be
now
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summed up as follows (The total adds to more than 52 because some
enterprises have experienced more than one positive change.):
Positive Change No. of Enterprises Reporting
1. Expansion of volume of business 25
2. Purchase of additional or new
machinery and equipment 27
3. Renovation of premise or
purchase of a new building 14
4. Miscellaneous changes
Another positive change is increase in levels of employment.
(See Q64.) Only seven out of the 52 employed five or more when they
started their businesses. Nine said they started alone with no help
whatsoever; 29 employed one or two persons from the beginning, and
seven had three or four workers when they started. But now all
employ five or more full-time workers. (See Q63.)
4. Physical Appearance
A majority of ghetto businesses are known to be in poor physi-
cal condition, epitomizing the slum environment of which they are a
part. This study maintains that the more successful black businesses
try to distinguish themselves from the rest by their outward physi-
cal appearance. As an illustration of physical conditions of black
businesses, a city-wide survey of 4,242 black businesses in Phila-
delphia revealed that 12.1 per cent were neat and clean, 55.9 per
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cent as "not eye-appealing," and 32 per cent as run-down. 2 2
In the absence of a universally accepted, objective method of
evaluating building conditions, we cannot help but rely on subjec-
tive intuitive surveys such as that conducted by the author on
the exterior and interior conditions of the 52 business premises.
With regard to exterior conditions, 30 of them are in good condition;
15 may be classified as fair, and seven are in poor shape. The 30
good ones appear to be well-maintained, and 14 of these have recently
been renovated, while a few have even moved to new buildings to
"improve their address," as one proprietor puts it.
In connection with interior decoration and appearance, 25 are
in good condition; 14 may be classified as only fair, and eight are
really poor. In five cases, respondents could be interviewed at
home only since they were always on the road, and hence the author
did not have a chance to examine the interior conditions. It could
be argued that the relatively satisfactory exterior and interior
conditions in which more than 50% of the businesses were found
probably depict a type of value orientation that is buttressed on
a "need to succeed'' though success may not as yet have come in the
way of a majority of them.
An attempt has been made to determine the relationship between
building conditions, type of business and level of education. Our
computation yields the following results:
2 2Eugene P. Foley, "The Negro Businessman: In Search of a Tradition,"
in T. Parsons and K. B. Clark (ed.), The Negro American, op. cit.,
p. 562.
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Variables
condition and level of education
condition and level of education
condition and sector of business
condition and sector of business
condition and exterior condition
Level of Significance
.123
.244
.433
.042
.002
Two interesting things emerge from the above computations.
First, businesses whose interior conditions a
have good or fair exterior condition, i.e. po
between interior and exterior conditions (.00
respect to exterior and interior conditions t
between those businessmen with high school or
education and those who could not finish high
the two major groups of business 'less compet
competitive" sectors, we see some difference
toward interior building conditions (.042).
significant at the .05 level, if we are willi
tive. 17 out of 24 bus
interior premises could
only eight out of 23 in
inesses in the le
be examined are
the more competi
re good or fair tend to
sitive relationship
2). Second, with
here is no difference
high school (plus)
scho
itive
in th
The d
ng to
ss competi
classified
tive secto
ol. Considering
" and ''more
e proprietors'attitude
ifference is
be less conserva-
tive sector whose
as good, while
r are so classi-
fied. The difference could be explained by two or more factors.
First, entrepreneurs in the
well known customers they a
the cleaner their premises,
less competitive sector usually have
ppeal to, and other things being equal
the better their chances of attracting
Exterior
Interior
Exterior
Interior
Interior
I
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more customers. Second, more entrepreneurs in the less competitive
sector (18 out of 29) own their business premises compared with
entrepreneurs in the more competitive sector (10 out of 23), and
owners generally maintain their properties more adequately than
renters.
Location and Locational Problems
Earlier, it was pointed out that 44 out of the 52 enterprises
(or 85%) are located in predominantly black residential areas, namely,
Roxbury, North Dorchester and the western part of the South End. It
is a common saying that black enterprises tend to "look in" rather
than "look out" of the ghetto areas for patronage. To test how
crucial this fact is in understanding the working of the ghetto
economy, our 52 interviewees were requested to choose three among
11 locational factors and rank them accordingly. (See Q88A, Q88B
and Q88C.) Included in the 11 factors is "convenience of customers."
This is a catch-all expression embodying such concepts as accessi-
bility and territoriality. It is obvious indeed that this single
factor is insensitive to size of business, market or the type of
neighborhood. Therefore, if our respondents rank it on top of all
other factors, we learn nothing new about the locational preference
of retail, service and other non-manufacturing types of enterprises.
However, given a known market, how do we evaluate this factor against
all other factors which influence the location of retail and ser-
vice activities in one way or the other? Should planners, for
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example, in locating enterprises, have to worry about common sources
of supplies for related service or retail activities, about external-
ities associated with suburban and other shopping centers? Or with
the market (i.e. customers) unknown, can subsidized rents in planned
locations induce potentially viable minority businessmen to try their
luck elsewhere?
In the light of such policy-oriented issues, the questions have
some merit. Our interest here is to determine the degree to which
our more successful black businessmen attach importance to the
factor "convenience of customers." In other words, we are interested
in finding out how entrenched this factor is in ghetto business
location vis-a-vis all other factors. We should, however, remind
ourselves that when most black businessmen talk about ''customers,"
they mean a known group of neighborhood residents with whom they
have established inter-personal relations, and the businessmen know
quite well that the stability of such relations plays an important
role in their ultimate success.
In testing how sensitive this factor is to ghetto business
location, two correlation tests are performed, ranking the 11 loca-
tional factors. In one of the tests, the factor ''convenience of
customers"' is included; and in the other it is excluded. Our hypo-
thesis is that it really does not make a difference whether or not
this factor is included in the ranking, as ranking of locational
factors has no statistical significance.
For our purpose, Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient is a
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useful measure. The coefficient is calculated such that when two rank-
ings are identical, then it attains a maximum value of plus 1; when the
rankings disagree or one is the reverse of the other, the coefficient
is minus 1. In our case, therefore, if our respondents (judges, judging
the eleven locational factors) really respond to the same environmental
conditions, then they should be consistent in their judgment.
In performing our tests, we shall use the first two reasons, as
coded in Q88A and Q88B. Each reason selected first by a respondent
receives three points, and the second reason two points. The results
of our tests are as follows:
1. Including "Convenience of Customers": R23 has a value of .225, and
using Student's test,24 signified by static t, with 9 degrees of free-
dom,25 t has a value of 4.08, and this is significant at the .005 level
for one-tailed test. We have a good reason at this point to reject the
hypothesis, and to argue that locational factors are subject to ranking.
2. Excluding "Convenience of Customers": If the factor "convenience
of customers" is excluded, R now has a value of .39, and with 8 degrees
of freedom, t has the value of 1.19, and even at the .20 level it is
not significant.
23R is Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient defined as:
R = 1 6 d2  6 x 164 .225.
n3  - n ll - 11
where d = difference in points scored by each reason;
n = 11 locational factors, i.e. items being ranked.
24
Student's test is defined as:
t n-2
t = R 2
1-R2
The items being ranked should not be less than 10.
2 5The formula for obtaining the number of degrees of freedom for this
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Our hypothesis holds in this respect. In order to ascertain that it is
this factor which makes all the difference we have to perform what may
amount to a sensitivity analysis to determine how each factor in turn
affects the R values. In fact such an exercise is not necessary. If
we simply adopt a point scoring system, and assign 3 points to each
first reason mentioned by a respondent, 2 points to each second reason
and I point to a third reason, "convenience to customers" outranks the
second important reason by almost a factor of 2, as shown below:
Total % of
Reason Points Total Score Rank
Convenience to customers 108 26.7 1
Likeness for neighborhood 58 14.4 2
Close enough to public transportation 52 12.9 3
Room for expansion, little competition 50 12.4 4
Reasonable rent, price or purchase terms 34 8.4 5
Close enough to associated businesses 28 6.9 6
Accessibility to workers 27 6.7 7
Business or family owns this building 26 6.4 8
Close enough to sources of supplies 10 2.5 9
Only place available 7 1.7 10
To demonstrate the foot-looseness of
black businesses 4 1.0 11
At any rate, the rank coefficients reveal more about how sensi-
tive ghetto businesses are to the factor 'convenience to my customers."
If, as it is contended, black businesses do not grow because they are
geared to consumers deeply entrenched in a cycle of poverty, it only
kind of test is simply n-2, where n is the total number of items
being ranked.
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stands to reason that public policy be designed to reduce the impact
of this potent locational factor. Put in another way, black entrepre-
neurs are only responding to a given environment, which evidently is
stricken with poverty. Entrepreneurial "supply" factors are clearly
not effective, and "demand'' influences alone can change such an
environment.
A major problem facing small businesses located in poverty areas
is frequent relocation as a result of urban renewal programs, riots,
forced ejection, etc. Out of the 52 respondents, 29 answered that
they have relocated their businesses for nine different reasons
(see Q83). Urban renewal was responsible for nine out of the 29
cases, another nine relocated because they needed more space, and
the remaining 11 relocated for other reasons as shown in Q83. Thus
urban renewal and the need for more space are the most recurrent
causes for the relocation of more successful black businesses in
the city. The study also shows that relocation is more intra-neigh-
borhood than inter-neighborhood. In other words, there is the
tendency for businesses to be relocated within Roxbury or Dorchester,
often within a distance of a few blocks. In a majority of instances,
relocation took place within five blocks. To be sure, 20 out of the
29 cases of relocation took place within the same neighborhood, and
a plausible explanation is that relocation involving long distances
departs from the all-important locational influence, 'convenience
to customers," which, as we have noted above, is most crucial in
locational decisions of these businessmen.
A policy issue which emerges from the experience of relocated
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businesses is the high cost of relocation. The study shows that it
takes at least six months and at most two years for relocated businesses
to recover. The recovery period differs from one type of business to
another. Of the various causes of relocation, the negative impact of
renewal programs and riots is most severe and it could be minimized by
a deliberate public policy to aid affected small businessmen by more
liberal subsidies than what they are entitled to at present. For
example, a policy could be devised to forecast possible losses and to
treat these losses as a cost to the government.
Problems
Problems which usually face small businessmen with no business
tradition are many and intricately interwoven together. However in
analyzing the problems facing our 52 businessmen, our primary interest
is to identify (a) those problems which could be tackled by ''demand
influences," i.e. public policy instruments, and (b) those created
by the ghetto environment, solution of which may lie outside the
realm of federal efforts.
Respondents were asked to select three problems out of 12
recurrent problems26 associated with ghetto businesses and to rank
them accordingly. In analyzing these problems, we cannot help but
resort to a simple point scoring system. Each problem mentioned
26 For a concise description of problems facing small businesses in
general in the U.S., see Wendell B. Barnes, "Small Business in
America - Its Place and Problems," Advanced Management, Vol. 21,
No. 7 (July 1956), pp, 7-10.
211
first receives four points, the second problem is assigned three points,
and the third problem two points. The result of the ranking procedure
is shown in Table 7-15.
It is evident that the most high-ranking problems are diffi-
culty in getting enough loans, and difficulty in getting reliable
employees. Three other studies have attempted to identify problems
facing black businessmen in Tennessee, Harlem, New York and San
Francisco. One interesting fact which emerges from a comparison
between the three studies (see Table 7-16) is that although the
rankings are not the same in all the three places, certain problems
are more highly ranked than others. The severity of each problem
differs from place to place as a result of regional differences in
racial relations, black economic history and lending policies of
local financial institutions.
Among the 12 problems identified in the Boston study, six of
them, accounting for 66% of the total score,could be dealt with
directly by government programs, and in fact programs are already
in existence to combat some of them. The six problems relate to
loans, insurance, availability of reliable employees, police pro-
tection, counseling services and political climate, with particular
reference to reduced White House interest in economic development
of the ghetto. Programs have already been devised for granting of
loans and provision of technical services. In particular, avail-
ability of reliable employees has received little federal attention.
In fact, if every first problem mentioned by respondents is assigned
five points instead of four, availability of reliable employees
TABLE 7-15: RANKING OF MAJOR PROBLEMS FACING BUSINESSMEN INTERVIEWED
Type of Problem-
Poor environmental quality
High insurance premiums
Competition from white business
Difficulty in getting enough
loans
High rents, high lease payments
Difficulty in getting reliable
employees
Frequent theft
Difficulty in getting counsel-
ing service
Less reliable clients
Inadequate pol ice protection
High cost of inputs
Political climate
Problem 1
No. of
times
men- Score
tioned (4 points)
1 4
7 28
1 4
18
3
12
2
Problem 2
No. of
times
men- Score
tioned (3 points)
2 6
6 18
3 9
72
12
48
8
0
12
8
4
4
0
3
2
12
12
27
12
9
0
6
6
0
Problem 3
No. of
times
men- Score
tioned (2 points)
0 0
1 2
3 6
3
3
6
6
14
2
6
6
8
0
2
Score
2.6
12.7
5.0
N)
N)
Total
Score
10
48
19
90
30
89
22
15
18
22
10
6
23.7
7.9
23.5
5.8
4.0
4.7
5.8
2.6
1 .6
TABLE 7-16: PROBLEMS FACING BLACK ENTERPRISES IN FOUR CITIES*
Boston
Rank in
order of
impor-
tance
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9. Counseling services
Poor environmental quality
High cost of supplies
Political climate
% Fre-
quency
23.7
23.5
12.7
7.9
5.8
5.8
5.0
4.7
Tennessee
Type of Problem
Labor
Investment and working capital
Expansion
Location
Advertising
Working capital
Business promotion
Investment capital
4.0 Extension of credit
2.6
2.6
1.6
Overhead
Time
Lack of business
Class of Customers
White competition
-continued next page
Type of Problem
Loans of various types
Labor
Insurance
High rents, high lease payments
Police Protection
Theft
Competition from white business
Less reliable customers or clients
% Fre-
quency
29.0
21.5
15.3
12.1
7. 1
6.5
6.2
6. 1
10.
11.
12.
1.14
0.9
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.3
Harlem2
Type of Problem
Police protection
Insurance
Loans of various types
Labor
Cost of doing business (overhead
Physical plant in area
Competition from large firms
Circular shift in population and
consumer taste
'Brand name' syndrome, lack of
San Francisco
%o bre-
quency
33.3
22.4
15.7
7.7
6.7
5.3
3.9
3.6
0.7
IAI
CType of Problem
Social concerns, e.g. crime, poverty, jobs,
hippies
Redevelopment and relocation
Financial assistance
Customer and employee relations
Advertising
Building improvement
Relations with city
Business associations
trust Inventory
Poor market location 0.5 Management training
Admitted entrepreneurial failure 0.2 Improving competitive status
Location expansion
No problem
Sources: 1. Schuster, op. cit., Table 17, p. 42. 2. Vietorisz and Harrison, op. cit., Tab
p. 49. 3.~PaltInc., op. cit., pp. 44-46.
Fre-
quen cy
15.1
14.1
12.8
11 .2
10.2
8.6
5.9
3.0
2.6
2.3
2.0
1.6
10.2
le 18,
)
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would be ranked first. The Tennessee study puts this problem ahead
of all. For about two decades now, federal aid to small businessmen
assumes that the most excrutiating problems relate to finance and
technical aid, and relegates to a lesser importance the problem of
labor procurement. The impact of this assumption is reflected in
the types of aid offered by SBA and OEO to minority businessmen.
In another question (Q.127), the respondents were asked: what
problems do you face now that you did not expect? 13 of them
mentioned that they never expected labor problems to be a major
obstacle, while 10 made mention of environmental problems such as
urban renewal, riots, imprudent behavior of landlords and theft. Six
made mention of finance, and only one out of the 52 referred to
managerial problems. It is maintained in this study that the most
pressing problem facing "potentially viable'' black businesses
relates to neither finance nor management, but to labor, especially
the problem of maintaining reliable employees sufficiently determined
to work on a job for a considerable length of time. In the course
of the study, respondents frequently remarked that there is "labor
drain" from the ghetto into white businesses. They explained that
black-owned enterprises provide training grounds for black youths
and hard-core unemployed. After receiving some training, they
become psychologically imbued with the idea that they can now make
it in the white business sector. Consequently many of them leave.
No doubt the "labor drain"' constitutes a substantial loss to poten-
tially viable black businesses. Depending on the type of job and the
type of business, the training periods vary a great deal, as shown
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in Table 7-17 below.
TABLE 7-17
TRAINING PERIODS FOR WORKERS
BY TYPE OF ENTERPRISE
3 Months 3-6 Over 6
Type of Business or Less Months Months
Construction and
Real Estate 1 4 6
Food and Catering 2 2 0
Manufacturing 4 0 1
Personal Services 7 3 4
Printing and
Advertisement 1 1
Retail 3 2 0
Transport and
Related Services 2 1 1
Total 20 13 13
Similarly, the number of workers trained vary from one enter-
prise to another. Altogether not less than 1,000 workers have been
trained in 46 of the 52 enterprises studied. Six of them reported
that training was either not necessary or they have not taken the
risk of training unskilled workers. The efforts of 46 enterprises
interviewed at training unskilled workers may be summed up as
follows:
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Number of Enter- Number of Workers
prises Reporting Trained
19 Less than 10 workers
4 10-19 workers
5 20-29 workers
2 30-39
2 40-49
50-59
6 60 and over workers
7 Unspecified number
6 None
The cost of training unskilled workers in marginal ghetto enter-
prises could be very high, and it is suggested here that one of the
main reasons why potentially viable black enterprises cannot get off
the ground is that from one part of the year to another they incur
training costs - costs which normally do not enter into their balance
sheets. To be precise, the issue at stake is whether an adequate
compensation, or a quid pro quo, is necessary to minimize the finan-
cial losses and the risk ghetto businessmen shoulder in hiring dis-
advantaged workers who ultimately depart for white firms. In the con-
cluding chapter we shall return to this all-important issue with
respect to federal policy towards black enterprises.
Environmental problems such as theft in business precincts,
less reliable customers, high rents and relatively high cost of
supplies lie outside the sphere of responsibility of the federal
government. But such problems are likely to be minimized if a more
comprehensive attack on social and economic problems of central
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cities is conceived of and adhered to as a deliberate public policy.
In this chapter, we have examined some salient characteristics
of the seven categories of enterprises, and have attempted to develop
a nonconventional approach for evaluating their performance. We have
also discussed the factors in their locational preferences and
major problems facing them. So far not much has been said about the
entrepreneurs themselves. This then will be the subject matter of
the next chapter at the end of which general conclusions from the
study will be drawn.
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE MORE PROMISING BLACK ENTREPRENEURS:
WHO ARE THEY?
Although a case was made in Chapter III that it is a difficult
task to interpret accurately entrepreneurial development within its
socio-cultural framework, it is a fact that in a given society the
ethnic or linguistic groups with entrenched business traditions have
a better understanding of the business environment than non-business-
oriented social groups. In other words, the business environment can
influence people's attitude towards thrift, savings and investment,
shape their thoughts on business and economic trends and make them
accustomed to thinking always in dollars and cents. Thus the develop-
ment of business tradition is a sine qua non for a social group that
wants to exist as a viable economic unit.
In Part II, we discovered that American blacks, unlike other
ethnic groups, have been unable to develop the type of business
acumen necessary to survive in this competitive capitalistic environ-
ment, because of political and institutional factors that have
historically dictated their economic position in the society. In
the following sections we shall attempt to draw a general picture
In several cultures such social groups do exist, e.g. Ibos and
Ibibios in Nigeria, Kwahus in Ghana, Lebanese in West Africa or
Brazil, Indians in Kenya, Jews in the U.S. and Canada, etc.
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of our more successful black businessmen. Specifically we shall
examine their familial background, how they relate to the black
community, their attitude toward investment, the types of work experi-
ence they possess that prepared them for the business world, signifi-
cance of sex, levels of education and place of origin, and why they
chose to go into business.
Do They Belong to Any Class?
The issue we want to pursue in this section is whether our more
successful or potentially successful black businessmen indeed belong
to a distinctive social class by virtue of their parental background
or through their own personal efforts. For example, E. F. Frazier
portrays the educated black elite as belonging to an emerging small
middle-class, living in a world of make-believe.2 What can we say
about our potentially more successful businessmen?
Our original hypothesis is that the "so-called more 'successful'
black entrepreneurs, unlike the educated black elite or the success-
ful white business elite do not belong to any elite class, but are
first generation urban entrepreneurs whose lack of business tradi-
tion and experience subjects them to various public assistance
programs".
In testing our hypothesis, we shall employ three mutually
reinforcing methods for determining social mobility and status. The
2 See Edward F. Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie. New York, Collier Books,
1962, pp. 56-76.
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first is an estimation of our entrepreneurs' educational attainment,
and to infer, a la Frazier, whether education has played any role in
their going into business. The second is to compare their nuclear
family characteristics with those of Boston black families. The
third is to trace our entrepreneurs' occupational mobility, using
the occupations of their fathers and of the Boston black community
as a frame of reference.
I. Educational Background
It is generally assumed that good education in terms of number
of years one remains in school and college broadens one's outlook in
life in addition to acquiring more knowledge, and therefore has a
better chance of succeeding in business. Studies have shown that
high education attainment is not a pre-condition for business success.
It has been noted, for example, that among technology-oriented
enterprises which span off from M.I.T. and other government-
sponsored research laboratories, those holding M.S. degrees appear
to be doing better than Ph.D. holders.3 Similarly, Collins and Moore
point out that only one in five of their Michigan entrepreneurs
stayed on through college graduation.
The average number of years of schooling attained by an entre-
preneur in our study group is 11.4, including college, but excluding
3Edward B. Robert, op. cit., Research Management, p. 263. The author,
however, points out that there are notable exceptions to this
tendency.
4 op. cit., p. 49.
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vocational education. This could be compared with 10.2 years (median)
for Boston non-whites in 1960. The 1960 population census for
Massachusetts non-whites 25 years and over shows that 41.8% had 8-12
years of schooling.5 For our study group 40% had 7-12 years of
schooling or about 37% had 8-12 years of schooling. In terms of
educational attainment, therefore, the author does not see any
pronounced difference between Massachusetts non-white and our study
group. We may also note a positive correlation between fathers'
educational level and that of the sons (Goodman-Kruskal's Gamma =
.385).6 We may be tempted at this juncture to reach a facile conclu-
sion that if education is a major yardstick for measuring the social
status of blacks, assuming of course that higher education determines
a black person's chance of entering a respectable occupation, then
our 52 entrepreneurs are a replica of the rest of Boston's black
population. However, to convince ourselves of this fact, it may be
worth our effort to examine other indices that reflect middle-class
way of life, which we assume to be the path our entrepreneurs would
like to tread if they are to be regarded as different from a majority
of black families.
5 U.S. Bureau of Census, Census of Population, 1960, Massachusetts
Detailed Characteristics, Vol. 1, Part 23, Table D-1, pp. 23-518.
6Goodman-Kruskal's Gamma is a static measure of association, which
takes its value from +1 to -1, depending on the degree of associa-
tion between a pair of variables, and hence it is responsive to
unidirectional association. Its conceptual meaning is that given
say nxn contingency table, it tells us the proportion of paired
positive associations less the proportion of paired negative
associations. See Weiss, op. cit., p. 201-206.
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2. Family Characteristics
The middle-class way of life in the American society is
essentially that of the white middle-class which the emerging small
educated black middle-class are attempting to emulate. One of the
most conspicuous features of this way of life is family size.7 67% of
our respondents comprises married persons living with their wives.
This proportion compares favorably with 71% for Boston non-whites in
196.8 The average size of a non-white household in the same year
was 3.06, in contrast with 5.5 for our study group. The difference
in household sizes may be attributed to a higher proportion of
recent arrivals and unmarried single-person households in the total
non-white families. Of particular significance is the size of the
parental nuclear families of the respondents. On the average each
has 4.5 brothers and sisters, or comes from a 6.5-person family. In
terms of birth order, representation of first-borns in the study
group is proportionately high (27%). The tendency toward gradual
decrease in the size of an average black family is supported by our
study. Nevertheless, our respondents exhibit a marked tendency
toward large family sizes, and this indeed reminds us of a common way
of life for most black families, and not of the emerging small middle-
class. We shall next turn to occupational structure to determine
whether going into business is an evidence of status mobility.
7The implicit value aroentation here is that with decent income, a
small family should encounter no difficulty leading a decent life
and possessing minimum necessities of life.
8Bureau of Census, Massachusetts Detailed Characteristics, 2p. cit.,
Table 110, p. 23-326.
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3. Occupational Background
Several studies9have shown that intergenerational occupational
mobility is taking place in several cultures. Leading entrepreneurs
are known to have come from second generation small industrialists,
traders and other self-employed occupations. The first question we
must resolve is whether our respondents come from recognizable busi-
ness backgrounds. 40% (21) said their fathers were in business at one
time or another (see Q16). Of the 21 fathers, 14 were in two lines
of business, namely construction and real estate and transport; and
another three in retail. Five said that their mothers were in busi-
ness, with one in the same business as the father. To be precise,
48% of their parents (i.e. 25 of them)were in self-employed occupa-
tions at one time or another. If we consider the fact that about 1%
of Boston blacks are self-employed and that they account for only 6%
of all self-employed persons in the city in contrast with their 15%
share of the total population, it appears that our respondents propor-
tionately have more parents who have been in business before. This ta-
llies with the findings of E.B. Roberts (see footnote below) and
others that business environment in which potential entrepreneurs grow
is a contributory factor in their going into business.
The next step in our analysis of the respondents' background is to
J.R. Harris (op. cit., EEH) indicates that the first generation indus-
trialists in Nigeria are sons of predominantly farmers, large-scale
traders and self-employed artisans. G. Papanek (op. cit., AER) also
confirms that people of trading background constituted over 50% of
the 250 industrialists studied. E.B. Roberts (op. cit., Research
Management) makes a point that 50% of the technical entrepreneurs
investigated came from self-employed homes. See also T.C. Cochran,
The Puerto Rican Businessman, op. cit.; J.J. Carroll, op. cit.;
J.J. Berna, op. cit.; and A.Alexander, op. cit.,EDCC.
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compare the fathers' occupations and their own prior to going into
business and to draw the necessary
occupational mobility. Table 8-1
evident from the table that the di
fathers and the entrepreneurs mere
in urban areas when black migrate
fathers were in farming mainly as
neurs was engaged in this type of
tionately higher number of the ent
vices and catering and in blue col
precisely the types of occupation
they migrate to northern cities.
inferences with respect to
attempts such a comparison. It is
fference that exists between the
.ly reflect economic opportunities
from the South. Nine of the
laborers but none of the entrepre-
occupation.10 Instead, a propor-
repreneurs were in personal ser-
lar occupations, and these are
usually available to blacks when
We may recall that 52% of our
respondents were born in the South and came to the North as adults
searching for jobs. Increase in the number of entrepreneurs in
the clerical category and to a small extent in the professional
group points to a general trend in improved level of education and
its attendant occupational mobility for blacks in general, although
some black families have taken a greater advantage of educational
opportunities.
If we group the fathers' occupations into four major cate-
gories, professional-clerical (white-collar), blue-collar, ghetto-
based type and farming, and the respondents into white-collar, blue-
collar and ghetto-based type, the correlation between the two sets
10Some pointed out that as teenagers they worked on farms in the
South, helping their tenant parents or were temporarily engaged
as laborers.
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TABLE 8-1
OCCUPATIONS OF FATHERS AND ENTREPRENEURS COMPARED
Type of Occupation
Fathers
% in
Number Group
Ent rep reneurs
% in
Number Group
Farming (mainly laborers
and tenants)
Personal services
and catering
Clerical
Transport and auto mechanic
Construction and real estate
Retail
Mining
Sports
Professional
9
4
4
8
7
2
4
17%
8
8
15
13
4
2
2
8
0
10
8
6
6
19
16
12
12
2
2
00
6
Blue collar (in industry
and commerce) 9 17 12 23
Printing and advertisement 1 2 2 4
Don't know 2 4 - -
1 1The entrepreneur's occupation was recorded for the type of work on
which he was engaged in all the time before going into business, or
if he took up different occupations, the longest period during which
he engaged himself on a particular job was recorded as his occupa-
tion.
1I
1
1
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of occupational attributes is in fact negative (Goodman-Kruskal
Gamma= -.165). A positive Gamma value would have meant upward occu-
pational mobility for the respondents. 12
Table 8-2 compares the proportion of Boston black workers
engaged in major occupations as shown in the 1960 census with the propor.
tion of our 52 businessmen engaged in almost identical occupations
priorto going into business. We can infer from the table that the
differences are not so extreme as to justify any claim that the 52
businessmen were in more dignified or inferior occupations compared
with the rest of Boston black workers. The slightly difference in
retail and wholesale category is attributed to the large number
of "Mom" and "Pop" stores which predominate ghetto businesses.
Our respondents have proportionately a higher representation in the
clerical category, and this may be due to the one-year difference
in educational attainment between them and the rest of the black
population. They are also strongly represented in transport and
related services because of the ever-increasing opportunities in
this line of business.
We may therefore conclude that the respondents in the Boston
study differ with respect to the entrepreneurial background of their
parents - a type of backgoround which probably might have induced
some of them to go into business. However, lacking special advantage
in terms of education, middle-class way of life, or higher occupatio-
nal status priorto going into business, our respondents have gone
12The assumption here is that the occupations lie along a status
continuum. However, the assumption is prone to subjective value
judgment.
228
TABLE 8-2
OCCUPATIONS OF BOSTON BLACKS AND RESPONDENTS COMPARED
Proportion of Proportion of
Boston blacks respondents
Types of Occupation engaged in engaged in
Agriculture .34% 0%
Construction, finance,
real estate 6.33 12.0
Personal services 14.88 19.0
Professional 16.86 12.0
Retail and wholesale 11.45 2.0
Clerical (Public administration
and other) 7.0 16.0
Transport (including utilities,
communication and other) 4.50 12.0
Blue collar (manufacturing plus
part of business and repair) 32.91 23.0
Miscellaneous 3.0+
It is to be noted that some of the categories have been combined to
approximate occupational types recorded for the respondents. Less
than 150 persons engaged in communication, utilities and sanitary
category have been added to transport and related services. 952 per-
sons were engaged in business and repair, and the number has been
split equally among blue collar and clerical. Other categories
remain intact.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Massachusetts Characteristics,
op. cit., Table 130, p. 23-476.
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into business as an avenue to create success stories and to carve for
themselves distinct paths of occupational mobility. 52% of them are
first generation entrepreneurs, striving to attain a new plateau of
entrepreneurship uncharacteristic of the ghetto economy. Only 14 of
them ever had a chance to work with their parents in their private
businesses, (see 021), so that a majority of them started business
unschooled in the basic rules of the game. This is one of the major
reasons why unflinching support of the government at various stages
in their development becomes most wanting.
Collins and Moore, in their study of 150 Michigan independent
entrepreneurs, arrive at a conclusion that they come from less
power and economically less secure homes.13 Their major aspiration
is to create organizations which they can control and protect.
Similarly, our Boston black entrepreneurs come from less affluent
homes, and are seeking to build new enterprises as symbols of per-
sonal achievement.To be sure, the ambition of the low-status worker
to be self-employed is a common American creed, deriving its strength
from the frontier spirit; and yet it promises no definite success,
not even to the most adept participants.
1 3Collins and Moore, op. cit. , pp. 33-38. In a similar vein Lipset
and Bendix contend that "self employment is one of the few po-
sitions of higher status attainment to manual workers." Among the
105 self-employed businessmen they interviewed in Oakland, 86% were
recruited from low-status occupations. See S.M. Lipset and R. Bendix,
"Social Mobility and Occupational Career Patterns", American
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 57, No. 5 (March 1952), pp.500-503.
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Although independent entrepreneurs are drawn from less economic-
ally secure homes, yet we must not underestimate the middle-class
aspirations of most independent entrepreneurs. Roger Coup, in a TAT
analysis of the Michigan data discovers that their social value system
is steeped in middle-class mores. For example, they regard them-
selves as hard-working men, much devoted to their businesses. When
our 52 entrepreneurs were asked, "to what reasons do you attribute
your success, if any?" (Q131), as many as 38 first mentioned their
own personal inputs, ranging from working around the clock, good
management, to prompt payment of bills. Most emphasized that any
amount of success they have achieved so far is summed up in two
phrases: hard work and self-discipline. 14 also referred to human
relations of one kind or another. The author became convinced in
the course of the interviewsthat the respondents were sincere in
their subscription to these middle-class mores. But subscription
to these mores per se does not result automatically in attaining
social mobility that may gradually extricate them from the cycle
of poverty that marked their youthful days. Roger Coup in his
analysis also asserts that "what is lacking here among these entre-
preneurs seems to be value of getting ahead, rising in a social
hierarchy, and achieving positionsof authority and rewards associated
with power and status.''15 Married to their business, independent
entrepreneurs usually take the environment as given, and because of
T4Collins and Moore, ibid., p. 40.
15 1bid.
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lack of social mobility drives, resign themselves to socio-economic
forces that directly impinge on their performance. In the next
section, we shall examine how our respondents relate to their environ-
ment.
Relations with the Black Community
In many societies, businessmen are known to occupy positions of
prestige and power. They are either directly involved in politics
and therefore are always where the action is, or through sheer
affluence they hide behind the scene, smoothly directing the course
of events. Take the case of prominent American white businessmen.
Proportionately few are in politics, but their influence extends from
Capitol Hill to the small city-hall in Montana. They have an un-
challenged status in society and occupy positions of great prestige,
influence and power.
What can we say about the relatively more successful black
businessmen? Are they capable of wielding the type of concessions
white businessmen obtain from the Government with respect to "demand
factors" that dictate their ultimate success? To what extent do
they influence the course of political events both in the black
community and in the city at large? In what way have they mani-
pulated the ghetto environment to further their business goals?
In studying black entrepreneurship, such questions are germane in
understanding who in fact the black businessman is. Our hypothesis
as stated in Chapter III is that the "so-called successful black
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entrepreneurs are performing better than others precisely because
they are exploiting their socio-cultural roles as members of community
organizations to further their economic and occupational goals."
An assumption underlying the hypothesis is that the ghetto,
apart from being a social phenomenon, is an economic stage on which
promising businessmen play their respective roles according to per-
ceived economic, social or other pay-offs. In much the same way
prominent white businessmen play their respective roles in politics,
backing one party against another because of the party's interest in
their business or what they expect to receive. They may support
one mayor against another in the light of their business interests.
They act as philanthropists and feature in social affairs, because
such activities enhance their prestige and status.
An implication of our hypothesis is that we should expect
relatively more successful black businessmen to be ''manipulators
of the ghetto civic environment" and to possess a minimum ability
to seek from different levels of government the type of help neces-
sary to enhance their business. Their strategy then could be
contrasted with that of less promising black businessmen, the
'novices,'' who only play to the tune of market forces.
A second assumption of our hypothesis is that community-based
organizations have been the most effective media for blacks who
aspire to positions of prominence in society and who have not achieved
116
professional pre-eminence. At this juncture James Q. Wilson's 1
16James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960,
Ch. 10, pp. 255-280.
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description of leadership
useful to our discussion.
The first is the prestige
achievement in business or
in high esteem and command
confine their civic roles
types in the black community may prove
He recognizes three types of leadership.
leader, who represents high personal
professional life. They are usually held
high respect in the community. They
to non-controversial issues such as settle-
ment houses, Red Cross and raising of funds, and try as much as
possible to avoid race-related issues. They have the most direct
contact with the white power structure, on the basis of their personal
achievement and respect they command in the black community. Two
important facts about this group should be stressed. Firstly, they
are very few in number in any city, and secondly, success in profes-
sional or business life tends to be the basis of acceptance by the
white elite and power structure. Third, continued acceptance by
the white elite and power structure depends upon the prestige
group's desire not to wield too many concessions from the white
elite and power structure.
The second type of leadership is the ''token leader," who is
often selected by the white power structure to represent the black
community. As Wilson points out, a person selected in this manner
has the tendency to represent the "agency viewpoint." As far as
his fellow blacks are concerned, he is another agent of Uncle Sam,
impotent and ineffective in terms of race-related issues. Token
leaders may be drawn from all walks of life so long as they repre-
sent the "agency viewpoint."
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The third is the "organizer," the trouble-shooter, constantly
involved in controversial issues. Ability to organize people for
action and to set achievable goals are important qualities for the
success of such leaders. The size of the organizations they repre-
sent is usually not a critical factor insofar as they represent a
recognizable force and a viewpoint in the community. Dennis Clark
has identified four types of organizers, and a common element
binding all the four types is how best to improve the lot of their
fellow blacks. Ladd18 in his study of Winston-Salem, N.C. and
Greenville, S.C., reaches a similar conclusion that Negro leadership
is a single-issue leadership, namely, race advancement, reflecting
the most vital political interests of all Negroes.
A basic tenet of our hypothesis, therefore, is that to do
comparatively well in business, black businessmen should be involved
1 7The four types are: (1) leadership which owes its existence to
growth of ad hoc movements to overcome specific racial barriers,
e.g. Southern sit-in, Montgomery bus boycotts. (2) Conscious
rebel leadership associated with civil rights movement, e.g. Black
Muslims. Such a movement has the tendency to be self-directed and
ideologically inclined. (3) Leadership in permanent nation-wide
mass organizations such as the NAACP, Urban League and CORE.
(4) Leadership associated with key positions in politics, government
and important institutions in American society. See Dennis Clark,
The Ghetto Game. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962, pp. 232-234.
l8Everett C. Ladd, Jr., Negro Political Leadership in the South.
Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1966, especially p. 143 et seq.
The study of M. Elaine Burgess of Crescent City also reveals that
astute maneuvering and compromise have allowed the Negro leaders
to reach a consensus on basic community issues and goals. See her
Negro Leadership in a Southern City. Chapel Hill: North Carolina
Univ. Press, 1962, especially chapters VI and V, pp. 76-150. See
also Myrdal, American Dilemma, o. c.it, pp. 720-722.
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in community improvement activities and race advancement issues; and
that prestige and token leaders are of no use to the community. This
is necessary, because as we saw in Part II, the initiative of
especially the Federal Government in raising the status of black
entrepreneurship has traditionally been lacking, and therefore it is
up to those who have something at stake in the community to strive to
wield various concessions from the three levels of government. Such
ghetto issues as inadequate policing, low welfare payments, poor
shopping centers, high rents and lack of manpower training facilities
impinge upon business promotion as well as race advancement and
community improvement. Hence, in playing diverse leadership roles
or participating effectively in communit
businessmen can manipulate the ghetto en
In the light of our hypothesis, we
promising 52 businessmen to be active in
Respondents were asked a set of question
participation in community organizations
business and whether these organizations
their going into business or in promotin
begin with, they were asked whether they
organizations before going into business
involved in community organizations or a
they were. The four types of organizati
identified as follows (the total is more
members of more than one organization):
y organizations, black
vironment to their advantage.
should expect most of our
community organizations.
s in connection with their
before and after going into
have been instrumental in
g their businesses. To
joined any community
27 said they were never
ssociations and 25 said
ons they joined could be
than 25 because some were
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Organ i zation Number
1. Race advancement, e.g. NAACP, CORE,
Urban League, Black Muslim 14
2. Community improvement, e.g. settlement
houses, Freedom House, Avco Day Care
Center 11
3. Social organization, e.g. Masonic
Lodge, the Elks, women's club in
churches 7
4. Business-oriented 2
Further inquiries into positions held in these organizations
proved futile. Except in social organizations, the majority
registered as dues-paying members, and were in fact out of the main-
stream of things. In describing how they participated, 15 out of
the 25 indicated that they were not actively involved (Q91). Of the
25 participants, 20 revealed that no organization was instrumental
in getting them into business or has helped them after going into
business. Only three indicated that they were helped by their
organizations in starting their businesses, and two replied that
their memberships are merely exposing them to the public. We can
conclude therefore that community organizations have not been in-
strumental in putting blacks into business, and this accords with
the conclusion we reached in Part 11 about the goals and achievements
of black nation-wide organizations, especially NAACP and the Urban
League.
Respondents were again asked whether they have joined community
organizations since they went into business. 32 said they have,
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and 20 replied that they have not. Nine out of the 20 were already
members of community organizations before going into business. To
be precise, 11 businessmen in our study group have never been
members of organizations or associations.
Focusing our attention on the 32 who indicated that they have
been part of organizations, they are distributed as follows (Again
the total is more than 32 because some have joined more than one
organization.):
Organization Number
1. Race advancement 4
2. Community Improvement 11
3. Social Organization 7
4. Business-oriented 18
Of the 32, 16 said their memberships have not been helping
them, and the remaining 16 divulged that they find their membership
beneficial. Asked how beneficial, as many as nine replied that
through meetings, public gatherings and public functions, they
become exposed to the public and this in itself is an advantage.
Only three affirmed that they receive contracts or jobs from their
organizations, and another three said their organizations consti-
tute a platform for mutual assistance in business. In all, not
more than four hold important positions on executive boards of two
important organizations.
A glance at the types of organizations they joined after going
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into business would reveal to us that the importance they attach to
race advancement issues is negligible. In fact, only four joined
nationwide race-advancement organizations after going into business,
compared with 14 who joined in the pre-business years. With
respect to community improvement and social organizations, our entre-
preneurs remained neutral to them after going into business. The
same number as before joined these organizations. The only remark-
able change has occurred in their attitude toward business-oriented
organizations. Almost all the 18 members of business-oriented
organizations belong to either the Roxbury Businessmen Association,
the black community version of chamber of commerce, or the Grove Hall
Contractors Association, none of which is more than two and a half
years old. The RBA is still struggling to get off its feet and its
goals are still ill-defined. The GHCA, on the other hand, offers
technical assistance of various kinds to its members. The tendency
to join business-oriented organizations as the main avenue of busi-
ness promotion is confirmed by an earlier set of questions (Q59 and
Q60) which solicited their memberships in city-wide professional,
trade or craft organizations. As many as 32 said they belong to
such organizations, and seven out of the 32 affirmed that they do
not gain whatsoever from their memberships. The remaining 24
receive publications, legal assistance, help in procuring labor and
in setting wages.
If our analysis of the data is correct, then we have not
marshalled sufficient evidence to support our hypothesis. Indeed,
'1
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we can even conclude that our more promising black businessmen tend
to dissociate themselves from community improvement and race advance-
ment issues, and in this
ghetto civic environment.
black businessmen to iden
with the black community
main reasons why much nee
government has been very
history of America other
sions been made to minori
respect they are "poor manipulators of the
" It is argued here that the inability of
tify themselves and communicate effectively
through community organizations is one of the
ded assistance from the three levels of
slow in reaching them. At no period in the
than the past decade have so many conces-
ty sub-groups under organized leadership,
almost at the wink of the brow. Yet, in spite of this wind of
political change, black businessmen are laboring under the banner of
assimilation into city-wide business-oriented organizations whose
goals are devoid of race-advancement issues.
Several reasons account for the marginal role the businessmen
play in community organizations. First, in some of the 52 businesses
studied, the absence of the proprietors is suddenly felt; business
may either slow down or come to a complete halt if they are absent
for several days. It is all because they either have no efficient
employees they can entrust their businesses to for a few days, or
almost all decisions are taken by them, with the result that their
employees do not have enough room to participate in decision-making.
The upshot of all this is that most of the businessmen interviewed
work about 12 hours a day. But community improvement and race
advancement organizations demand full-time leadership, and this is
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incompatible with business organization. The only time an ambitious
black businessman would like to engage in non-business affairs that
take a few hours a month is Sunday afternoon. 19  If it is summer,
it could be anybody's guess.
Wilson20 draws our attention to two other factors that condition
blacks' participation in civic action. The first is the intangible
nature of rewards and incentives that participants can expect. With
the exception of business-oriented organizations whose goals may be
geared to achieving specific benefits for members, there are usually
no incentives to motivate blacks into civic action. Consequently,
the most active participants tend to be either full-time employees
of the organizations or a few individuals who seek to enhance their
social prestige and status through civic actions. The powerlessness
of the masses of Negroes is the second factor. They are fully
aware that no matter how hard they work for the organizations,
they cannot influence the course of public affairs and political
events in any meaningful way, and therefore "the Negro leader is
more easily persuaded of the plausibility of protest as the appro-
priate political style."21
In understanding the problems facing black businesses, the
restricted nature of the market, lack of managerial talents, and
1 9This is one of the main reasons why black businessmen (and also
whites too) are not good interviewees.
20Wilson, op. cit., pp. 281-294.
21 Ibid.
-i
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ineffective nature of "demand determinants," i.e. the various forms
of government assistance, do not explain the entire picture. In
instances where the government response to the needs of businessmen
leaves much to be desired, the only alternative approach to influence
demand determinants is through civic actions that attempt to alter
conditions of poverty permeating the community's socio-economic
system. To be sure, unless black businessmen join the race-advance-
ment battle to improve the social and economic lot of the very people
who patronize their businesses, reliance on such externally generated
programs as management training and loans is simply myopic. Put
in another way, black businessmen have through the years taken the
business environment as given, and as long as the environment remains
poverty-ridden their businesses are likely to remain marginal. To
change the environment therefore, they must commit time and resources
to civic action so that they may in the course of time become
better manipulators of the civic environment.
Attitude Toward Investment
An interesting finding of the study is ownership of a second
business, which for want of a better term could be referred to as
"dual entrepreneurship." 20 out of the 52 respondents indicated that
they solely own other businesses that give them regular income;
seven said that they part-own other businesses and 23 do not. In
other words, 54% of the study group own other businesses. This
excludes about five or six businessmen who have set up branch
.W
242
businesses in other neighborhoods and therefore do not find time to
run second businesses.
A further enquiry into the nature of the second businesses
(Q58C) reveals that 10 out of the 27 are real estate concerns, and
the remaining 17 comprise all sorts of enterprise - from car washing,
beauty-aid stores, entertainment halls to construction and barbering.
Two major reasons account for such a widespread practice. First,
the ownership of more than one business by Jim Africanus, our
proprietor, is a sign of great success in the eyes of a majority of
Jim's associates. As far as he is concerned, his ability to keep
two businesses going without falling into any messy financial situa-
tion may be sufficient to keep him satisfied, as long as the two
enterprises boost his ego, self-esteem and importance in the community.
Jim in this respect compares favorably with Kwame Nti, a well-known bus-
inessman operating in a typical town in Ghana, and who commands some
respect in the community because he is smart enough to keep two or
three variety shops going at the same time irrespective of how
profitable they may be.
The second reason may be psychological more than anything else.
Because an average black business is marginal, both marginal and
more promising entrepreneurs are tempted to diversify their invest-
ment portfolios in order to increase their chance of survival. One
could argue that the behavior of dual entrepreneurs is rational,
given the restricted nature of the ghetto market, low purchasing
power of a majority of black consumers, and above all the risks
associated with the ghetto environment.
IM
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On the other hand, it could be argued that it is a better strategy
to develop one enterprise to its full potential, taking advantage of
various kinds of internal economies of scale, and thereby increasing
the net returns on capital invested. We are assuming here that a
rational entrepreneur would seek to maximize his profit margins,
although the "satisficing entrepreneur'' may be content to receive
smaller returns on his capital if only dual entrepreneurship makes
him important in the community or enhances his self-esteem. In any
event, evidence abounds to prove that owning and managing two businesses
in the ghetto could lead to decreasing efficiency. First, as pointed
out earlier, most dual entrepreneurs interviewed do not have reliable
employees who can easily fill their shoes, should something happen
or if they want to take some vacation. Consequently, an average
dual entrepreneur is saddled with the problem of keeping his two
businesses running simultaneously. A lot of time is wasted commut-
ing between the two locations. Some say that for about two years
now they have been unable to go on vacation.
Second, judging by the type of managerial skills the dual
entrepreneurs have, one doubts whether meaningful financial and
expansion plans can be drawn separately for each business, without
falling into the inevitable temptation of transferring cash receipts
from one enterprise to another, depending on financial exigencies
they may encounter from time to time.
In our attempt to understand the marginal character of black
enterprises, lack of managerial skills, restricted nature of the
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ghetto market, undercapitalization and environmental risks do not
entirely define the problem. We should add to the definition dual
entrepreneurship which tends to create more management problems than
the financial benefits or the "image of importance" it is supposed
to bring.
Significance of Work Experience
In our effort to find out why some black entrepreneurs are more
successful than others we cannot underestimate their work experience
prior to going into business. Rarely are people born natural
businessmen. Harvey Leibenstein rightly states that "The initial
entrepreneur must have a more than satisfactory work experience.
This means that the economic environment must be such that, on the
average, the risks taken pay off better than anticipated." 2 2
Students of achievement motivation have demonstrated the effect
of individual differences in the strength of the disposition to
achieve. The strength of the tendency to achieve on a given task
is known to be governed by (1) the personality disposition and
(2) immediate environmental influences. 2 3 Our main interest as far
as American Negroes is concerned is in the second condition -
environmental influences, for as was pointed out in Chapter III,
2 2 Leibenstein, op. cit., p. 129.
2 3McClelland, The Achieving Society, op. cit., See also a review of
various dimensions of motivation in John W. Atkinson, An Introduc-
tion to Motivation. Princeton, D. Van Nostrand, 1964.
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the master-slave relationship to which a majority of Negro families
had to succumb for almost three generations after Emancipation and
the attendant low socio-economic status currently occupied by most
black families have obliterated a normal personality development.
Hence, a single controlling factor in understanding a black worker's
attitude to work and the quality of his work experience is his
immediate job environment.
The environment may be dictated by how challenging the work is,
opportunities to take and be responsible for specific decisions,
relations with co-workers, especially immediate supervisors and so
forth. Ray C. Hackman finds that an interplay of three senses
characterizes the motivated working adult: namely, sense of recogni-
tion that results
successful comple
of accomplishment
This leads him to
motivation, one a
operate."25
An empirical
mental influences
company, he finds
need level as wel
from praise; sense of confidence emanating from
tion of a task and permissive supervision; and sense
resulting from interesting and challenging work.2 4
assert that "in order to develop this kind of
rranges for the higher levels of reinforcement to
work done by Michael Beer gives credence to environ-
In his study of 129 workers of a large insurance
that satisfaction is a "function of the individual's
1 as the environmental factors (i.e. opportunities)
24Ray C. Hackman, The Motivated Working Adult. The American Manage-
ment Association, 1969, pp. 125-145; pp. 159-161.
25Ibid., p. 159.
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which may provide satisfaction of the need."26 At any rate he also
finds the correlation between actual need satisfaction and motivation
to be statistically not significant.27
Our hypothesis is that there has been a transfer of entrepreneur-
ship from the white business sector to the black ghettoes; and that
the success of a black entrepreneur is greatly dependent upon his
work experience and satisfaction in the white business sector.
In connection with the first part of the hypothesis, i.e. trans-
fer of entrepreneurship, henceforth referred to as ''entrepreneurial
transfer,'' the reader's attention is drawn to Q42-Q47. Respondents
were asked: are you providing the same services,or doing the same
business as another business you worked for before? 23 said they are
doing the same kinds of business; 5 responded that they are doing the
same kinds but with some modifications; and 24 said they are doing
something different. Thus direct transfers account for 28 (54%) of
the total cases. However, further enquiries (Q45) show that 16 of
the 24 had worked as apprentices, part-time workers, and in separate
divisions of firms other than the divisions in which they were
employed, and in so doing they were able to learn some skills and
business practices that proved helpful in establishing their
businesses. For example, a former truck driver of a white firm
decided to go into building maintenance because his knowledge of
26 Michael Beer, Leadership, Employee Needs and Motivation (Monograph
No. 129, Bureau of Business Research). Columbus: Ohio State Univ.
Press, 1966, p. 46.
2 7 1bid.
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truck routing acquired from the firm is vital to building maintenance
involving a number of offices. Thus in total, 41 out of the 52 enter-
prises could be attributed to entrepreneurial transfer of one form
or another, and 29 (56%) originated from the white business sector.
Although the proportion is not exceptionally impressive in view of
the fact that the white business sector is a major employer of blacks,
it is significant for the ghetto economy. Further, if we consider
that such personal services as hair-dressing and funeral homes account
for a majority of the remaining 12 "intra-ghetto transfers," then
the transfers from the white business sector constitute a significant
trend.
There is nothing spectacular about the nature of the transfers.
They all involve simple forms of service activities and basic
technologies already known and practised in the white business
sector. Reference has already been made to manufacturing, a good
example of direct copying. However, an interesting change is occurr-
ing in laundry and dry cleaning where the SBA is assisting firms to
buy the most up-to-date machinery and equipment with the expansion
loans they receive. This type of assistance has been necessitated
by frequent breakdowns of old models of machinery and equipment.28
With reference to the second part of the hypothesis, two issues
are involved, namely, the type of work experience and the challeng-
ing nature of job performed by the entrepreneur prior to going into
28In the course of the interviewsone businessman complained about the
problem blacks in laundry and dry cleaning face when they buy old
models. Not only are prices dearer, but also they are expensive to
maintain.
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business. By type of work experience, we mean the quality of job and
all the responsibilities that go with it, as explained in the initial
part of this section. Since not many blacks have opportunities to
become supervisors in white firms, we are certainly interested, among
other things, in the number of respondents who had opportunities to
become supervisors in white firms, the number of people supervised
and the length of time they occupied these positions.29
We are equally interested in how challenging were the types of
supervisory jobs they had. Very often we hear and read about job
upgrading for Negroes in reputable white firms. While some jobs are
upgraded and geared to a purposeful goal, others tend to be "token
types'' of job upgrading that only lead to utter frustration.
Of the 52 cases, 38 (73%) were supervisors in firms prior to
going into business, and 32 out of the 38 were in white firms. Data
are lacking on how many blacks occupy supervisory positions in the
American business sector, but our best guess is that the 32 former
supervisors in white establishments are not a representative sample
of black workers. They belong to a distinctive group of black
workers whose sense of responsibility and discipline acquired through
worthwhile work experience has carried them into independent entre-
preneursh i p.
Q 34A and Q34B summarize the number of years the 38 former
2 9 It is worth noting that the expression "supervisory position" refers
to various positions of responsibility in an organization - foreman,
a leader of a working crew, head of a secretarial staff, chief tech-
nician in a laboratory and so on.
249
supervisors performed their jobs, and the number of workers they
supervised. A majority of them supervised 10 or more workers, and
on the average each supervised 14 persons. The average number of
years each supervised is 6.4 years. The association between super-
visory position and the years of work experience is found to be
significant at .05 level.30 This result conforms with what we might
normally expect, for the longer one's work experience is, the greater
are his chances of climbing up his occupational ladder. On the other
hand, the relationship between supervisory position and number of
firms one has worked for is found to be statistically not significant
(.221). We may also note that no significant relationship exists
between supervisory position and direct "entrepreneurial transfer"
(.201).
Respondents were asked to describe their occupations prior to
going into business. Twelve occupations were identified (See Q39).
To permit us to perform relevant statistical tests,these occupations
are grouped into three broad categories: white collar, blue collar
and traditional (ghetto-based) occupations. We find no association
between supervisory position and type of occupation (.616). In
fact, our 38 former supervisors are evenly distributed among these
three major occupations.
30Using mean-square contingency test, phi-squared ( ) assumed a
value of .27, revealing that the correlation between the two vari-
ables is not all that perfect. Were the rglationship perfect,
would have been unity. The formula for 0 is simply X2/N.
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Let us turn our attention now to satisfaction with jobs on which
respondents stayed for the longest period of time. 28 said they
found their work challenging; 14 replied that their jobs were just
challenging, and 10 did not find their jobs challenging at all. If
we group our respondents into those with less than 10 years of work
experience, and those with more than ten, there seems to be no
association between challenging nature of job and years of work ex-
perience (.311).
With regard to the 38 former supervisors, 23 found their jobs
very challenging, and 10 said their jobs were just challenging, and
only five were not satisfied with the challenging nature of their
job assignments. Put in another way, 23 out of the 28 who found
their jobs very challenging and 10 of the 14 who considered their
jobs just challenging occupied supervisory positions, so that 33 of
the former 38 supervisors (86.8%) found their jobs either very
challenging or just challenging in comparison with their 73% repre-
sentation in the study group. It is not surprising therefore that
the association between supervisory position and challenging nature
of job was found to be significant at .06 level. 3 1
It is sometimes wondered whether workers who occupy responsible
positions measure the challenging nature of their jobs by the number
3lThe significant level was derived from a dichotomized 2x2 table,
with rows being supervision, no supervision, and columns challeng-
ing and not challenging. Again, F 2 (and therefore Pearson r in
the case of dichotomized variables) assumed a value of only .26,
depicting imperfect correlation.
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of workers they control. Using Fisher's Exact Test32 for our sub-
group of 33 former supervisors who found their jobs either "very
challenging" or "just challenging," it turns out that there is no
significant relationship between the number of workers supervised
and the extent of the challenging nature of job (p = .27).
The next step in our analysis is to link supervision and
challenging nature of jobs with relevance and applicability of work
experience to the initiation of one's business. 33 of the 52 re-
spondents affirmed that their work experience helped them "very much"
to start their own business, 6 said "some how" their work experience
was relevant and 13 did not. Of the 33 who said their work experi-
ence "very much" helped them, 27 were former supervisors, of the
six who replied "some how," four were former supervisors. Seven
of the 13 who did not see any relevance were former supervisors.
Considering the fact that our former supervisors account for 73%
of the total number of respondents, they are over-represented
(82.1%) in the sub-group who found that their work experience helped
them "very much" in starting their businesses. In all 31 out of the
38 former supervisors found their work either "very challenging" or
''just challenging,'" and said that their work experience contributed
''very much'' or ''some how'' to the starting of their businesses.
32The formula for Fisher's Exact Test is:
r r k kr1 r2 1 2
P= r, where r and k are end totals,
N ' a ' b ! c ! d i
and a,b,c and d are cell values. See Weiss, op. cit., pp. 265-269.
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Of equal interest is the fact that 23 of the 38 former super-
visors went into the same or almost the same business as those
businesses they worked for. We may recall that direct entrepreneurial
transfer involves 28 of the 52 firms, so that proprietors of 23 of
the 28 "direct transfer" firms were former supervisors. In other
words, they account fo 82.1% of the direct transfers, although they
comprise 73% of the total number of respondents.
In sum, there is sufficient evidence to support our hypothesis
that there has been a transfer of entrepreneurship from the white
business sector to the ghetto. Our data indicate that at least
71% (29) of the 41 total transfers originated from the white business
sector.
But what is more important and significant in validating our
hypothesis is that 73% (38) of the 52 cases involves persons who had
opportunities to assume positions of responsibility as assembly line
foremen, foremen of construction crew, office supervisors, and so
forth. Further, it has been shown that the work experiences of
31 of the 38 former ''supervisors'' in firms they chose to work for
the longest period of time were challenging and relevant enough
to enable them to start their own businesses. In short, the transfer
has been possible mainly through more enduring work experience. 33
33A similar conclusion has been reached by other studies. See for
example Jerome Goldstein, The Spin-off of New Enterprises from a
Large Government Funded Industrial Laboratory. M.S. dissertation,
Sloan School of Management, M.I.T., 1967, Ch. 4. It has also been
noted that material and moral support given by immediate super-
visors to potential entrepreneurs create an environment conducive
to technical innovation. See Frederick L. Buddenhagen, Internal
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Our analysis raises two important policy issues. In creating
a cadre of viable businessmen among minority groups, the government
should be concerned with the type of persons who receive SBA loans
and other public assistance programs. Generally, loans are advanced
on the basis of the soundness of business proposals and one doubts
whether much importance is attached to quality of work experience
and the relevance of work experience to the business proposals.
Visits by the author to some SBA regional offices convinced him that
officials tend to emphasize the number of minorities they have put
into business since 1968 at the expense of potential capabilities of
applicants.34 The issue is often not how many blacks, Mexican
Americans or Puerto Ricans that have been assisted to go into business
within any fiscal year, but how many potentially suitable entrepre-
neurs have been sought for through a thorough screening process.
The second policy issue relates to job upgrading for minorities.
Probably the most potent reason for upgrading jobs for minorities,
Entrepreneurship as a Corporate Strategy for New Product Development,
M.S. Thesis, Sloan School of Management, August 1967; pp. 29-31.
Further evidence is furnished by Dean A. Forseth who discovered that
the commercial work experience of technology-oriented entrepreneurs
he interviewed was very helpful to them. See D. A. Forseth, The
Role of Government-Sponsored Research Laboratories in the Generation
of New Enterprises. M.S. Thesis, Sloan School of Management, June
1966, pp. 35-37, 87-88.
34 Before 1968, federal laws prohibited publication of statistics on
loans to different ethnic groups. Since then statistics have been
compiled by SBA regional offices. For example in Chicago, loans to
minorities increased by 439% between 1968 and 1970. In Boston the
increase during the same period was 258%. (This information was
obtained from the two regional offices during an interviewwith
officials.
-.4
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other than attendant increase in wages, is that such a strategy can,
under ideal conditions and genuine, good intentions of corporations,
bring about worthwhile work experience, a keynote to entrepreneurial
transfer. What is needed to make such a strategy work is a well-
tailored wage subsidy program, the discussion of which is deferred to
the concluding chapter.
Reasons for Going into Business
People go into business for different reasons, which may differ
with respect to type of culture, type of occupation, social status,
quality of work experience and so on. In explaining why a sampled
Michigan businessmen went into business for themselves, Collins and
Moore first sought for commonalities in life situations prior to their
going into business, and argue that the single most important factor
was "'role deterioration,'' signifying a shattering of previous life
pattern. 3 5 The co-authors explain that the period of role deteriora-
tion is not accidental in the lives of these men. "It is an event,
which given their character formation is almost predestined to
happen.''36 They end up running business for themselves, or take to
other occupations such as writing, teaching and painting in which
they can enjoy some independence. It should be pointed out that the
co-authors exclude people who inherit family businesses from the role
35Collins and Moore, op. cit., pp. 95-113
36 Ibid., p. 113.
deterioration typology. Role deterioration, as they explain, occurs
under the following circumstances:
1. Block mobility - sets in when one sees slim chances
of moving up the occupational ladder, ''marking time'' in wages
and so on.
2. Losing out - occurs when men reach the top working
for someone else, and discover that they can lose it all. For
example, a man sees a company he has worked for for a number
of years falling apart gradually; or a son of an owner of a
firm graduates from college and comes to replace a hired
manager, who now begins to "lost out".
3. Disgust with the way the business is run.
4. Job insecurity - now employed and the next day out
of work again.
5. Ideas are not accepted by superiors.
6. Born to the way of business. However this is rare.
Although the concept of role deterioration is useful, it skirts
some of the more concrete reasons that give birth to independent
entrepreneurship. Of course, it is difficult to draw a line of
difference between, on the one hand, distasteful work experience
that discourages a worker to quit his job, compelling him to decide
never to work for somebody else; and, on the other hand, how a
potential entrepreneur values such things as avenues to affluence,
total independence in self-employment, economic security in self-
employment, means to display acquired skills and desire to give
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employment to the needy. Nevertheless, this study maintains that
there are more concrete reasons that explain why people go into
business other than factors in role deterioration, and that these
concrete reasons are underlain by the potential entrepreneur's value
orientation, beliefs and aspirations in life. 3 7 Further, in the case
of most black workers, their low socio-economic status implies
"potential role deterioration" with which they are associated at
birth. It is difficult therefore to apply the concept to our study
in a meaningful way.
3 70ne of the foremost authorities on theory of values and beliefs,
Clyde Kluckhohn, describes the role of value as placing things, ways
of behaving, and goals of action on the approval-disapproval contin-
uum. He formally defines value as: 'a generalized and organized
conception influencing behavior, of nature, of man's place in it,
of man's relation to man, and of the desirable and non-desirable as
they relate to man-environment and inter-human relations." See his
essay ''Value and Value-orientations in the Theory of Action,'' in
Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (eds.), Toward a General Theory
of Action, op. cit., p. 411. Specific patterns of behavior are
believed to be concrete expressions of values, and hence the two
concepts are closely related. For an interesting discussion on
this relationship, see Florence R. Kluckhohn, "Dominant and Variant
Value Orientation" in Clyde Kluckhohn, Harry A. Murray and David A.
Schneider, Personality in Nature, Society and Culture. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1953, p. 345 et seq.
Louis Kriesberg has pointed out that many values and beliefs
are relevant to engaging entrepreneurial activity. Applying the
Latin American scene, he explains that the belief that the society
is orderly and advancing could influence the attitude of those in
business. Another pertinent belief he cites is one's own perception
of his worthiness and ability. He further amplifies that certain
values affect entrepreneurial behavior among which are entrepreneur-
ship as a way to excel - behavior closely related to child-rearing
practices. Another value-orientation is entrepreneurship as a way
to gain or maintain status, especially in those societies where
entrepreneurship is a cherished occupation. See Louis Kriesberg,
"Entrepreneurship in Latin America and the Role of Cultural and
Situational Processes," International Social Science Journal,
Vol. 15, No. 4 (1963), pp. 581-594.
da-
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The respondents were asked a simple question: why did you
decide to do your own business rather than work for someone else?
(See Q61A and Q61B). They were requested to pick two reasons from
a list of reasons and to rank them accordingly. They also had an
option to give their own reasons. The reasons were selected a priori
to reflect some of the values and beliefs minority groups are likely
to entertain. We shall adopt two approaches to analyze our entrepre-
neurs' response to the question.
Our purpose is to determine whether there is a general agree-
ment between the respondents about the ranking of the reasons they
picked. Spearman's rank correlation coefficient38 could again be
employed here. If the entrepreneurs are in complete agreement, the
value of the coefficient should be unity, and if there is complete
disagreement, the value should be minus unity. The response to the
questions is shown in Table 8-3.
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient has a value of .36,
revealing not much agreement. T assumes a value of 1.09, and with
8 degrees of freedom the coefficient is statistically not signi-
ficant even at .10 level of t. We conclude therefore that the entre-
preneurs do not completely agree on primary reasons for going into
business.
38The coefficient is defined as before. It is to be noted that this
technique is applicable here since the number of items to be ranked
is not less than ten.
The relevant formula for t is defined as before.
.. i
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TABLE 8-3
REASONS FOR GOING INTO BUSINESS
Reason
1. To make money
2. To be my own boss
3. Employment security
4. To reap fruit of own labor
5. To display my ability and skill
6. To provide employment in
commun i ty
7. Desire to continue family
business
8. Search for leadership roles
9. By accident
0. Blacks need black business
No. of times
mentioned as
first reason
14
10
5
7
9
2
3
0
No. of times
mentioned as
second reason
10
7
2
2
7
8
0
1
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A second method for analyzing the reasons is to group them into
meaningful categories since some of the reasons pivot on identical
goals, values or beliefs. By this grouping, we are assuming that
each category occupies a specific position in a hierarchy of reasons
to which a majority of the entrepreneurs subscribe. The ten reasons
could be grouped into five categories.
can rank the categories such that each
respondent receives 2 points and the s
result is shown in Table 8-4 below.
TABLE 8-4
REASONS FOR GOING INTO
By a point scoring system, we
first reason mentioned by a
econd reason 1 point. The
BUSINESS: GROUPED RESPONSE
Reasons
1. To make more money
2. To be my own boss
and reap fruit
of own labor
3. To display abil-
ity and skill
4. To provide myself
with employment
security
5. Identity and per-
sonality pro-
jection
First Reason
No. of
Times
Men-
tioned Score
14 28
Second Reason
No. of
Times
Men -
t i oned
10
17 34 9
9 18 7
5 10 2
Score
10
Total
Score
38
Rating
27.0
9 43 30.5
7 25 17.7
2 12 8.5
6 12 11 11 23 16.3
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The % ratings of the scores in Table 8-4 differ remarkably from
the findings of Pact Inc. Reasons advanced by San Francisco black
businessmen are given by Pact Inc. as follows: 39
To be my own boss 
- 52.7%
Employment security - 20.2%
To display ability and skill - 14.8%
Possibility of unlimited income - 4.4%
Germane to our interest, however, is the prime importance both San
Francisco and Boston respondents attach to "desire to be their own
boss.''
In his 1947 study of 282 black businesses in 12 cities, J. A.
Pierce gives the following reasons for his respondents going into
.40busi ness:
Economic possibility - 65.2%
Special interest and ability - 15.5%
Family connections and influence - 10.1%
To meet a racial need - 9.2%
A further breakdown of the first reason is necessary to enable us to
make a meaningful comparison. However, Pierce in his analysis inter-
prets this to mean "desire to make money." We can thus reasonably
argue that this reason was buttressed on post-War economic recon-
struction which provided an infinite mix of economic opportunities
3 9Pact Inc., op. cit., p. 42.
J. A. Pierce, Negro Business and Business Education. New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1947, p. 37.
261
for all social classes. But now such a belief is no more a budding
reality.
If we compare the reasons given by our Boston entrepreneurs
with those given by technical white entrepreneurs, former employees
of M.I.T. laboratories, who founded their own companies, we can
detect a slight shade of emphasis. The most common reasons given
by the technical entrepreneurs were: (1) innate and long-time desire
to form own business, and (2) conception of a new idea or technology
for a potential market. While our black respondents were moti-
vated more by the desire for independence and economic gains, the
"innovative" white entrepreneurs were influenced more by the desire
to commercialize innovative ideas in the form of specific products
which could simultaneously serve as a means to create success
stories.
The reasons ranked in order of total score (as indicated in
Table 8-4) have far-reaching implications in terms of Negro history,
problems, values, beliefs and dreams. The highest score of 43 for
the category "to be my own boss and reap fruit of my own labor" re-
echoes the hardships which Negroes have been experiencing over three
centuries. It also reminds our entrepreneurs of the slave tradition
and social injustice in the American society. Further, since most
black workers believe that they are underpaid in most economic
sectors, and therefore do not reap the fruit of their own labor,
the respondents are merely expressing their pent-up beliefs of social
4 1 Forseth, op. cit., p. 98.
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injustice they have been subjected to.
The second highest score of 38 for the category 'to make more
money'' is similarly not surprising. The respondents are merely
giving vent to an entrenched American value that accords respect to
the "guy who can amass the buck." Moreover, since affluence coupled
with education often constitutes the basis for social acceptability
of blacks, the respondents are simultaneously expressing a cherished
aspiration to move up the social ladder.
''Avenue to display ability and skill," the third in rank, could
be a convincing reason for potential entrepreneurs who repeatedly
face occupational immobility, or are so low in the occupational
echelon to hope for fast promotions. Negroes, compared with whites,
generally have lower skills, and therefore this category requires a
different interpretation from the "projectors'42 of Collins and
Moore. In the main, when our respondents refer to their desire to
display their ability and skill, they imply a belief of an acquired
(or innate) ability to manage a business and make it grow. They
also imply that their shrewdness and thrift acquired through worth-
while work experience make them potentially successful businessmen.
As an illustration of short stories about work experiences told by
42Independent entrepreneurs have been described by the co-authors as
projectors, i.e. men who want their ideas to come into fruition.
It is evident that the co-authors are primarily concerned with
manufacturers, and therefore categorize their projectors as people
with: (a) the idea of an invention; (b) the idea of a product;
(c) the idea of exploiting resources; (d) the idea of a market;
(e) the idea of making money. See Collins and Moore, op. cit.,
pp. 115-134.
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some of the respondents, Mr. Sammy Blackman used to be a supervisor
of a large white-owned automobile parking garage. Usually when the
owner, Mr. Whiteman, was absent for a few weeks he used to manage the
entire garage, and because of his efficiency during these occasions,
he was frequently rewarded with pay raises. At one time, Mr. Whiteman
decided to take a long vacation. Instead of entrusting the business
to Mr. Blackman as usual, he promoted a white employee next in rank
to Mr. Blackman to take over. Disillusioned, Mr. Blackman joined the
staff of the garage next door. By the time Mr. Whiteman returned
from his vacation, his business had almost collapsed to such an
extent that he had to put it up for sale. According to Mr. Blackman
he was approached by Mr. Whiteman to take over the supervisory post
but he refused.
A number of inter-related reasons have been lumped together
under the category "identity and personality projection," fourth
in rank. In fact as a second reason, it was the most frequently
mentioned. It deeply epitomizes a search for social recognition
which haunts minority groups in several cultures. As far as
American blacks are concerned, it is a stepping stone to achieving
an imagined social status denied them on account of color and slave
tradition. It further mirrors a rejuvenated awareness that after
all blacks have something to offer in the business arena, no matter
how marginal their contributions may be. As an observer puts it:
"The entrepreneur in the ghetto may not have enough to eat, but he
does have a hierarchy and he can find status and pride within it.
901-
264
He may have as a pimp or a hustler the equivalent of a key to the
washroom, a carpet on the floor, and a private secretary.'4 3
"Employment security," the last in rank, has a low score of 12,
not because it is relatively less important to an average American
black businessman, but because he knows well that the marginality
of his enterprise spells frequent insecurity, and therefore as a
reason for going into business he must rank it the lowest of all.
Consider as an example a case where on one Saturday afternoon the
author received an appointment to interview one of the few business-
men doing well on Blue Hill Avenue. For various reasons the interview
had to be postponed till the following Monday morning. On reaching
the place that morning, it was a spot of great mourning and disaster.
A neighbor with whom the businessman had quarreled the previous day
climbed up to the roof-top in the dead of the night and set about 3/4
of the business on fire.
We would sum up our discussion by hypothesizing that more
promising black entrepreneurs are motivated to go into business
primarily because of (1) desire for independence or avenues to reap
the fruit of their own labor and (2) desire for economic security;
and that these two reasons jointly explain their ultimate ambition
to enhance their status in society - ambition which is difficult to
fulfil in the white business sector or in public employment.
43Laird Durham, Black Capitalism: Critical Issues in Management.
Washington, D. C., Arthur D. Little, Inc., 1970, p. 15.
i
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Significance of Sex, Education and Place of Birth
Our respondents differ in several ways, but most obvious of
all are sex, level of education and place of origin.
1. Sex
Owing to the small number of females in the study group (i.e.
about 1/5), detailed comparisons between male and female proprietors
will not be pursued here. We shall confine ourselves to a few
comments.
As pointed out earlier, females are found in only two out of
the seven categories, although proportionately female-owned enter-
prises are as old as those of males. We therefore do not find any
relationship between age of business and sex (.977).
Female proprietors are better educated. Only one out of the
ten female proprietors has no high school diploma compared with 19
of the 42 male proprietors. Thus, the relationship between sex and
education is significant at the .05 level.
There is the tendency for female businesses to remain small
in size even after several years of operation. Seven of the ten
proprietors are small operators. Six of the seven have been in
4 4 In her study of small businesses in Poughkeepsie, N.Y., M. Newcomer
reached the same conclusion. See M. Newcomer, "The Little Business-
men: A Study of Business Proprietors in Poughkeepsie, New York,"
Business History Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 1961), p. 485. We
must also note that in general female Negroes are better educated
than males. While about 43% of female Negroes in the nation had
four years of high school or more in 1965, the proportion for males
was about 34%. See U.S. Department of Labor, The Negroes in U.S.
Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., June 1966, p. 31.
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existence for at least seven years, but still employ between 5-8
persons. The study also shows that proportionately more males own
second businesses than females, but this is statistically not
significant (.625).
2. Education and Place of Origin
Our primary aim is to report a series of tests of significance
performed to determine whether the level of education and place of
origin of our respondents can explain their performance and attitude.
In terms of educational achievement, they are divided into two
groups: those with high school or college education and those who
did not finish high school. With respect to place of origin, those
born in the Southern states form one group, and the rest constitute
another. Ideally, we should have grouped New Englanders separately,
but those born outside New England and the South number only 11, and
this imposes some constraint on constructing meaningful contingency
tables.45
It could be seen from Table 8-5 that a majority of the relation-
ships are not significant, although marked variations in s.l. are
visible in some of them. Thus we shall concern ourselves with only
those tests which are significant at .05 (or less) level, and we
shall also comment on two of the gamma values.
45As explained earlier, cells with values less than 5 should form a
small fraction (about 1/5) of the total number of cells in order
to maintain true chi-square values.
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TABLE 8-5
LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE IN RELATION TO EDUCATION
AND PLACE OF ORIGIN
Variable
Level of education
Age of business
Sector of business
Employment level
S.L. for Level
of Education
.937
.04135)
(Gammna=. 135)~
S.L. for Place
of Origin
.228
.447
.805
.292
Relevance of work experi-
ence to initiation of
business
Challenging nature of work
Business transfer
Supervisory position
Volume of equity capital
Volume of physical assets
Volume of sales
Planning period
Involvement in community
organization before
business
Involvement in community
organization after
business
Ownership of another business
*Gamma values are valid for rows and
systematic ordering.
.277
.750
.878
.941
.335(Gamma=.326)
.003
(Gamma=-.319)
.629
(Gamma=-.169)
.717
.872
. 129
.983
.441
.344
.858
.181
.217
.948.910
.467 .960
.835 .349
columns which lend themselves to
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The relationship between level of education of the entrepreneur
and level of employment is significant at the .05 level. The relevant
correlation coefficient is positive (Goodman-Kruskal Gamma =.1351) but
not convincingly strong. Those with a minimum of high school educa-
tion tend to employ more people. As an illustration, only one
proprietor out of 20 with no high school diplomas employs 17 or more
persons, compared with 9 out of 32 proprietors with a minimum of high
school diplomas. If employment level is a useful measure of 'promis-
ing performance,' then a minimum level of education for the operation
of certain types of business should interest policy-makers. In
manufacturing, for example, all the proprietors have high school
diplomas and additional technical or vocational training.
The association between the level of education and volume of
physical assets is significant at the .005 level. Respondents with
a minimum of high school diplomas reported less volume of physical
assets than those with no high school diplomas, and thus the corre-
lation between the level of education and volume of assets turns out
to be negative (Goodman-Kruskal Gamma=-.319). This could be explained
by two major reasons. Either those with a minimum of high school
diplomas intentionally concealed the actual values of their physical
assets, or those with no high school diplomas are more prudent with
respect to investment decisions. The latter reason is reinforced
by the fact that proportionately more proprietors with a minimum
of high school diplomas started their businesses with more equity
capital, revealing a positive correlation between the level of
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education and volume of equity capital (Goodman-Kruskal Gamma=.335),
and yet they report less assets.
In conclusion, we should note that whereas the level of education
of our respondents seems to offer us some clues, place of origin
apparently has not been a decisive factor in explaining any aspect
of their performance. In the main, this is due partly to the diminish-
ing influence of the "Southern tradition," partly to the experience
some of the Southern-born proprietors gained in other cities before
settling finally in Boston, and partly to their work experience prior
to going into business.
Summary of the Study
Our method of approach has been to divorce the characteristics
and problems pertaining to types of enterprise (Chapter VII) from
the characteristics and the behavior of the entrepreneurs themselves
(Chapter VIII). Indirectly it is being implied in Chapter Vii that
irrespective of the characteristics and background of black entre-
preneurs, the ghetto environment imposes intractable limitations on
their ultimate success. On the other hand, we learn in Chapter VIII
that even though ''demand determinants" may be in full force, black
entrepreneurs must prepare themselves through worthwhile work
experience, acquisition of sufficient management skills, prudent
investment decisions and self-discipline to realize the implicit
advantages in public programs. We may sum up the highlights of our
study as follows:
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1. A majority of potentially successful enterprises "look into''
the ghetto environment for their survival - an environment severely
stricken with poverty. "Looking out" by reaching the white market
may pave the way for their ultimate success.
2. Our more promising black enterprises have not made an im-
pressive dent into the ghetto unemployment problem, and this could
be explained by such reasons as: (a) Low wages. Most of them cannot
compete effectively in the labor market owing to low wages paid to
workers, an average monthly wage rate being $495. Consequently, a
majority of them can employ only semi-skilled and unskilled workers.
(b) Inadequate employee benefits, which tend to deter more useful
workers. (c) Insufficient management skills, exemplified by planning
and investment practices.
3. Though loans are now more accessible than before, working
capital to tie them over during critical periods, and the absence
of a public program for providing equity capital are major bottlenecks
4. A majority of our more promising entrepreneurs come from
families that are not different from average black families. Thus,
they do not possess the business tradition upon which they can
anchor, and as a result they are necessarily prone to public support.
5. A majority of them are also less involved in community
organizations geared to race-advancement, and could therefore be
described as "poor manipulators of their civic environment." The
author has argued that their involvement in race-advancement organi-
zations could be a worthwhile endeavor simply because benefits
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resulting from civic actions have a direct bearing on business
promotion.
6. By investing in more than one business, while managerial and
reliable labor are in short supply, "dual entrepreneurship" could in
the long run hurt most inefficient black entrepreneurs who indulge in
it.
7. Worthwhile work experience and assumption of positions of
responsibility as supervisors are important keynotes to entrepre-
neurial transfer from the white business sector to the ghetto.
8. Though several reasons may dictate a black person going into
business, the dominant reasons are likely to be those that assure
him that he can enjoy the fruit of his own labor, and that by so
doing he can make more money.
Relevance of the Study to Public Policy, i.e. Demand Determinants
In Chapter 1I, a case was made to the effect that to develop
entrepreneurship at the grassroots level, demand determinants, i.e.
public programs capable of arousing individual's interest to seize
economic opportunities, are more important than supply determinants,
i.e. voluntary seizure of economic opportunities. If we accept this
premise, then the underlying implication is that well-tailored
promotional programs should open up more opportunities for blacks to
go into business.
This study raises a number of issues in relation to demand
determinants. First, it affirms the fact that even the more promising
i
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entrepreneurs in the Boston black community enter business with an
average equity capital of $6,000 which by American standards may
be considered inadequate to start a viable business. It is a fact
that for a given level of operation, there is a minimum "quantum of
equity capital" necessary to put the enterprise on a proper footing,
and this is one of the basic weaknesses of black enterprises. In addi-
tion to the problem of equity capital, some respondents complained
about lack of working capital and expansion loans. These three types
of capital fall within the scope of public assistance programs.
The study also indicates that employee problems are paramount.
Among these is the high cost entailed in the hiring of the hard-
core and inexperienced black workers. In most cases, they need
training when they are hired, but after receiving some basic training
and just at the time when they begin to be useful to the black em-
ployers, a sizeable number of them leave for the white business
sector. To minimize the risk black employers incur in voluntarily
hiring the hard-core and inexperienced black workers, a program
could be designed specifically for well equipped and capable black
firms to offer job training for these workers. A special program is
necessary because most black firms ''marginally'' participate in the
JOBS program which pays corporations an average of $2,400 annually
per worker for training the hard-core unemployed.
46Professor E. B. Roberts, Sloan School of Management, M.I.T., has
kindly pointed out to me that proprietors of companies which span
off from M.I.T. laboratories had an average equity capital of
$10,000.
WNEW
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Another employee problem is inadequate fringe benefits. In the
absence of attractive benefits, black enterprises cannot compete on
the job market. A program to assist small enterprises to provide
better fringe benefits to their employees may raise discontent in
some quarters. Nevertheless, it is politically feasible to integrate
it with the proposed negative- income tax program. This strategy will
be discussed in Part IV of the study.
The problem of decline in volume of business due to urban
renewal is found by the study to be severe. Respondents indicated
that it took them between 6 months and two years to recover from
business relocation caused by urban renewal. This hardship could be
mitigated through a relocation assistance program that takes into
account total losses and not just an arbitrary subsidy ceiling of
$3,000.
The study also raises a delicate issue with respect to dual
entrepreneurship. Although the study does not offer any proof as
to whether dual entrepreneurship is profitable or not, the need to
discourage inefficient dual entrepreneurs who operate with SBA-
guaranteed loans cannot be overemphasized.
Lastly, it is indicated by the study that worthwhile work ex-
perience is a cornerstone to successful entrepreneurship. This
being the case, could public policy encourage more enduring job
training programs and job opportunities for the minority? In fact,
the future of black entrepreneurship in America may well depend more
on meaningful job upgrading and useful work experience than on any
other program.
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In sum, the study attempts to deal with selected aspects of
problems facing black entrepreneurs. Problems related to management
are superficially touched upon not because they are unimportant but
because they require a more systematic investigation and the full
cooperation of respondents to obtain useful answers. Further, problems
concerning pricing have been evaded for the same reason. Another area
of investigation not included in the study is the use of federal
technical assistance programs. The original questionnaire covered
these programs, but the pretest of the questionnaire and the first
ten interviews revealed that respondents were either not interested
in the programs, or the programs were considered less crucial as far
as their ultimate success is concerned. Consequently the technical
assistance part of the questionnaire was dropped in the course of
the interviews.
Before we offer specific recommendations on how to tackle the
problems identified in the study, it may be appropriate to sketch
and evaluate briefly the major federal programs designed to promote
minority entrepreneurship. We shall also examine the role the
private sector is currently playing in the national crusade to build
"black capitalism."
PART IV
CONCLUDING NOTES
Black capitalism may well be the least
expensive way for society to help the
black upgrade himself economically.
Relatively little risk capital, even if
subsidized in some way by government
....... can help establish thousands
of businesses that provide jobs, in-
come for the owners, and a healthy ad-
dition to the gross national income.
Howard Samuels (Saturday Review
Aug. 23 1969, p.23).
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CHAPTER NINE
IN SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS
The Private Sector and Promotion of Black Entrepreneurship
Within the last five years, corporations have become involved in
finding solutions to social problems which normally fall outside the
realm of profit-and-loss calculus. Among different age-groups, a
firm belief is entertained that corporations should shoulder "social
responsibilities," such as air and water pollution, training of the
hard-core unemployed, aid to disadvantaged entrepreneurs, re-building
of the school system, etc. The rationale behind the universal
demand for a greater involvement of corporations in social affairs
stems from the close relationship between societal progress and
corporate prosperity. Shareholders and executives cannot sleep if
their factories are constantly threatened by riots. Clarence C.
Walton poses the problem more succinctly thus: "Required, too, is a
completely different kind of business structure, and a completely
different set of standards for measuring performance would be
required for corporations to attain the objective of dual service
to shareholders and to society."
Apart from evoking the "doctrine of corporate social responsi-
Clarence C. Walton (ed.), Business and Social Progress. New York:
Praeger, 1970, p. 10.
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bility" to justify why large corporations should join the battle to
upgrade minority entrepreneurship, there are practical and historical
reasons to be considered.
1. Given the capitalistic structure of the economy, the private
sector serves as a training ground for independent entrepreneurship.
2. Business is goal-oriented in terms of economic rewards, as
compared with political rewards which are often ephemeral.
3. The life of a corporation is longer and its decisions more
lasting than an elected government.
4. American business, compared with say Japanese business, is
socially more buoyant; it offers ever-widening opportunities for
individual economic advancement, free from hereditary cleavages.
5. Unlike some European countries, notably Britain, meritocracy,
political influence and economic power often converge on corporations,
as evidenced by their lobbying powers on Capitol Hill.
6. The capacity of corporations to commit and risk resources
for social goals far exceeds that of the government. As an illustra-
tion, outstanding SBA loans accounted for less than 2% of business
loans made by commercial banks. 2
7. As pointed out earlier, a large number of corporations,
especially departmental stores, utilities and financial institutions
depend solely on economic stability of central cities. In some cases,
2S. A. Levitan, G. L. Mangum and R. Taggert II, Economic Opportunity
in the Ghetto: the Partnership of Government and Business. Balti-
more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, p. 9.
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without minority patronage they could lose over 25% of their regular
customers. Some financial institutions cannot legally operate outside
the statutory boundaries of the city.
For all these reasons, the future of black entrepreneurship will
"partly" rest on a more favorable attitude of corporations. Corpora-
tions have recently sought to aid black enterprises in six main ways.3
(1) Some owning branch plants in the ghettos have sold them to
residents at reasonable prices. (2) Certain corporations have formed
joint ventures with black entrepreneurs, each hoping to gain from the
other. (3) Large corporations have gone outside their established
markets to buy supplies and services from black-owned enterprises.
(4) Some have donated large sums of money, machinery, and have freely
supplied technical assistance to incipient black businesses. (5) Some
banks have adopted a more liberal attitude toward lending to minority
groups. (6) Several corporations are working with community organiza-
tions on economic and social programs.
It is disheartening to note that the experience of corporations
energetically involved in promoting black entrepreneurship has been
less rewarding. In a recent nationwide study of 30 cases of
corporate involvement in ghetto business and black entrepreneurship,
3For more on ways corporations are involving themselves, see
Conference Board, op. cit., ch. 1.
4Various accounts of discouraging experiences as reported in the Wall
Street Journal can be found in the Staff of the Wall Street Journal,
Business and Blacks. Princeton, N.J.: Dow Jones Books, 1970. See
also Conference Board, op. cit., pp. 55-101.
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the Conference Board reports: "Most of the ventures studied have
encountered greater difficulties, incurred higher costs, employed
fewer people and met with less success than had been anticipated at
the outset.'5 The report goes on to specify that the main problems
pertain to the training and integration of the hard-core workers,
working with inexperienced management, adaptation to unusual mana-
gerial relationships, establishing and holding markets, misjudgements
in planning and the loss of outside company support.
Similarly, poor public relations and frequently clogged channels
of communication between black leaders as well as black entrepreneurs
and representatives of corporations doing business in ghetto areas
constantly lead to tensions, inconducive to mutual cooperation in
business. Some black leaders regard the role of the corporations
in the development of the ghetto as token gestures to allay the dis-
content of riot-prone black youths. Others are critical of the fact that
better benefits, e.g. tax incentives and retrieval of job training
costs from government accrue to investors than to local residents,
and consequently they view the whole situation as another means
to perpetuate the imbalance in economic and political power.
In spite of these early set-backs, we cannot question the
capacity of the private sector to turn the tide in a more favorable
direction. We should painfully admit that huge corporate investment
in ghetto areas will not occur in the foreseeable future under normal
5Conference Board, ibid.
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market conditions. It is for this reason that the Government must
be the "goad and the catalyst" to trigger the interest of the private
sector through properly designed programs.
Performance of the Public Sector
Independent entrepreneurship as a vehicle for promoting black
economic progress poses four serious problems in relation to public
policy. First, it implies "compensatory opportunities." In other
words, rigid economic criteria cannot be applied to such programs as
federal contract awards to minority businessmen and economic opportun-
ity loans, i.e. Title IV of the Economic Opportunity Act. Second,
a sound public policy dictates that a dollar invested in promoting
black entrepreneurship should have a multiplier effect. It should
not be regarded as another "welfare buck." The implication here is
that putting many blacks in business will not necessarily ameliorate
black economic problems. Rather, the emphasis should be on the
quality of entrepreneurship. Third, promotion of black entrepreneur-
ship as a public policy cannot avoid the question of choice of
economic sectors in which promotional efforts should be concentrated.
Involvement of black entrepreneurs in such rapidly growing sectors
as pollution and environmental control, electronics and aerospace
is a sine qua non if they are to make any headway at all. Lastly,
although a greater part of the burden may be borne by the private
sector, yet the initiative, leadership and guidance in all promo-
tional efforts should come from the Federal Government.
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Adequacy of Demand Determinants
The Federal Government's interest in minority entrepreneurship
began in 1961 when President Kennedy, in his Plans for Progress,
appealed to corporations to adopt voluntary compliance in the area of
equal employment and economic opportunity. By 1969, 441 corporations
had subscribed to the program. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964
was another landmark. For the first time SBA could make small loans 6
to very small businessmen.
The next landmark was the Economic Opportunity Loan, popularly
referred to as EOL, which has helped many minority persons to go into
business. In an interview with one top official of the SBA regional
office in Philadelphia, the author was told that before the passage
of the Act officials were so conservative that they had made only
four loans to minority persons in Philadelphia. But between 1964
and 1970 they made about 900 loans.
The next landmark was the signing of Executive Order 11458 on
March 5, 1969, establishing the Office of Minority Business Enter-
prise (OMBE) in the Department of Commerce to promote minority
entrepreneurship. The Order also authorized the establishment of
an Advisory Council for Minority Enterprise, comprising top govern-
ment officials, business leaders and leaders of minority groups.
Besides, the Order established an Inter-agency Committee to
6The loan program started with the six-by-six program by which SBA
made $6,000 loans to small businessmen for six years with or
without collateral. This was later replaced by the Economic
Opportunity Loan program. (See Appendix E.)
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coordinate the activities of federal agencies capable of assisting
minority entrepreneurs.
In Appendix E an attempt has been made to summarize the main
federal programs directly related to the promotion of minority entre-
preneurship.7 One cannot help but be impressed by the diversity of
opportunities which the programs are 'supposed" to entail. An
obvious question posed here is, to what extent are the programs meet-
ing specific objectives of the government, or how effective are they?
The promotional activities of OMBE has been given a wide publicity,
which is out of proportion to the monitoring role it was created to
play. It appears, as some observers put it, that "the new office is
just another substitute for action." In fact, no new program has
been authorized by Congress since the passage of the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act. A brief examination of the loan and technical assistance
programs may illuminate some of the shortcomings of the current
programs.
With respect to Economic Opportunity loans, SBA tends to empha-
size the number of persons being helped instead of business types
that possess growth potential. To illustrate this point, while the
total number of minority loans increased by 96.6% in FY 1969, the
7For a more comprehensive description of all federal programs capable
of assisting minority entrepreneurs, see U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
Special Catalog of Federal Assistance Programs for Minority Business
Enterprise, compiled for the Executive Office of the President by the
Office of Economic Opportunity. Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1969.
8Levitan, Mangum and Taggart IlI, op. cit., p. 74.
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dollar value of such loans increased by only 23.4%, i.e. from
$19,715 in FY 1968 to $24,327 in FY 1969.9 The small size of economic
opportunity loans (maximum $25,000) poses two problems. First,
commercial banks are usually not interested in making small loans owing
to excessive overhead costs. Second, so long as EOL loans remain small,
minority entrepreneurs will remain small operators. Sooner or later,
they will be advocating for larger loans, and at that point the govern-
ment will have to decide between on the one hand more small loans and
attendant marginal businesses, and on the other hand, larger loans for
a selected number of entrepreneurs capable of entering viable busi-
nesses.
Again, on the question of loans, serious doubts have been
expressed as to the efficacy of the Minority Small Business Investment
Companies (MESBICs),10 a program launched in November 1969 to inject
private long-term loans and equity capital into minority businesses.
For every dollar put up by a MESBIC, SBA adds two dollars, and a
minimum sum that a corporation can put up is $150,000. The govern-
ment then adds $300,000. With a paid-up capital of $450,000, the
corporation can raise a government-guaranteed loan, amounting to
$2.5 million ($3.5 million maximum) from a bank for a period of
15-20 years.
9 SBA Annual Report, 1969, p. vi.
10 For a critique of MESBICS see Richard S. Rosenbloom and John K. Shank,
"Let's Write Off MESBICs," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 48, No. 5
(Sept.-Oct. 1970), pp. 90-97.
For other details see Dept. of Commerce, Special Catalog, op. cit.,
p. 91.
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So far, the program has not been successful. Out of 100 MESBICs
budgeted for FY 1970, only 9 were established. It should be pointed
out that the program is really not new. It is just a variation of
the Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) created by the Small
Business Investment Act of 1958. SBICs themselves have not been very
successful,12 and on this score, MESBICs should not have been
patterned after SBICs. Rosenbloom and Shank have pointed out that
small SBICs do not succeed until private capitalization exceeds
$1 million,13 and no MESBIC has so far achieved this level of capitali-
zation.
Moreover, SBA regulations governing the operation of MESBICs
pose three major problems. First, a MESBIC cannot invest more than
20% of its private invested capital in one company. Therefore, it
is not likely that a MESBIC will be involved, at least in the fore-
seeable future, in any large scale ghetto enterprise. Second, SBA
regulations require that a MESBIC engages two full-time managers.
Together with their secretarial services, the cost of labor alone
could erode much of the company's capital reserves. Third, most
minority enterprises require substantial supervision during the
first two years. Overheads associated with technical services
could severely drain the resources of financially weak MESBICs.
12See Addison W. Parris, The Small Business Administration. New
York: Praeger, 1968, pp. 234-235.
1 30p. cit., p. 94.
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To be sure, MESBICs are not only imperfect substitutes for other
forms of financial assistance, but also their investment decisions
are not linked with specific development goals for ghetto areas.
While the MESBIC program is vaguely attempting to create individual
capitalists, it ensures that economic decisions reside mainly with
external agents, i.e. the MESBIC's and financial institutions which
finance them, and for black leaders who want to have "a piece of the
action," MESBICs detracts from their search for economic and political
equality.
In connection with technical assistance programs, the main
roadblock relates to duplication of efforts by three federal agencies.
(See Appendix E.) In Boston alone, over half a dozen non-profit
organizations, excluding business schools, are funded by federal
agencies to provide technical assistance to minority entrepreneurs.
Duplication and lack of coordination of technical assistance programs
have reached a point where it is difficult to evaluate the effective-
ness of individual organizations. Some even share the same class-
room facilities in Boston. One businessman bitterly complained in
an interview with the author that in spite of the apparent usefulness
of the organizations, they are so numerous that one does not know
which of them should be listened to. Other businessmen contend that
the frequent breakdown of channels of communication between them
and agents of the organizations is the main reason why they have
not persevered to take a maximum advantage of the programs. No
doubt a better method for delivering technical assistance could be
devised.
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The Role of State and Local Governments
A few states have so far launched programs to aid minority
businesses. New York has a legislation that provides business-tax
credits and property-tax exemptions for businesses that locate and
improve facilities in poverty areas. Under the Illinois Community
Investment Program, state funds in banks can be used by businesses
willing to use them for urban development purposes. Some trust com-
panies in Chicago are using these funds to make loans to minority
businesses. In California, the Job Development Act of 1968 permits
the state to guarantee loans made by non-profit organizations to
minority-businesses. The state of Pennsylvania has chartered the
Greater Philadelphia Community Development Corporation to, among
other things, invest in businesses located in poverty areas.
The involvement of cities is not only marginal, but it is of
very dubious nature. A few cities are experimenting with Model
Cities grants-in-aid to provide equity capital to minority businessmen.
Although the states and individual cities can play an important
role in promoting minority entrepreneurship, it is doubtful whether
they will devote much resource to it. To them, minority entrepre-
neurship is just a trivial aspect of the urban crisis, and besides
they feel that the economic problems of the minority belong to the
realm of federal programs.
Black Entrepreneurship and Community Development
Two new programs have recently been initiated, incorporating
-4
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minority entrepreneurship with large-scale community development.
The first is an EDA's central city poverty area program which is
being experimented upon in a few cities. Under Section 401(a) (4)
of the Public Works and Economic Development Act (1965), the
Secretary of Commerce is authorized to designate any area afflicted
by high unemployment as a ''redevelopment area," making it eligible
to receive funds for employment-generating projects.
In addition to other goals, the program hopes to offer minority
entrepreneurs opportunities in business. Needless to emphasize, the
program is geared to the economic development of central cities and
especially projects which will generate many jobs and enhance their
tax base. Consequently, entrepreneurial opportunities for the
minority are of secondary importance. As an illustration, the
Mid-Chicago Economic Development Project, recently funded by EDA,
has assigned a minor role to minority entrepreneurship. The popula-
tion in the project area is 90% nonwhite, but the first stage of the
plan indicates that minority entrepreneurs will be involved in only
two projects: a multi-service commercial center and a housing
project. In an interview with one of the top officials in the
Mayor's Office, the author was informed that four out of every
five minority enterprises in the city do fail, and therefore such
1 4For a full account of the project, see the Mayor's Committee for
Economic and Cultural Development, A Partnership for Action: Mid-
Chicago Economic Development Project. Chicago, May 1970.
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enterprises cannot make any economic impact on the area. The truth
of the matter is that local politicians are mostly interested in
creating jobs for the minority with EDA funds, while black leaders
on the other hand think that they are entitled to "a piece of the
action."
The second experiment in community development is the Model
Cities Economic Development Program funded by HUD. The thrust of
the program is
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15See the Greater Philadelphia Community Development Corporation,
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Program," Business Information Digest, Vol. 1, No. 19, April 15,
1971, p. 2.
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ventures with corporations. (3) A Venture Capital Corporation to
invest in small businesses through neighborhood councils, residents
will participate in planning, monitoring and evaluation of programs.
Before we evaluate the Model Cities economic development program,
a brief reference should be made to the Community Corporation Bill of
1971,16 because both are based on almost identical community develop-
ment concepts. The Bill calls for the establishment of a National
Community Corporation Certification Board in the President's Office,
and an advisory committee to advise it. It will be responsible
for chartering national community development corporations at the
local level. Funds appropriated by Congress will be put in a Trust,
and the Board will use the funds to finance the activities of the
local development corporations. The Bill authorizes corporations
to issue shares to local residents. A Board of Directors, all share-
holders of a local corporation, shall direct its activities, which
according to the Bill should include:
increasing (people's) economic and educational
opportunities; expanding their ownership of pro-
ductive capital and property, improving their
health, safety, and living conditions, enhancing
their personal dignity and independence; expand-
ing their opportunities for meaningful decision-
making and self-determination.... 1 7
Local corporations will be authorized to set up community
development banks, with full powers to make business loans and to
16 For details of the Bill, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Community Corporation Bill 1971. Committee Print,
January 22, 1971.
17Ibid., p. 16.
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extend credit, and to provide legal, managerial and other types of
assistance to their clients, to make equity investments and to
guarantee business loans. The activities of the banks will be
regulated by the community development corporations' governing
board, and their sources of finance will come from the corporations
and from voting and non-voting shareholders.
Other features of the Bill are designed to broaden the functions
of the corporations, but our interest here is to examine the rationale
and the philosophy behind the comprehensive community development
approach as a vehicle for promoting minority entrepreneurship.
Within the last five years, a large number of Congressmen and tax-
payers have come to believe in the community development approach.
However, it is incompatible with the U.S. economic and political
experience. First, American capitalism is the result of individual
economic achievements buttressed on the frontier spirit. A great
many individuals prefer to control their own economic destiny, and
not to entrust it in the hands of non-political groups.
Second, community development programs assume, at least in
principle, that there are well-defined power structure and leadership
in the ghetto to protect divergent economic and social interests.
But OEO and other programs have taught us that the power structure
is amorphous and for almost every new program or project, a new
interest and power base develops, and this is because black leaders
are still far from learning how to work together.
Third, policy-makers overlook the fact that the ghetto is
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socially unstable, owing to a high residential turnover. It is wondered
how a comprehensive local development scheme can be built around an
unstable population.
Fourth, dearth of political power and influence in the ghetto
make social and economic programs poor bedfellows. On the one hand,
social programs in poverty areas are often the source of political
influence of mayors, a majority of whom are not going to give in to
direct involvement of the Executive Office of the President in local
affairs. On the other hand, economic programs belong to the domain of
the private sector which looks at social problems from a different
angle.
The author strongly believes that as a vehicle for economic
change and growth, all-inclusive community development programs will
simply not work in the foreseeable future. Social programs should be
separated from economic programs if our intention is to pursue more
realistic and practical development goals. In effect, this will mean
the creation of two separate institutions: one social and the other
economic, and the best economic institution to fulfil the economic
needs of the ghetto is a development bank.As an economic institutionit
has withstood the test of time, and should therefore be given a trial
in the U.S. poor communities.
Need for an Autonomous Community Development Bank
The use of a development bank as a vehicle for the development
is actually not a new idea among liberal politicians. It was first
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proposed in 1967 by Senator J.K. Javits, It is important to stress
that a local development bank should indeed be divorced form local
politics as much as possible, and should follow mainly economic goals.
The following simple structure and functions of an ideal community
development bank are proposed:
1. An enabling legislation should be passed by Congress to give
it a national political support.
2. Board of Directors: At least at the local level there should
be a Board of Directors appointed by the President, and should
represent four major interests, namely local residents, the
Federal Government, private business and the city hall.
3. Loan Division: to grant all types of loan and to extend credit.
4. Technical Assistance Division: to coordinate and direct all
federal technical assistance programs. It should be the main
local institution through which SBA and EDA should communi-
cate with the people.
5. Venture Capital Division: to enter into joint ventures by
itself or to encourage local residents team up with corpora-
tions genuinely interested in doing business in the ghetto.
6. Capital Projects Division: to invest in such projects as indus-
trial estates, mass housing, small sewage works, etc. Such
projects should be selected on the basis of their contribution
to the economic development of the ghetto.
18See U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator J.K. Javits introducing the bill,
The Community Development Bank and the Economic Opportunity Corpora-
tion. 90th Congress, 1st. sess., Oct. 23 1967. Congressional Record,
VZ7T1ll3,Part 22, pp. 29729-29737.
293
7. Sources of finance: Partly from Congressional appropriations,
sale of non-voting stocks, and tax-deductible contributions. 9
Recommendations Emanating from the Boston Study: Incremental Solutions
1. Loans and Credit: The proposed development bank, if estab-
lished, will be the most reliable easy, source of capital for black
enterprises. However to meet the immediate capital requirement of mino-
rity businessmen, the President's Task Force on Small Businesses (1970)
has recommended that a separate division should be established within
SBA to cater to the special needs of minority businessmen.20 It is
suggested that if this recommendation is accepted by Congress, then
the Minority Division of SBA should institute a program to advance
equity capital and short-term credits to its clients.
2. Employee-Related Problems: As discussed in Chapter \II,
employee-related problems arise from (a) high turnover of labor, and
its implicit high labor training cost, and (b) low wages and extremely
limited fringe benefits. Two complementary programs should be insti-
tuted to improve the present situation. First, a special JOB program
(see Appendix E) should be designed for minority enterprises, simply
because the regulations governing the participation of firms in the
present JOBS program disqualify a large number of minority enterprises.
19Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code permits Organizations
to make tax-deductible contributions to community development corpo-
rations or to businesses operated by members of the minority and
poverty groups. For the implications of this provision, see the
Yale Law Journal, Note, "Tax Exemption for Organizations Investing
in Black Businesses" , Vol. 78 (1969), pp. 1212-1227.
2 0The President's Task Force on Improving the Prospects of Small
Business. Washington, D.C., U.S.G.P.O., March 1970, p.4.
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To do this, the Federal Labor Standards Act and the Dun and Bradstreet
credit rating used by the Department of Labor to select firms should
be modified to suit ghetto enterprises. In selecting ghetto enter-
prises for the new program, they should be rated according to the
number of persons employed, annual sales, quality of product or
service, training facilities, and the quality of the physical environ-
ment. All enterprises should be grouped into three classes: high,
medium and low performers. The rating should automatically disqualify
low performers.
Second, to tackle the problem of poor fringe benefits, the
proposed negative income tax benefits21 could be applied to ghetto
enterprises. It is further proposed that every minority enterprise
employing five or more persons should receive a subsidy, equivalent
to two-week vacation wages for all employees.
3. Improving Work Skills: The Department of Labor's on-the-job
training program has helped thousands of corporations to upgrade the
skills of their workers. For several reasons, it has not benefitted
minority enterprises. It is suggested that a specific percentage of
OJT training slots based on the total number of non-white population
in a locality or state be reserved for workers employed by minority
firms. To implement this program, a Joint Consultative Committee
comprising representatives of the Department of Labor and minority
2 1For a discussion of the merits and demerits of the proposal, see
Joseph A. Kershaw, Government Against Poverty. Chicago: Markham
Publishing Co., 1970, pp. 111-130.
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businesses should be established in each large city or administrative
region to determine periodically different types of training require-
ments.
4. Supervisor Exchange Program: It was disclosed in Chapter V/I
that there is more racial harmony when blacks and whites work together
in black-owned firms, in contrast with racial tensions that occur in
white firms, especially when black workers are hired through non-union
channels. As a strategy for improving racial relations and to enable
black workers to understudy more experienced white workers, it is
proposed that a Supervisor Exchange Program be instituted. By this
program, white supervisors or foremen will be assigned temporarily
to black firms to act as "co-supervisors." A reciprocal arrangement
will also be made for black supervisors to work in white firms. Owing
to differences in wages between black and white firms, a subsidy
program will be required to supplement the wages of black or white
supervisors who will volunteer to participate in the program.
5. Technical Assistance: Because too many non-profit organiza-
tions compete for the same funds from SBA, EDA and other sources to
provide technical assistance to the same client population, it is
suggested that under SBA authorization a technical assistance council
be formed in cities with large concentrations of black population.
It will be composed of the representatives of minority businessmen,
SBA, non-profit organizations offering the assistance, and any other
state agency or academic institutionswhose services may be needed.
The council will select technical assistance organizations to assist
individual firms until such time that the firms can stand on their
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own. The council will also be responsible for arranging educational
programs. Federal funds for technical assistance will be channeled
through the council. Further, it is recommended that Congressional
appropriations for technical assistance should be made to only one
federal agency, preferably SBA.
6. The Problem of Relocation: The study discloses that it
takes a minimum period of six months and a maximum of two years for
relocated firms to recover completely. At present SBA pays a maximum
compensation of $3,000 to relocated firms. Very small firms receive
only $2,500. It is doubtful whether these grants cover all financial
losses. It is suggested that this matter should be studied carefully
so that the total relocation cost, including transportation, loss in
business volume, and possibly cost entailed in furnishing a new place,
is properly computed and a fair compensation paid.
7. The Problem of Dual Entrepreneurship: Our study does not
reveal specifically that dual entrepreneurship does damage to marginal
firms. However, since a large number of black enterprises rely on
financial and technical assistance programs, we should be concerned
about the effectiveness of the programs. Therefore, it is proposed
here that some restrictions should be imposed on SBA-loan recipients
who run two or more businesses. These restrictions should include:
(a) loans received by entrepreneurs should be used for the purposes
indicated on their application forms, and (b) SBA should have the
right to inspect each recipient's account payables and receivables
as well as profit and loss statements to determine the disbursement of
cash flows.
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Effective Ways to Involve the Private Sector
It has earlier been argued that the structure of the economy
requires that the private sector should be induced to promote
minority entrepreneurship. In the light of the most feasible options
open to policy-makers, the private sector can be involved in two major
ways: (a) Joint-venture arrangements with more reputable white firms.
Preference for reputable firms is justified by such factors as assured
market, readily available technical assistance, use of most modern tech-
nology and training facilities for workers. Incentives to joint
ventures should be made flexible enough to suit the financial needs
of participating corporations, and should include various forms of
tax incentives, land development grants, contributions to equity
capital. Needless to emphasize, incentives should be based on
profitability of projects.
(b) Franchising: The argument in favor of franchising is that
a large proportion of new businesses are appendages of old ones, e.g.
spin-off industries, subsidiaries, etc. Franchising is a good approxi-
mation of vertical integration, with built-in economies of scale,
including quantity purchasing, national advertising, research and
development, management training, easy access to credit, etc.
No doubt franchising can immensely boost black entrepreneurship,
given the rapid growth of central city black population. The Office
of the Minority Enterprise has initiated a program22 to involve
franchisors in minority entrepreneurship, and probably this is the
most encouraging program launched by the agency.
220MBE invites 25 franchisors at a time to Washington every few weeks
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Research Agenda
We need to
enough research
know several things about black enterprises, but not
has been done. Problems facing black enterprises may
differ from one category to another,
research areas are universal enough
1. Enlarging the urban market
Chapter VII it was pointed out that
enterprises, namely more competitive
policy-makers to plan for the expans
those which can make quick i
is suggested therefore that
"real competitive positions'
2. Business planning:
of black enterprises could b
fascinating issue is that a
normal business operations i
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n the ghetto, but technical assistance
atterned after textbooks' rules of thumb.
for an enterprise which depends largely
on credit extension to close associates and relatives? We need to
know more about the significance of such environmental and social
to discuss possibilities of drawing franchisees from the minority
group. The importance of franchising to small businesses is well
documented in U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business,
The Impact of Franchising on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2nd sess.,
Parts 1 and 2, January, March, April 1970. Washington, D.C.:
U.S.G.P.0., 1970.
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factors in business success.
3. Employer-employee relations: The author has argued that
probably the most crucial problem facing black entrepreneurs relates
to how to secure and maintain reliable employees. It is still not
known whether poor employer-employee relations is the root of the
problem. Albeit, research is needed to throw light on it.
4. How to motivate the black entrepreneur: David C. McClelland
sees the low achievement motivation of the black entrepreneur as a
major problem, and has subsequently initiated a program in Washington
and Oklahoma to test some of his ideas.23 The author thinks that
further research is needed in this direction to eliminate one of the
major roadblocks facing black entrepreneurship.
Long Range Urban Growth Considerations
The dearth of entrepreneurial talents among urban blacks is only
one of the many economic problems of the ghetto. Consequently
programs to promote black entrepreneurship should be conceived within
the framework of: (1) a national urban development policy and (2) a
national economic development policy for urban ghetto areas. A
national urban development policy dictates the following:
1. Regional economic opportunities should be identified such
that a "regional system of cities" will have complementary economic
2 3For a description of this experiment, see D. C. McClelland, "Black
Capitalism: Making It Work," Think, (July/August), 1969, pp. 6-11.
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activities. To encourage inter-regional trade, specialization at
the regional level will be necessary.
2. Within each regional system of cities, the economic
relationships between the growing suburbs and the decaying central
cities should be worked out in order to mitigate the present trend
toward economic polarization.
3. For each central city, economic opportunities for independent
entrepreneurship should be spelled out in detail. Sufficient emphasis
should be placed on economic integration between the ghetto areas
and the surrounding areas. In this connection, the breakdown of
black enterprises into more competitive and less competitive sectors
will become more meaningful.
These policy issues imply that systematic studies should be
initiated by EDA or HUD to gather sufficient data on which a national
urban development policy will be based. As a supplement to these
studies local economic studies should also be pursued. It suffices
therefore to stress that ''carving programs'' out of existing legislations
to promote the development of urban poverty areas underestimates the
urgency to prepare and adopt comprehensive long-term urban development
plans.
4. Since it is impractical to create a dynamic entrepreneurial
class relying on the present managerial know-how in the ghetto, it is
the growing number of black executives and the more educated blacks
who will ultimately fill the "entrepreneurial supply gap." Thus,
immediate attention should be paid to job training, job placement and
30 1
job upgrading for the minority labor force in the private sector.
Concluding Remarks
The Civil Rights and Economic Opportunity Acts of 1964, indices
of "determinants of demand for entrepreneurship," have created condi-
tions which are both conducive and adverse to black entrepreneurship.
First, more capital, techn
are now accessible to ambi
technology characteristic
increasing capitalization
Dry cleaning and laundry b
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"washerwoman" is of no use
black operator has to reso
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tious black entrepreneurs.
of the U.S. economy calls f
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usiness is an illustration
establish a sound business
now. Another example is t
rt to automatic lifting dev
der to satisfy customers.
training programs
But the type of
or an ever-
small businessman.
of the amount of
, for the old
rucking where the
ices, vis-a-vis
In short, external
factors of technology and intensive capitalization seem to pose a real
challenge to the development of black entrepreneurship.
Second, the Civil Rights Movement is gradually succeeding in
breaking down the barriers of racial discrimination and segregation.
Black entrepreneurs can now receive contracts from white businesses,
academic institutions, and so forth. White customers are beginning
to buy from blacks. Thus, it is a challenge which has been thrown
at them to compete effectively in the urban market and to measure up
to a standard commensurate with the expectation of the society. How
this challenge will be faced constitutes one of the fundamental issues
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in the growth and development of the ghetto economy.
The third upshot of the Civil Rights Movement is increasing
unionization of certain occupations, especially in crafts, trades and
a few professions. Black entrepreneurs are being drawn into local
unions, with a full obligation to maintain union performance
standards and pay union wages in order to qualify for contracts and
other benefits. Unionization is therefore a challenge black entre-
preneurs have to face in order to compete effectively.
Lastly, we have to ask whether black entrepreneurs are taking
the fullest advantage of managerial and manpower training programs
that have been placed at their door-steps by federal agencies,
academic institutions and corporations. Opinions, however, seem to
converge that managerial handicaps still continue to cripple black
businesses. The future emphasis and focus of these programs and
the willingness of black businessmen to improve their managerial
talents almost at no cost will certainly be one of the key factors
in black entrepreneurial development.
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APPENDIX A
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: VARIATIONS IN FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION
One is usually confounded by different shades of definition econo-
mists, starting from Adam Smith, have imposed on the behavior of an entre-
preneur and the role he plays, or he is expected to play. Adam Smith
(1776) conceived of the entrepreneur as a "master" or a manipulator who
manipulated materials and workmen to achieve a principal goal of making
in his business. He stated: "in all arts and manufactures the
greater part of the workmen stand in need of a master to advance them
the materials of their work, and their wages and maintenance till it be
completed. He shares in the produce of their labour....... and in this
share consists his profits.''1
Smith was unquestionably under the spell of the system of economic
organization in Europe during the eighteenth century at which time mas-
ter-workman relationship was an established institution. Corporations
were relatively unimportant, and even in the early nineteenth century the
master was both a capitalist and an entrepreneur. His definition implies
a fourth factor of production in addition to capital, land and labour,
namely, the entrepreneur who master-minded an economic operation. The
entrepreneur's position in that period could be compared with the role
played by a contemporary board of directors of a business corporation.
Although his definition fitted into the scheme of things of his day, it
Adam Smith, op. cit., pp. 116-117.
a profit
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is too restricted in scope for our generation.
Alfred Marshall (1890), unlike Adam Smith, adopted a broader defi-
nition. He regarded entrepreneurs as adventurers who undertake risks,
and who "bring together the capital and the labour required for the
work; they arrange or engineer its general plan and superintend its minor
details." 2 His entrepreneur is unquestionably a fourth factor of pro-
duction, but serving in a different capacity from Adam Smith's. Mar-
shall's entrepreneur is an active participant in the planning and pro-
duction processes. His concern for details stigmatizes him as a profit-
maximizer and a disciple of micro-economic principles. In comparison
with present day set up of business organizations in which an administra-
tive entrepreneur or a paid manager played the role of Marshall's entre-
preneur but may not own the capital invested or control labor, the
shortcomings of Marshall's definition become evident.
The function of the entrepreneur as a risk-taker who is rewarded
with profits for taking risks was first enunciated by Frederick B. Haw-
ley (1893) in his statement of the "risk theory of profit." The theory
states:
The final consumer is forced to include in the price he pays
for any product not only enough to cover all the items of cost to
the entrepreneur, -among which items is a sum sufficient to cover
the actuarial or average losses incidental to the various risks
of all kinds necessarily assumed by the entrepreneur and his in-
surers; -but a further sum, with which, as an inducement, the en-
trepreneur, or enterpriser, and his insurers will nog undergo or
suffer the irksomeness of being exposed to risk....
2 Alfred Marshall, op. cit., p. 293.
Frederick B. Hawley, "The Risk Theory of Profit," QJE, Vol. 15, (Aug.
1901), p. 610. His viewpoint was elaborated at various times. See
his "Enterprise and Profit," QJE,Vol. 15,(Nov. 1900),pp. 95-105 and
"The Risk Theory of Profit," QJE,Vol. 7,(July 1893),pp. 459-479. Some
111
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In short, Hawley regards profit as a ''residual income'' or reward
for taking risk. But Frank H. Knight (1921) severely disagrees with
Hawley and affirms that "if risk were exclusively of the nature of a
known chance or mathematical probability, there could be no reward of
risk-taking." 5 Although Knight recognizes that most risks can be insured,
and therefore reducing the level of uncertainty to desirable limits, he
admits that profit "is a unique kind of risk which is not susceptible of
measurement."
Both Hawley's and Knight's conception of the entrepreneur as a risk-
taker who is rewarded with profits for venturesomeness still leaves us
with a groping desire for a more comprehensive definition. Their defini-
tions, like Marshall's, are couched to tow the line of micro-economic
theory.
The entrepreneur, as a vehicle of "economic innovation" was advanced
by Joseph A. Schumpeter (1934). He is depicted as an individual whose
function it is to carry out new combination. By his ability to effect
new combinations of factors of production, by acting as an executor of
"strategic decisions"' and playing roles of economic leadership, he be-
of the issues he raised in later publications dealt with the distinction
between an entrepreneur, a speculator and a gambler. A speculator and
a gambler as he explained, do not play economic roles in a technical
sense. The speculator assumes no risk; he is guided by a "distributive
force." In the long run some speculators gain and others lose, so that
on the average they become neutral elements in the production process.
The gambler on the other hand is driven into action by the excitement
of risk. If he believes the chance of winning or losing to be even, he
likes to take the chance whenever opportunity offers.
Frank H. Knight, op. cit., pp. 22-48.
5 Ibid., p. 46.
6 Joseph A. Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 74.
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comes an innovator.7 Schumpeter warns that a capitalist should not be
confused with an entrepreneur, although a person could play both roles.
He points out that "risk obviously always falls on the owner of the means
of production, or of the money capital which was paid for them, hence
never on the entrepreneur as such." 8
To a large extent, Schumpeter's definition excludes the small
businessman, e.g. a trader who marshalls and directs his own resources
to reap the benefit of his own labor and possibly of others, without any
capacity to innovate. Writing at the time of the Great Depression, he was
pre-occupied with macro-economic issues and factors that were decisive
in bringing about a rebirth of shattered economies of nations across the
world. The innovator, or the economic leader, was therefore a crucial
element in such a global crusade. At best, the function he assigns his
entrepreneur approaches that of a director of a firm who is only respon-
sible to shareholders. His claim that in theory the entrepreneur has no
social status or belongs to no recognizeable social class 9 does not mirror
contemporary high positions occupied by successful industrialists in western
society. Nevertheless, his definition, viewed in terms of big strides
in economic development through the application of technological inven-
tions in diverse industries is a useful one.
It is worth noting that an anthropological view of the entrepreneur
as an agent of economic change supports Schumpeter's line of argument.
As an illustration, Belshaw maintains that a true entrepreneur is one
whose business expands and grows in situations of cultural change and
economic development. See Cyril S. Belshaw, "The Cultural Milieu of
the Entrepreneur: A Critical Essay," op. cit., pp. 146-163.
8 Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 75.
9 Ibid., p. 78.
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Frederick Harbison (1956) unlike his predecessors, equates the entre-
preneur to "an organization which comprises all of the people required
to perform entrepreneurial function." 10
His main objection is that traditional definition has tended to
focus on individual persons performing all the entrepreneurial functions.
The shortcoming of such a focus, he contends, is that it does not take
into account larger firms where hierarchy of individuals perform the func-
tions. In sum, he outlines entrepreneurial functions as follows: (1)
The undertaking or managing of risk and the handling of economic uncer-
tainty; (2) planning and innovation; (3) co-ordination, administration
and control; (4) routine supervision. 11
Harbison's definition, encompassing the risk-taker, the innovator,
the entrepreneurial administrator and supervisor is designed to include
modern industrial giants, and even shareholders in their capacity as risk-
takers are not left out. However, with the diffusion of entrepreneurial
functions among diverse managerial and administrative units in modern
corporations, the whole concept of entrepreneurship is losing its real
meaning at the expense of organizational efficiency. It is evident also
that divorce between ownership and control is almost complete, and if eco-
nomic power of corporations continues to grow, Adam Smith's definition
will not be discarded so easily in the near future. However Harbison's
definition throws more light on changing economic forces, namely, the
business corporations on which major economic decisions and costly inno-
vations rest.
10Frederick Harbison, "Entrepreneurial Organization as a Factor in Eco-
nomic Development," op. cit., pp. 364-379.
11 Ibid.
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Entrepreneurship conceived as "true integrated sequence of actions
taken by individuals or by groups operating for individual business units
... " was put forth by Arthur H. Cole 12 (1965). He goes on to explain
that such actions are conditioned by three processes, namely innovation,
management, and adjustment to external condition. Cole's major contri-
bution lies in identifying (1) the significance that should be attached
to influences exerted by external conditions or the institutional frame-
work which govern the incidence of profits and (2) the role of manage-
ment or monitoring actions which produce desired results.
Cole touches on an interesting issue central to our task. He
thinks that whether the organ is singular, plural or institutionalized
is not a crucial factor in depicting who is an entrepreneur, although
rational entrepreneurship would differentiate between an itinerant ped-
dler, a primitive textile proprietor and a modern corporation.13 Mc-
Clelland even widens the entrepreneurial group when he states that house-
holds in preliterate societies who produced 75 per cent over and above
their needs were entrepreneurs. Fritz Redlich also makes an interes-
ting point that the "copying entrepreneur," compared with the creative
or "innovative entrepreneur"' is subjectively an entrepreneur, insofar
as he has done what he has never done before. 15
12Arthur H. Cole, "An Approach to the Study of Entrepreneurship: A
Tribute to Edwin F. Gay," In Hugh G.J. Aitken (ed.), Explorations in
Enterprise, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, pp. 30-44.
13Ibid., p. 39.
14David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society, op. cit., p. 65.
15Fritz Redlich, "Innovation in Business," American Journal of Econo-
mics and Sociology, Vol. 10, No. 3, (April 1951), p. 288.
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The above survey of some of the major functional definitions of
entrepreneurship conveys an important message that the functions have
been changing in accordance with stages in economic development, the
development of the banking system, dynamic impact of applied science and
technology on business, evolution of business corporations, etc. Yet,
in spite of all these developments, the "small independent entrepreneur,"
vis-a-vis the administrative and other types of entrepreneur16 will
continue to feature significantly in economic decisions. He may be a
peddler, a corner-grocer or a small manufacturer; yet the combined decisions
of these men, viewed in the aggregate, have economic significance. In
fact, few small enterprises are designed initally to operate at their
maximum scale. Most take time to grow and expand from humble beginnings.
16Ibid. The co-authors distinguish between two kinds of entrepreneur
who through both geographic mobility and vertical occupational mobility
become builders of economic organization, e.g. executives who rise to
become directors and managers of corporations. The second type is one
who has created out of nothing an ongoing enterprise. He lacks social
mobility and desire of achieving positions of rewards and authority.
Vide p. 85 et seq. Hoselitz, on the other hand, identifies three types
of entrepreneur: (1) the merchant type, suited to persons with predom-
inantly marketorientation; (2) the managerial type with authoritarian
orientation, e.g. the Russian factory type of manager, and (3) the in-
dustrial type, who may have characteristics of the above two but is more
oriented towards production. See Bert F. Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects
of Economic Growth, New York: the Free Press, 1960, pp. 149-156.
... 4
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APPENDIX B
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research Design
1. Definition of Area of Study: An initial problem the author had to
grapple with was whether to study businesses located in predominantly
black neighborhoods or anywhere in the metropolitan area. The metro-
politan area was selected for two main reasons: (a) to find out
whether more successful black businesses are indeed footloose with re-
spect to location; and (b) to determine whether certain types of black
businesses require specific locations. It turns out that all the busi-
nesses which met our criteria of success are all located within the
city limits of Boston.
2. Selection of Interviewees: Two criteria were employed to select
interviewees, who under conditions of the ghetto economy could be re-
garded as "better performers" or "more successful." These criteria
were (a) an enterprise employing five or more persons working full-time,
and (b) the enterprise should be at least two years old, i.e. it should
have been started not later than January 1969. Where an enterprise en-
gaged part-time workers, two part-time workers were substituted for a
full-time worker. For example, if an enterprise engaged three full-time
workers and three part-time, then in our calculation, it employed 4.5
full-time workers, and this was adjusted to 5.
Since over 50% of small enterprises in urban poverty areas die be-
fore they are two years old, the minimum age eliminated some enter-
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prises which started after January 1969, and whose future is in fact
unpredictable. It should also be noted that a number of black enter-
prises which started after January 1969 employing five or more persons
are known to be doing well but were not included in the study simply
because they failed to meet our criteria. Further, community-based ven-
tures such as Freedom Industries and State Enterprises Inc. were also
excluded for the simple reason that they are not identified with indepen-
dent entrepreneurship.
Of the 443 businesses recorded in the Black Business Directory for
Boston and its vicinity, 20 are located in cities and towns outside the
metropolitan area. Another 49 professional types of business comprising
medicine (14), law (30), architecture (3) and management consulting (2)
were eliminated because they belong to anothercategory of business ven-
ture altogether. In any event, in June 1970 about 95% of the professional
businesses were employing less than five person4, according to the author's
telephone investigation. In drawing up the list of interviewees from
the remaining 368 businesses, a key person2 in the team who prepared the
directory was approached. She had previously been working with a sub-
stantial number of the businessmen as an economic development officer of
the Action for Boston Community Development, a community action agency,
and she was familiar with some of the enterprises engaging three persons
or less. With her assistance, about 150 of the enterprises were elimina-
ted from the list. The author was then saddled with the task of making
Roxbury Businessmen's Development Corporation, First Annual Directory
of Black Businesses and Professionals, 1969-70, Boston, 1970.
2 My thanks go to Mrs. Riva Poor.
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telephone calls to over 200 black businessmen who were asked to answer
two questions: year and month of establishment and number of employees.
About 60 qualified according to the telephone ivestigation. Subsequent
telephone calls and talks with knowledgeable persons in the black com-
munity revealed about eight more. With only 68 potential respondents
forming what amounted to the "total universe", the question of sampling
did not arise; for it was considered that if all the 68 agreed to be
interviewed on 129 questions, the results of the survey would adequately
be representative. In the final analysis, 52 out of the 68 finally ag-
reed to be interviewed.
3. Method of Interviewing: With no extra hands to help the author, a
decision was taken to employ both personal interview and mail questionnaire
techniques. Thus, out of the 68 businessmen, 30 were contacted through
mail questionnaires, and it was made clear in a covering letter that if
some questions proved difficult to answer, the author would call person-
ally to assist them. The mail questionnaires were sent to those business-
men who either requested them during the telephone calls or were believed
to be educated enough to answer the questions unaided. The remaining 38
were reserved for personal interviews. To the surprise of the author,
only one of the thirty questionnaires was returned after one month. It
was later discovered that mail questionnaire is the least efficient method
of soliciting information from businessmen and more so in the case of
black businessmen most of whom are either suspicious of the use of the in-
formation about their businesses by public agencies and researchers, or are
not well educated enough to answer the questions correctly. Consequently
the personal interview approach was used throughout. The interviews took
place between July and November 1970.
313
"Success" Criteria
It is debatable whether the use of the two criteria of success
does not eliminate a lot of enterprises several years old, but are enga-
ging less than five full-time workers, or may be doing well financially.
As an illustration, some funeral homes and insurance companies, several
years old, employ less than five persons, and although they are known
to be financially viable in the Boston black community, they are not
included in the study.
Three measures of success usually employed in business research
are the size of enterprise in terms of employment, growth of enterprise
and entrepreneurial income. In defense of our "success" criteria, the
author is more concerned about alternative approaches to ghetto develop-
ment, and one of these approaches, as we saw in chapter 2, is independent
entrepreneurship capable of generating employment. Most traditional
black enterprises are "parasitic" in character, feeding on the sheltered
ghetto market, and insensitive to changes that can bring about dynamic
growth. Employment level3 and a minimum period of existence are potent
yardsticks capable of separating a few enterprises with growth potential
from the stagnating majority.
Method of Statistical Analysis
A cursory examination of the questionnaire prepared for the sur-
vey (Appendix D) would reveal to the reader that mostly nominal and mutu-
ally exclusive types of data were collected. As an illustration, ques-
tions of the following types: yes-no, male-female, proprietor-partner-
ship-corporation, predominated the questionnaire. Nominal data
3 As an illustration, 78% of black businesses in San Francisco employed
between 1 - 3 persons in 1968. See Pact. Inc., op. cit., p. 9.
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are usually not suitable for parametric statistical tests, but are
appropriate for non-parametric or distribution-free tests such as
Fisher's Exact test, chi-square, other measures of association, and
rank order correlations. Much of our data analysis will therefore con-
centrate on determining the strength of associations between independent
variables. Some of the data warrant ranking of preferences, problems,
etc., and hence ranking techniques will be used where necessary.
X2 appears to be a more appropriate technique for analysing a great-
er part of the data for two main reasons: first the data are in discrete
categories of mostly independent variables. Second, if the number of
degrees of freedom is more than one, X2 tests are insensitive to the
effects of order, 5i.e. whether one alternative is preferred to the oth-
er, and since order is not crucial in the analysis, X2 is a useful sta-
tistic in this respect. Where appropriate, other measures of association,
e.g. phi-square and Goodman-Kruskal gamma will be employed. Fisher's
Exact test will be used in cases where a sub-group within the study
group is being considered. In all cases however significance levels
For an incisive description of analytical applications of non-para-
metric techniques, see Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics, New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1960; Sidney Siegel, Non-parametric Statistics
for Behavioral Sciences, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956; Robert S. Weiss,
Statistics in Social Research - An Introduction, New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1968; M.J. Moroney, Facts from Figures, Baltimore:
Pelican Books, 1963; Philip J. McCarthy, Introduction to Statistical
Reasoning, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957. For more mathematical treat-
ment of the subject matter, see also, L. Goodman and W. Kruskal,
"Measures of Association for Cross-Classification," Journal of the
American Statistical Association, Vol 49, No. 268, (Dec. 1954), pp.
733-736; William L. Hays, Statistics for Psychologists, New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1963; Maurice G. Kendall, Rank Correlation Meth-
ods, New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1955.
Sidney Siegel, Ibid., pp. 109-110.
6 Fisher's Eact Test is suitable for analyzing 2X2 contingency tables if
the total sample or population is very small; 40 or less has been sug-
gested. See Ibid., p. 110; Blalock, op. cit., p. 221.
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will be determined by the number of degrees of freedom, which normal-
ly is dependent upon the total number of cells comprising each con-
tingency table.7
To avoid the temptation of repeating the term "level of signifi-
cance," the level as computed for any test will be enclosed in paren-
theses in most cases, or simply "s. 1. was found to be .015, .153, etc."
As usual this should be interpreted to mean that the X2 or t distri-
bution of a certain occurrence is found to have .015%, .153%, etc.,
probability of occurring by chance.
Since not much research has been done on black entrepreneurship,
it would be premature, with the exception of a few cases, to state the
direction of the hypotheses, warranting the use of one-tailed tests.
For the most part therefore we shall avoid predicting the direction
of hypotheses, but instead we shall let the data speak for themselves.
In short, the reader will be allowed to be his or her own judge.
Reliability of Interview Data
A pretest of the questionnaire enabled the author to eliminate
some questions which could have given rise to incorrect answers. Even
in the course of the interviews, it became obvious that certain ques-
tions were not crucial or were irrelevant in understanding black entre-
preneurship.
Like most interviews, there is no way of ascertaining answers
that create doubts in the mind of the researcher, especially in entre-
The formula for estimating the number of degrees of freedom is
(r - 1) (k - 1), where r = number of rows in the contingency table,
and k = number of columns.
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preneurial research. Businessmen contend they have nothing to lose
by concealing facts about their businesses or themselves, and that
under certain circumstances it is a wise thing to do. In a few
instances, respondents felt shy to talk about their educational back-
ground and that of their parents. A few also preferred not to talk
about their fathers' occupations. In all, it was in a half-dozen ca-
ses that the author felt respondents were hesitant to answer certain
questions. Questions which received partial answers were in fact not
coded at all, as evidenced in the numerical sequence of the interview
results in Appendix D. In particular, questions relating to finan-
cial administration received poor response. Questions on the use of
federal technical aid were dropped not because respondents failed to
answer them, but because in the course of the interviews it was de-
termined that a majority had not bothered to find out what the aid
programs can do for them. In any event, the frank atmosphere and spi-
rit in which over 85% of the respondents answered the questions as-
sured some degree of reliability.
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APPENDIX C
ARINAL 7ESULTS OF THE BOSTON STUDY
TPE 1.00 1.00 52 WHAT IS YOUR BLSI NESS ABOUT
.25 .25 13 :ONSTRU:TICN AND REAL ESTATE
.08 .08 4 FOOD AND CATERING
.10 .10 5 MANUFA TURI N:
.31 .31 16 PERSONAL SERVICES
.06 .06 3 PRINTIN; AND ADVERTISEMENT
.12 .12 6 RE TAIL
.10 .10 5 TRANSPORT AND RELATED SERVICES
LCC 1.00 1.00 52 WHERE IS YOUR BLSINESS LOCATED
.56 .56 29 ROXBURY
.23 .23 12 DRCHESTER
.08 .08 4 SOUTH EN)
.06 .06 3 FENWAY
.06 .06 3 DOWNTOWN BCSTCN
.J2 .02 1 MORE THAN CNE LOCATICN
cI 1.00 1.00 52 SEX OF THE PROPRIETOR, PARTNERETC
.81 .81 42 MALE
.19 .19 10 FEMALE
Q2 1.00 1.00 52 AGE OF THE PROPRIETOR, PARTNER,ETC
.08 .08 4 29 YEARS OR LESS
.10 .10 5 30-34 YEARS
.13 .13 7 35-39 YEARS
.25 .25 13 40-44 YEARS
.21 .21 11 45-49 YEARS
.17 .17 9 50-54 YEARS
.06 .06 3 55-60 YEARS
C3 1.00 1.00 52 PLACE OF BIRTI
.17 .17 9 BOSTON
.13 .13 7 NEW EN5LAND
.52 .52 27 SOUTH
.12 .12 6 U S BUT OLISIDE NEW ENGLAND AND SOUTH
.06 .06 3 OUTSIDE U S
Q4 1.CO 1.00 52 RELIGION
.69 .69 36 PROTE STANT
.10 .10 5 CATHOLIC
.12 .12 6 NON-DENOMINATIONAL
.08 .08 4 MOSLEM
.02 .02 1 JEWISH
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HON MANY YEARS CF SCHCOLING HAVE YCU HAD
LESS THAN 7 YEARS CF SCHOOLING
7 YEARS OR MORE BUT NC HIGH SCHCCL CIPLCMA
HIGH SCOCL DIPLCMA
HIG-4 SC-OOL DIPLOMA PLUS LESS THAN 4 YEARS CF COLLEGE OR VOCATION
HIGH SZiOUL DIPLOMA PLUS 4 OR MORE YEARS CF CCLLEGE OR VOCATION
NO -41-i SCHCOL DIPLOMA BUT SCME VCCATICN
OCCUPATION OF FATHER
FARMING
PERSONAL SERVICES INCLUDING CATERING
CLERICAL
TRANSPORT AND AUTO MECHANICCONSTRUC TICN AND RCAL ESTATE
TRADING IN COMMODITIES
MINING
SPORTS
PROFESSIONAL
3LUE COLLAR
OTHER
PRINTI NG
DONT KNOW
OCCUPATION Oa MCT14ER
FARMI NG
PERSONAL SERVICES INCLUDING CATERINGCLERICAL
TRANSPORT AND AUTO MECHANICCONSTRUCTICN AND RCAL ESTATE
TRADING IN COMMODITIES
MINING
SPOR TS
PROFESSIONAL
BLUE COLLAR
HOUSE WI FE
PRINTING
DONT KNOW
Qs 1.00
.12
.25
.15
.33
.13
.02
Q13A 1.00
.17
.08
.08
.15
.13
.04
.02
.02
.38
.17
a.
.32
.04
138 1.00
.12
.08
.08
.02
.02
0.
0.
.06
.06
.58
0.
0.
014A 1.00
.31
.23
.15
.06
.08
.02
.l5
Q14B 1.00
.27
.25
.27
.04
.02
.04
.12
1.00
.12
.25
.15
.33
.13
.02
1.00
.17
.08
.08
.15
.13
.04
.02
.08
.17
0.
.02
.04
1.00
.12
.38
.08
c.
.02
.02
0.
0.
.06
.06
.58
0.
0.
1.00
.31
.23
.15
.06
.08
.02
.15
1.00
.27
.25
.27
.U4
.02
.04
.12
EOLCATIONAL ATTAINMENT CF FATHER
7 YEARS OF SCHOOLING CR LESS
MORE THAN 7 YEARS LF SCHCOLING BUT NC
HIGH SCHOOL DIPLCMA
SOME COLLEGE EDUCATIChCOLLEGE DEGREE
HIGH SC-IDOL PLUS VCCATION EDUCATION
DONT KNOW
EDLCATIONAL ATTAINMENT CF MOTHER
7 YEARS OF SCHOOLI NG CR LESS
MORE THAN 7 YEARS CF SCHCCLING BUT NC
HIGH SC-400L DIPLOMA
SOME COLLEGE EDUCATICA
COLLEGE DEGREE
HIGH SC-IDCL PLLS VCCATION EDUCATICA
DONT KNOW
HIGH SCHCOL CIPLOMA
-IGH SCFCOL CIPLOMA
52
6
13
8
17
7
1
52
9
4
4
8
7
2
4
1
9
0
2
52
6
4
4
0
0
3
30
0
52
16
12
8
3
4
1
8
52
14
13
14
2
1
2
6
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015 1.CO 1.00 52 DOES DR )I) YOLR FATHER OWN A BUSINESS CF ANY KINC
.40
.58
.C2
1.00
.43
.10
c.
0.
.05
.05
.14
.24
1.00
0.
.05
0.
.90
.05
21
3C
1
21
9
2
0
0
1
1
3
5
21
0
1
0
19
1
YE S
0
3ONT KNOW
IF YE S, WHAT KIAD OF 8LSINESS IS CR WAS TAT
:ONSTRU:TICN AND REAL ESTATE
FARMING
FOOD AND CATERING,
MANUFA TURI NG
PERSONAL SERVICES
PRINTIN; AND ADVERTISEMENT
RE TAIL
TRANSPORT AND RELATED SERVICES
FOR HOW LON; -AS HE BEEN CR WAS HE IN BUSINESS
LESS THAN 5 YEARS
5-10 YEARS
11-2C YEARS
OVER 20 YEARS
DONT KNOW
018 1.00 1.00 52 DOES OR )ID YOLR MOTiER OWN A BUSINESS CF ANY KINC
.10 .10 5 YES
.90 .90 47 NO
019 .10
.02
.02
.04
3.
3.0
0.
.02
0.
1.00
.20
.20
.40
0.2
0.
C.
.20
0.
Q20 .10 1.00
0. 0.
0. 0.
.02 .20
.08 .80
021 1.00 1.00
.27 .27
.73 .73
Q22 .27 1.00
3. C.
.26 .21
.17 .64
.04 .14
5
2
0
0
c1
4
IF YES, WHAT KIND CF BUSINESS IS OR WAS THAT
:ONSTRUCTICN AND REAL ESTATE
FARMING
FOOD AND CATERING
MANUF A: TURI NG
PERSONAL SERVICES
PRINTIN3 AND ADVERTISEMENT
RE TAIL
TRANSPORT AND RELATED SERVICES
FOR HOW LONG -AS SHE BEEN CR WAS SHE IN BUSINESS
LESS TIAN 5 YEARS
5-10 YEARS
11-2C YEARS
OVER 20 YEARS
52 DID YOU WORK WI TI ANY Of YCUR PARENTS CR RELAT IVES IN BUSINESS
14 YES
38 NO
14 IF YES FOR HOW LONG
0 LE SS THAN 1 YEAR
3 1-5 YEARS
9 5-IC YEARS
2 OVER 10 YEARS
.40
.58
.02
016 .40
.17
.c4
0.
3.
.02
.02
.a6
.10
017 .40
0.
.02
0.
.37
.02
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023 1.30 1.00 52
.04 .04 2
.38 .38 2C
.15 .15 e
.42 .42 22
H106 MANY BROTIERS
NONE
1- 3
4-6
7 OR MORE
AND SISTERS HAVE YOU
wHAT IS YOUR BIRT-4 ORDER
FIRST dORN
LAST BORN
ONLY ClILD
OTHER
NA
MARITAL STATUS
MARRIE)
3I VORCE3
SEPARATED
WI3 0WED
SIN:LE
IF MARRIED FOR HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU BEEN MARRIEC
LESS TAN 5 YEARS
5-10 YEARS
11-2C YEARS
OVER 2C YEARS
NA
028 1.00 1.00 52
.12 .12 6
.52 .52 27
.31 .31 it
.06 .06 3
HO MANY CHILDREN DO YCL HAVE
NONE
1-3 :IL)REN
4-6 AHILDREN
7 OR MORE C-I1LDREN
025 1.00
.27
.19
.34
.48
.02
026 1.00
.67
.19
.06
.06
.02
Q27 .67
.08
.13
.17
.27
.02
1.00
.27
.19
.04
.48
.02
1.00
.67
.19
.06
.06
.i2
1.00
.11
.20
.26
.40
.03
52
14
IC
2
25
1
52
35
10
3
3
1
35
4
7
9
14
1
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6 . 6 3 ifI i 'T1, i1f-4 LrASE WAYMEI4,, HIGH INSTALLMEIT PAYMENTS
. 15 1 1 ) I I , T Y I N IE FTI1'4 FNUJGH LOANS
./4 .2) 17 )l l;IJULTY IN I Tf ', RELIAiLE CMPLLJYEES
. 4 . 4 2 7 . Ur 4 ti T I' lITE o4USIN0S' ARfEA
) I. .L T Y I 1i II 1 IN' 0JJN E. IN, iFki ICES
. . 4 L:',, 4 LI AOL LLIF IS OR (JTI0MERS
.)4 . 4 1144 I A) UATit POLI PR9 '(CTION
.. ? '1 ' s1/ I '4 MEFNIAL OUALITY, PI)V FTY IN C0OMMJFNITY
. 2/ . I :LATI V LV Y1,4 ,LI f I PJI OR SJPPLIFS
. * .: 1 T LI I4 I I AI rf IS NOT (OJAJCIVE ENfUJGH
. . '2 I Au P-'1IL-I'
326
.j62.. .75 1.0 39 S:JN) PRtOBLEM
.12 .15 6 - 1- NSURANCE PREmlUMS
.;6 .U8 3 : LMPE TI TI GA FROM WHITE dJSINESSES
.8 .1) 4 -l1 s R4T, 1-i L' ASE PAYMENTS, HIGH INSTALLNENT PAYME4TS
.-Is .1 ) 4 1 1ri ULTY I N 7 ITT NG FNOJGH LOANS
.17 .23 31 1ULTY IN SFTTING RELIABLE EMPLUYEES
-d8 .12 4 ER.EQUENT THEFT IN IHE AUSINFSS AREA
.16 . 3 3 3(arI:ULTY IN -ETTING CGJNSELING SERV ICES
I- . L-SS (-LIAiLE CLIENTS OR CJSTOMERS
-94 -1 2 INA)EQUJATE PULICI VROTLCTION
.)4 j. 2 P004 E AVE RrCME NT AL JAL I T Y , POV ERT Y IN CJMMJN ITY
.- 24 .5 2 R LA TI V- L Y AI 1- COST CF INPJT S OR JPPL IES3- . 0 POL1 TI AL CLIMATE IS NUT CONDJCIVE ENOJGH
Q62t .5f 1.'1 29 THIA) PR 3L-M
.2 .,3 1 41li ISURANCE PREMIUMS
.J6 .1 I  :UMPz TI TI CS F RUM W'I TE BJS I NESS ES
.)6 .10 3 ill RCNI.), -l-iA Lt ASE PAYMENTS, HIGH" INSTALLME4T PAY4ENTS
.6 . 3 )IF: I:ULTY 1 F TTIN. ENOUGH LUANS
1A .24 1 )1:::ULTY IN E TTIN6 RELIABLE EMPLCYEES
J .-3 1 UEQUFNT THEF T I A THE BUSINESS AREA
Ic 3 )IF I:ULTY IN :E TTIN4G COUNSFLIN- SFRV ICES
-. .10 3 LESS RzLIAHLE CLIETS OR CJSTOMERS
.34 .14 4 INAI)QUATE PULICE PROTECTION
0. . O PO ECVIRCNMI-NTAL WUALITY, POVERTY IN COMMJNITY
0 AELAII V-LY -3 41 CO',T CF INPJTS UR SJPPL IES
. '2 .3 1 PULI T ~.AL CLIMATE IS NOT CONOUCIVE ENCJGH
061 1.' 1. 2 52 JJW MN Y PEPLE WORK FU4 YLU NOM
.52 .52 27 '-p PER'>ONS
.13 .13 7 9-12 PERSCAS
.15 .15 8 13-16 PERSCNS
.10 .1) 5 11-30 PERSCNS
.)8 .v 4 30-53 PERSCNS
.42 .12 1 OVER 53 PERSCNS
'14 1.0 1.10I 52 Alw MSNY W:R- WCRKIN0 FCR YJOJ WHEN YCJ S1ARTED YJJR BUSI1ESS
.1 .17 9 40KU3Y
.1o .5 2; 1-2 PFRSoNS
.13 .13 7 3-4 PERSONS
.36 .:f 3 5-1l P-RSOAS
.24 .j4 2 11-4) PERSCNS
.2 .2 1 1VER 42 PERSONS
.32 . 2 1 )T4t 4:NEMEER
06, 1. 0 1. )0 52 HMi MNY WORKI (, FOR YOL NLW ARE MALES (ANSWER IN PERCE4TAGESI
. . 8 4 10)
.37 .37 19 75-99
.23 .23 12 50- 74
.17 .17 9 49-25
.1J .Ia 5 LESS T AA4 2,
. 6 . j6 3 NO15
6 1.XJ 1.0' 52 -1-1h MSNY AR- 3LACKS (ANWER IN PERCFNr AGES)
.17 .37 1') 10JiLA KS
33-99 iLACIKS
60-19 3LACKS
4)- 59 .LACK5
20-39 ALACKS
LES TIAN 2C 13LACKS
.6 7 1 .0 c , I.;. : 52
.54 .54 2d
.21 .21 11
.17 -17 9
.8 .,8 4
G.68 1.00
-23
.48
137
.12
12
.48
J74 1.00
.37
.12
. 4
.2
.12
.q2
.13
'J f4 .8H8
.12
.27
.34
.15
J7155 1.30
.83
.14
. 8
1. J
.08
.13
.12
.12
.48
1. 2
17
47
.2
.13
.4
1. .j4
.123
4
.22
.17
.83
.J 4
.26
.24
J7%0 1.J1 1. jc
.41 .4j
.2 .2
.21 .21
.13 .Li3
KIJWi ISNY A4- :ULL-TIME AORKERS
IC) FULL-TI ME
75-99 FULL-TIPF
50-74 FULL-TI ME
. 55 TIAN 50 FULL-TIME
1,11W MANY OF YOUR WCRKFR', WCJLD)
S)
100 UNSKILLED
15-99 UNSKILLED
50- 74 UNSKI LLED
25-49 UNSKI LLFE
L: SS TIAN 25 UNSKILLED
NONE11
(ANSWER IN PERCENTAGES)
YOJ CL ASS IFY AS JNSK I.L EC ( A4 SWEA 14 PE iENTA"E
ALiik MA NY OF YOUR WGRKERS PAST AND PRFS ENT HAVE EIEEN TRA INTEO BY YJU A T YOIR OWN
: XPE NSE
LE SS a-AN 1) WORKE W,
10-14 WORKLRS
20-29 WOR KE. S
40- 39 40RKFRS
40-49 WJRKEKS
5 0-- WORKERS
6G AN) uVER
Tp(AI NI N; NCT NECESSARY
UNSPEU'IFIED NLMBER
JN TAl AVERA~, FOR -lUW LONG WAS EACH TRAINED
LES TIAN CNE MUNTH
1-3 MONT-IS
3-6 MONTIS
7-12 MONT-IS
UV:-1 1 YEAR
UNSPE:I=TED PERICD
OF :MPLOYEE S REEIVING Sl33 OR LESi
NUNE
L2SS TIAN 25
25-49
50-74
75-100
)UNT KNJW
'IF -MPL(JYE:S REZEIVING &3)1-45)
LESS TIAN 25
25-49
NC- 74
327
-3 F
.15
) 4.34
-48
.2
.04
. 4
20
8
2
2
328
.23 .4 3 12 It5-13"1
C75C 1.30 1.jo 52 OF EPIPLUYE S REEI VINS 6451-53)
.40 .40 21 NO4
.19 .~19 0c IrS TAAN 2S
-11 .13 7 25-49
.12 .12 6 50-74
.15 .15 8 75-1CO
75 1.0 0 I. 52 iF .MPLUYEE S RECEI vAN3 651-75)
.71 .77 AC NUN:
.13 .13 7 LE SS TIAN 25
.36 .96 3 25-49
.r2 . I C 5- 74
.,2 1 751 C
Q 75F 1.3 1. do 52 11 E MPLUYLE S RF..EIVI A; OVER $75)
.71 . 17 4C NOP4
.. 2 .. 2 I LE 'S TIAN 25
4 . '4 2 25-49
2 1 50- 14
.1 .li 8 75-I0c
.774 1.-JJ I. 52 11W MAY 0: YOUW WLkKER., &ME ENT ilILED TO S LCK PAY
.48 .38 20 ALL
.11 .13 7 SIME
.4R .48 25 AulE
Q77B 1.3' 1.) 52 'IdN MANY OF YOUR WG4KER. ARE ENTIILEO 10 W ACATION PAY
.56 .56 29 ALL
.1? .17 9 SLUM:
./7 .27 14 NU1:
278 1. I . 52 NAME ) .ElI)1-CRO) IN WHICH ENFERPRISE IS LOCATEC
.5. .5? 26 RUX3UR Y
.27 .2 1 14 )UR:IESTER
."8 . )3 4 SOUTUI 2. )
.)4 .4 2 FE WA Y
. JI .. jH 4 )UWNTOWN LSTUN
.,4 .. 4 2 MURE TAN CNE 4uSI'.ESS PREMISE
Q73 1., I.A 52 3J YOU 0 vvN OR RENT T-IIS PL ACE
.52 .52 27 OWN
.48 .43 25 RE-lT
j) I.2% 1. I 52 WHA T IS T-I TOTAL FLUCR SPACE
.21 .21 11 LESS TAN ICCC SC IT
.23 .23 12 1,2-1,499
.:8 .08 4 I,500-I,45
.s .8b 4 2,300-2,499
4 2 2,500-2,99S
.12 .12 6 3,000-5,tCC
.2S ./ 12 SVE R 5,91CC
L A
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Q81 1.00 1.) 52 HAVE YOU ALWAYS BEEN IN THIS BUILDING
.44 .44 23 YES
.56 .56 29 40
Q82 .56 1.u0 29 IF N0o Wi-RE YOL FORMERLY LOCATED
.38 .69 20 WI TiN TilS NEI3HBORHCOD
.15 .28 8 jUTSI)E THIS NEIGHBORHOOD 8Jr IN ANOTHER BLACK I61GH"H030
.02 .03 1 IN A NUN-BLACK NElaHBORHOOD
063 .56 1.00 29 WHY )I) YOU MOVE
.17 .i1 9 )ISPLA::3 NY AN URBAN RENEWAL PROGRAM
.17 .31 9 NEEJED MORE SPACE
.j4 .3T 2 )ESTRU-rTICN OF FCRMER PREMISE BY RIOTS OR FIRE
.22 .,3 1 TIlS 3UI LOI NG WAS CFFERED TO ME AT A CHEAP PRICE
.32 .(3 1 WANTEJ TO BE CLOSE TO MY CUSTOMERS
.C2 ."3 1 zORiE) TO POVE BECAJSE OF BJGLARY
.06 .10 3 :0REz) TO MOVE BY NEW OWNER
.24 .u7 2 WA4IE) TO POSSESS MY CWN BUILDING
.2 .-3 1 WANTE3 A LCEATION mITH A GOOD ACDRESS
Q86A 1.00 1.00 52 F IRST RE ASON ;lR ZIlCOSI NG THIS LOCAT ION
.35 .35 1B :ONVENIENT TO MY CLSTCMERS OR CLIENTS
.11 .10 5 4EASIJNA3LE RENT, PRICE 04 PJRCHASE TERMS
.16 .C6 3 ACESSIBILITY TO PRESENT AND POTENTIAL WCRKERS
.15 .15 8 1 LIKE TIE NEISIBORHCCD
.12 .12 6 OOM ;OR FLTURE EXPANSION, LITTLE CCMPET IT ION
.13 .1) 5 3USINESS OR FAMILY OWN THIS BJILDING
0. C. 0 :LOSE ENOUGI TO MY SOURCES OF SJPPLIES
.;t .- 6 3 -LOSE ENOUGA TO CTHER BUSINESSES I DEAL WITH
.04 .j4 2 ^LOSE ENOUGI TO PUiLIC TRANSPORTATION
.i2 .42 1 ONLY PLA:E AVAILABLE
.22 .02 1 )ESIRE TO DEMONTRATE THAT BLACK BJSINESSES COULD SE F0aTLO3SE
0868B .5 1.k0 44 S=ZJN) R:ASON FCR CHUCSING THIS LOCAFION
.14 .23 10 :ONVENIENr TO MY CLSTCMERS OR CLIENTS
.1d .09 4 AEASONABLE RFNT, PRICE OR PURCHASE TERMS
. .07 3 %E SSId1LI TY T0 PRESENT AND POTENT IAL WORKEftS
.1? .14 6 I LIKE TIE NEl;-4BORHCCD
.12 .14 6 4OM FOR FUTURE EXPANSION, LITTLE COMPETITION
U. 0 3USINESS OR FAMI LY OWN THIS BUILDING
.)4 .i5 2 LOSE E40LUI TO MY SOURCES OF SJPPLIES
.04 .. , 2 :LOSE ENOWl. TO OTHER BJSINESSES I HAVE TO DEAL WITH
.14 .23 13 LOSE ENOUG- TO PUMLIC TRANSPORTATION
.42 .. 2 1 ONLY PLA:E AVAILABLE
0. C. 0 )ESIRE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT BLACK BJSINESSES COULD BE F03TL3SE
C88C .62 1.33 32 THI A REASON FOR CHCOSI NG THIS LOCATION
.0 .)4 3 10NVENIENT T) MY CJSTCMERS OR CLIENTS
.j2 .3 I REASONABLE RFNT, PRICE, OR PJRCHASE TERMS
.36 .. 9 3 4::ESSI31LI TY TO PRESENT AND POTENTIAL WORKERS
.'J .13 4 I LIKE TIE NEI;-8MRHCCO
.Op .13 4 ROOM FOR FLTURE EXPANSION, LITTLE COMPETITION
.)6 .09 3 iUSINESS OR FAMILY OWNS THIS BJILDING
.J4 . je6 2 .LOSE ENOULI TO MY SCURCES OF SJPPLIES
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C98 .62 1.'.C 32 1S YOUR MEMBER94iP AELPING YCU IN YCJR BUS INESS
.31 .5 16 YE S
.31 .50 16 NO
Q99) .31 1.co 16 IF YFS, IN WHAT WAY
.17 .56 9 E XPOSLRE TC THE PLHLIC
.36 .19 3 U:.ASIONALLY I P4CURE WCRK THROUGH CR DIRECTLY FROM MEMBERS
. 6 .19 3 MLTUAL ASSISTANCE (F VARIOUS KINDS
.j2 .--6 1 OLTLET TO PLAY LEAOERSHIP ROLES
Q103 1.CC 1.30 52 HOW MUCA OF YOLR CWN PCNEY DID YOU START YCUR PUSINESS WITI
.29 .29 15 LESS TIAN $500
.15 .15 8 S500-1.COC
.C .1- 5 $1.CCl-2,CCO
.1C .10 5 $2,CCI-3,CCO
.34 . 4 2 $3,L01-4.CC0
.08 .u8 4 $4,CCI-5,CCO
.J4 .,.4 2 *5,oI-10,C0C
.08 .8 Af siC01-25,CCC
.08 .28 4 OVER 625,CCC
.J4 .v4 2 8 SI NE SS I NHERI TED CR FAMILY CWNEC
.02 .02 1 NA
C102 1.00 1.00 52 WHAT IS THE CURRENT VALLE CF YCUR PHYSICAL ASSETS (IN OTHER WORDS YOUR BLSINES
S PREMI SE IF YOU CWN I T,MACHINERY ANC E IU IFPENT ANC INVENTORY)
-IC .1C 5 LESS TIAN $25,CCC
.17 .17 9 $25,CCO-4,999
.13 .13 7 $50,CCO-74,599
.J4 .,4 2 $75,CCC-9,999
.12 .12 t $ICC,CC0-I24,999
.i
6  
.-6 3 5125,CC0-149,999
.15 .15 8 S150,COO-259,999
.Ic .IC 5 $300,CC0-5CC,CCC
.36 .C6 3 OVER 65CO.CCC
.08 .L8 4 CANNOT E SI MATE
C103 1.C: 1.:0 52 HOW MUCH LOAN DID YCU RrCEIVE TO FINANCE TI-ESE ASSETS
.38 . 8 LESS THAN 65,CCc
.06 . 6 3 s5,CCC9,599
.12 .12 6 $50,CC0-19,999
.13 .13 7 $2C,000-29,999
.12 .12 6 S30,0C0-39,S99
.C2 .32 1 S40,CCO-45S,99
.'J8 .-8 4 650,0C-74,999
.04 .A4 2 $75,CCC-99,999
.12 .-2 1 $10C,CC0-250,003
.08 .C8 4 OVER S250.COO
.36 .)6 3 WOULD NOT TELL OR CAAACT ESTIPATE
.21 .21 11 NO LCAN
0104 .73 1.L0 38 WHERE DID YOU GE T THI S LCAN FRCM
.29 .39 15 )IREC TLY FRCM A BANK
.27 .37 14 FROM A BANK BLT 58-GLARANTEEC
."4 ..5 2 A FINANCE AGENCY, INCL CREDIT JNICNS
.le .11 4 OTHER SOURCES
333
.02 .3 1 30T-1 ANK AND FINACE AGENCY
.24 .s5 2 BUT BANK AND SBA-LARANTEEC
36
4
9
C
8
11
2
I.C 38
.42 1e
.58 22
1.,.i 38
."b 3
.53 2C
.18 7
.16 t:
. 5 2
IF YUU RECEIVED THE LCAN(SI FRCM A BANK CR A FINANCE AGENCY, HOW LONG DID IT TAKE YCL
WITIIN A DAY
WITHIN A WEEK
1-2 WEEKS
2-4 WEEKS
5-8 WEEKS
9-12 WEEKS
OVER 3 MONTIS
UNSPECIFIED TIME
WHAT CULLATERAL SECURITY CID YOU USE
NONE
dUILDINGMAC4INERY, ECUIPPENT, INVENTCRY, INSURANCE POLICY
PERIO) FOR T-4E REPAYMENI
2 YEARS CR LE SS
3-5 YEARS
6-1C YEARS
OVER IC YEARS
NA
CF THE LCAN(S)
Ci12 1.01 1.u0 52 HOW FAR 20 YOU PLAN IhTL THE FUTURE IN YCUR aBJSINESS
..8 .J8 4 3 MONT-45 CR LESS
.17 .17 9 6 MONTIS CR LESS
.13 .13 7 12 MONTHS CR LESS
.12 .12 f 2 YEARS OR LESS
.21 .21 11 MORE T4AN 2 YEARS
.27 .21 14 PLANNING IS NCT NECESSARY OR IS CIFFICULT
.02 .22 1 VARYIN, PERIODS
C113 1.:c 1.00 52 HAVE YOU EXPANDED YCR HLSINFSS WITHIN TOE LAST FIVE OR SIX YEARS
.79 ./9 41 YE S
.19 .19 IC NO
.22 .. 2 1 UPS AN) OCWNS
Ci14 1.Cc i.Cj 52 WHAT SIGNIFICANI CHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN YCUR PUSINFSS SINCE YOU STARTED
.21 .2 1 11
.17 .17 9
.13 .13 7
.J4 .4 2
.06 .L6 3
.08 .%;8 4
.12 .12 6
.IC .IG 5
C. C
.52 .:2 1
EXPANSION CF VCLLMF CF BUSINFSS
AD'I TIONAL OR NEW FACHINERYEQUIPPENT, INVENTCRY
AM03 TIONAL OR NEW FMACHINERY. ECJIPMENT, INVENTORY IN ACCITION TO RENOVATION OF
PREMI SE CR PLRCHASE CF A NEW BUILCIkG
RENOVATION OF PREMISFPURCHASE CF A NEW 8UILCING
3ECLINE OF BUSINESc
NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES
EXPANSION CF VCLLME CF BUSINESS, PLJS ACCIT ICNAL OR NEW MACHINERY , EQUIPPENT,
INVENTORY
EXPANSION CF VCLLME CF BUSINESS, PLJS ACDITICNAL OR NEW MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT,
INVENTORY, PLLS RENCVATICA CF PREPISE CR PURCIASE OF A NEW BUILDING
EXPANSION CF VCLLMf CF BUSINESS PLJS RFNCVATICA OF PREMISE OR PURCI-ASE OF A BU
ILDING
HIRING OF PORE LABLR
I .C0O
.11
.24
C.
.3
.21
.29
. '5
.105 .73
.17
.0(
.22
-15
.21
.,)4
C108 .73
.31
.42
C109 .73
.38
. 13
.12
.)4
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.36 .)6 3 HIRIN. OF PORE LABCR AND EXPAhS ICK CF VCLUME CF BUSINESS
.32 .-2 1 MISCELLANECLS C-ANGFS
G15 I.CC 1.00 52 HAVE YOU INSURED YLUR BLSINESS AGAINST FIRE ANC THEFT
.38 .38 2C FIRE ONLY
C. C THEF T ONLY
.54 .54 28 BOT-I FIRE AND TIEF T
.32 .L2 1 INFORMATICA NCT AVAILABLE
.o6 .C6 3 NONE
Q126 1.00 1.Co 52 HOW MLCA DID YCLR GROSS SALES OR YOJR TCTAL VOLUME OF eUSINESS AMJUNT TO LAST
YEAR
C. C 11C,CCC OR LESS
- C. C 61CCCI-25.CCC
.10 .1) 5 $25,CCl-5C,0C0
.27 .27 14 650,CCI-ICCv00
.33 .33 17 S100,001-250,CCC
.12 .12 6 $25CCC1-5C0,C00
.12 .12 6 OVER 55CO,CCC
.38 .C8 4 WOULD NOT TELL
(.127 1.CO 1.30 52 WHA T PROBLEMS DC YCU FACE NCk THAT YCU CIC NCT EXPECT
.12 .12 6 FINANCIAL PRCBLEFS
..-2 .- 2 1 RELA TIONS WI TH PLBLIC AGFNCIES ANC PUFL IC CFFICIALS
.19 .19 IC ENVIRONMENTAL PRCBLEMS,E G URBAN RENEWAL, FROPLEMS WIT- LANDLORDS ,RIOTS
.02 .C2 1 MANAGERIAL PRCHLEM5
.25 .25 13 LABOR PROBLEMS
..86 ..8 4 MARKE T LIMI TATIONS ANC RECENT ECCNCMIC RECESSICN
.32 .02 1 E TTING INIC LNI INS
.D4 .4 2 RELIABI LI TV OF CLSICMERS
.)4 .04 2 PI TFALLS IN PLANNING
.j2 . 2 1 INVOLVEMENT IN CCPPLNITY ACTIVITIES
.32 ..2 1 7OT-1 FINANCIAL AND LABCR PRCBLEPS
.19 .19 IC NONE
C12) 1.QO 1.G. 52 SLPPOSE YOU WERE APPRCACHED BY A FRIEND CR RELAT IVE TO ACVISE HIM OR I-ER ON HO
W TO START AND RLN YCLR TYPE CF BUS INESS WIAT WOULC YOU ACVISE
.25 .25 13 RELIANCE CN PERSCNAL EFFCRT, PERSCNAL EXPER IENCE ANC OTIER PERSONAL QUALI TIES
.19 .19 IC MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL KNOW-HCW
.1 .10 5 ADEQUATE FINANCIAL SCLRCES
.32 .- 2 1 ABILI TY TC MAINTAI N RELIABLE WCRKERS
.02 .C2 1 TYPE OF ObNERSHI P
.)2 .;2 I HUMAN RELA1ICNS- LABCR, CUSTOPERS
.J2 .*2 1 WOULD ADVISE AGAINST ENTERING THIS KINC CF BUSINESS
.19 .19 IC PLANNIN AND PARKE T SILDY
.i6 .36 3 PERSONAL EFFORT, PFRSCNAL EXPERIENCE, PLUS MANAGERIAL ANC TECIM ICAL KNOW-HOW
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APPENDIX D
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION
A Survey of Black-Owned Businesses
To Whom It May Concern:
Mr. Robert K. B. Bofah, a citizen of Ghana, is a graduate stu-
dent of the Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Cambridge. He is conducting a survey of a
selected number of black-owned enterprises in Boston for the pur-
pose of writing his doctoral dissertation.
Mr. Bofah is employed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs,
Government of Ghana. His survey of black-owned businesses in Ameri-
ca will enable him to study the problems which small businesses
face within capitalistic economic institutions, and the efforts that
the Federal Government is making to put minority small businesses on
their feet.
It is to be understood that any information supplied by you
will be kept strictly confidential. No mention will be made in the
dissertation of any business by name or address. Rather, figures
will be lumped together for all the firms interviewed.
I should be grateful indeed if you could give all the help and
co-operation he needs in order to make his study a real success.
Sincerely,
John T. Howard
Head of Department
June 8, 1970
MAJOR FEDERAL
APPENDIX E
PROGRAMS ASSISTING MINORITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP
TYPE OF PROGRAM
1. Loans
(a) Economic Opportunity
Loans
(b) Operation Business
Mainstream
(c) Regular SBA Business
Loan Program
SPONSORING AGENCY
Small Business Admini-
stration
Small Business Admini-
stration
Small Business Admini-
stration
For a full description of these and other
programs, see Dept. of Commerce, Federal
Assistance Programs for Minority Business
Enterprise, Washington, D.C: U.S.G.P.O.,
1969.
PURPOSE OF PROGRAM
To provide business loans and management assis-
tance to low income and other disadvantaged per-
sons. Long-term loans up to $25,000 with a
maximum maturity of 15 years. Loans can be direct,
or are made by banks but guaranteed by SBA.
Designed to put economically or socially disad-
vantaged persons in business through a loan and
technical assistance program. Similar to (a)
above except that loans are made up to $15,000.
To provide financial assistance to existing or
new small businesses in general. SBA may guar-
antee up to 90% of bank loans or $350,000 which-
ever is less. Where SBA-guaranteed loan is not
available, SBA may then consider advancing funds
on an immediate participation basis with a bank.
Regular loans are guaranteed for as long as 10
years.
TYPE OF PROGRAM
(d) Displaced Business
Loans
(e) Lease Guarantee
(f) Rehabilitation
Loans
(g) Other Housing
Programs
(h) Minority Enterprise
Small Business In-
vestment Companies
(MESBIC's)
SPONSORING AGENCY
Small Business Admini-
stration
Small Business Admini-
stration
Dept.
Urban
Dept.
Urban
Small
strat
of Housing and
Development
of Housing and
Development
Business Admini-
ion
PURPOSE OF PROGRAM
To cushion the impact of economic injury
to renewal programs. Long-term loans up
30 years can be made direct by SBA or in
ticipation with lending institutions.
due
to
par-
Assists small businesses in obtaining space in
commercial or industrial locations, usually
beyond their reach for credit reasons. Assis-
tance in the form of rental or lease guarantee.
Enables contractors to participate in rehabi-
litation of dwelling units in urban renewal or
code enforcement areas.
In various ways, minority contractors do parti-
cipate in ghetto-based housing projects usually
as sub-contractors.
Designed to create sources of venture capital
for minority entrepreneurs. MESBIC's provide
both equity or long-term capital loans. A mini-
mum capital of $150,000 is initially required of
each company before SBA matching funds are re-
leased.
co
L
A
TYPE OF PROGRAM
2. Financial Assistance
(a) Relocation Pay-
ments to Displaced
Businesses
SPONSORING AGENCY
Dept. of Housing and
Urban Development
PURPOSE OF PROGRAM
To reduce the impact of d
by urban renewal programs
may receive up to $3,000;
nesses may receive up to
isplacement caused
Business concerns
certain small busi-
$2,500.
3. Contract Procurement
(a) 8a Program
(b) Construction Con-
tracting Services
Small Business Admini-
stration
General Services Ad-
ministration
(c) Contracting for General Services Ad-
Supplies and Services ministration
To enable small businesses owned and operated
by economically disadvantaged persons to obtain
government contracts. Prime contracts are a-
warded to SBA by government procurement agen-
cies, and SBA in turn subcontracts to selected
small businesses.
To inform minority contractors and entrepre-
neurs of a list of repairs and improvement
contracts within their sphere of competence.
This program is an integral part of 3 (a) above.
To enable small businesses operating in labor
surplus areas and those with special problems to
participate in contracting for government sup-
lies and services.
SPONSORING AGENCY
(d) Contracting with
Labor Surplus Area
Concerns
(e) Subcontracting
Program
4. Management Training
and Counseling
(a) Procurement and
Management Assistance
(b) Technical Assistance
(c) Business Service
Centers
Department of
Defense
Department of
Defense
Small Business Admini-
stration
Economic Development
Administration
General Services
Administration
To enable firms located in labor surplus areas
to contract with the Department to supply var-
ious defense and other items.
This is part of 3(a) above.
To provide management, technical and counsel-
ing assistance; government procurement and sales
assistance to small businesses and community
groups.
To encourage consulting firms to provide such
technical services as project planning, feasi-
bility studies, management, accounting, market-
ing, etc. to minority enterprises.
To identify small and minority business con-
cerns and furnish them with information, assis-
tance and counseling so they can participate in
government procurement and disposal programs.
TYPE OF PROGRAM PURPOSE OF PROGRAM
SPONSORING AGENCY
5. Manpower Training
(a) Job Opportunities in
the Business Sector
(b) On-the-Job Training
(c) Institutional
Training
(d) Legal Services
Department of Labor
Department of Labor
Department of Health,
Education and Welfare
Office of Economic
Opportunity
To enable businesses to provide on-the-job
training to the hard-core unemployed; it also
provides for remedial education, counseling,
transportation and other incidental costs. Re-
putable minority firms can participate.
To provide occupational training for the unem-
ployed and underemployed. Minority entrepre-
neurs can obtain training for their employees
through this program.
To provide unemployed and underemployed persons
with basic education and skills within an insti-
tutional setting. Minority entrepreneurs can
enroll in a management training program or may
encourage their employees to enroll in speci-
fic courses necessary for their jobs.
To assist minority businessmen in various legal
matters related to the starting and operation
of their businesses.
'-'
TYPE OF PROGRAM PURPOSE OF PROGRAM
TYPE OF PROGRAM
6. Community Projects
(a) Special Impact
Program
(b) Business Develop-
ment Program
SPONSORING AGENCY
Office of Economic
Opportunity
Economic Develop-
ment Administration
PURPOSE OF PROGRAM
An experimental program to promote community-
based development corporations in urban po-
verty areas suffering from acute unemploy-
ment. Recommended projects include invest-
ments that create job, managerial and entre-
preneurial skills development, guaranteeing
of loans and technical assistance.
To assist areas of persistent unemployment in
diverse investment projects capable of crea-
ting new and permanent jobs. Long-term loans
for land and capital equipment are made up to
65% of the project cost. EDA also guarantees
working capital not exceeding 90% of the un-
paid balance.
N3
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